我国企业内部控制信息披露存在的问题及对策分析

内部控制信息披露,可以提高企业财务报告的可靠性,为投资者提供财务报告所不能提供的信息,有助于提高管理当局内部控制的管理水平。目前我国企业内部控制信息披露存在的问题,法律、规范的不完善,企业领导者的认识不到位,与商业秘密的保护存在冲突。文章对此进行了分析,并在此基础上提出了相应的对策。     

非政府投资建设项目参与人行为的博弈分析

在非政府投资建设项目中,涉及四方参与人——业主、承包商、监理方和政府,他们的行为必然对工程质量产生影响。本文以寻租理论和委托代理理论为基础,建立了四方博弈模型,并求解了博弈过程的混合策略纳什均衡。通过对博弈结果的分析,提出在项目质量管理过程中应当建立的制度安排。     

基于信息融合证据理论的往复机械故障诊断方法

以Dempster-Shafer证据理论为基础,确定出一种基于多故障特征信息融合的诊断方法,并以往复机械故障诊断为例详细介绍该诊断方法的实施过程。诊断结果表明,经过多故障特征信息的融合,诊断结论的可信度明显提高,不确定性明显减小,该技术能较好地解决往复机械故障诊断的技术问题。     

Indifference,indecision, and coin-flipping

This article operationalizes a non-empty relation as implied if strict preference and indifference jointly do not completely order the choice set. Specifically, indecision is operationalized as a positive preference for delegating choice to a least predictable device.     

基于web services构建电子政务信息资源目录服务模型

为更好地实现分布式环境下的异构政务信息资源间透明性交互与共享,提出了一种基于政务信息资源目录服务的信息资源整合方案。针对目前政务资源整合现状,基于Web服务思想以及政务资源目录组织结构构,建政务资源目录服务模型,并结合信息资源注册及发现过程,对模型各部分组成、功能和构建方法进行了详述,最后对模型特点加以概括。     

闽台信息产业的转移与承接问题分析

闽台两地隔海相望,产业间交流的日趋频繁为两地经济提供了良好的发展平台。信息产业作为台湾的领先产业和福建省的主导产业近年来已经形成了闽台间转移与承接的合作模式。福建省通过承接台湾信息产业转移获得了极大的发展机遇,然而也正是在承接台湾信息产业的过程中凸显出了福建信息产业发展的不足。闽台信息产业实现深度对接应通过营造良好投资环境、加强集群区域的产学研合作机制、鼓励大型自主投资项目和完善物流配送体系等,以提升闽台信息产业的转移与承接质量,促进两地经济和谐发展。     

基于演化博弈的监测—约束—激励系统生态补偿机制研究——以旅游胜地漓江流域为例

"两山"理论要求重构"经济—环境"生态,因地制宜设计生态补偿机制。以漓江流域作为研究对象,利用演化博弈理论分析不同情境下漓江流域各主体策略的演化趋势,再使用SD进一步模拟仿真,结论如下:(1)上下游地方政府实施策略概率的初始值会影响最终的稳定状态;(2)仅依靠上下游政府的相互自发监督,不能有效实施利于生态补偿的合作机制;(3)上下游都不履行义务时的惩罚应比只有一方不履行义务时的惩罚更大,上下游履行义务时的奖励应比不实现合作时的惩罚更大;(4)当中立机构监管流域水质状态时,上游提供给下游的补贴应该比下游给上游的生态补偿更少。据此提出漓江流域生态补偿机制政策建议。     

Prudent expectations equilibrium in economies with uncertain delivery

In an economy with private information, we introduce the notion of objects of choice as lists of bundles out of which the market selects one for delivery. This leads to an extension of the model of Arrow–Debreu that is used to study trade ex ante with private state verification. Under the assumption that agents are prudent, equilibrium is characterized by the fact that agents consume bundles with the same utility in states that they do not distinguish. This is a weaker condition than the restriction of equal consumption imposed by Radner (Econometrica 36(1), 31–58, 1968), therefore, some no trade situations are avoided and the efficiency of trade increases.     

Imperfect Information and Opportunism

Information is a scarce resource. It is inherently available only in a limited form to decision-makers. Limited or imperfect information is caused by uncertainty — both ontologic and epistemic, limitations in cognitive capabilities or bounded rationality, hidden information, and information asymmetries. This has fundamental implications for the manner in which the self-interested behavior of agents will manifest itself. The article argues that in the context of imperfect information, self-interest can function in a manner quite different from what standard approaches assume. This has been demonstrated by the recent financial crisis. However, there has been limited consideration in mainstream models, both of the neoclassical and institutional type, as to what the exact nature of self-interestedness is, and how this affects the market behavior of agents. The nature of self-interest, therefore, needs to be modeled explicitly to improve the explanatory power of economic theories.