略论产业集群技术标准与集聚的正负效应之相关性

产业集群是现代产业发展过程中形成的一种具有典型特征的，介于企业和行业之间的产业组织形态。产业集聚的巨大正效应是产业集群形成和发展的重要原因。同时，产业集聚也会产生负效应，这些负效应可能导致产业集群发展缓慢，甚至衰退和消亡。找到正确有效的途径强化产业集聚的正效应，预防和消除产业集聚的负效应，是保持产业集群健康、持续发展的关键。技术标准对产业和企业的命运起着越来越重要的作用，技术标准与产业集群发展、运行秩序规范、负效应的防范与消除等方面都有着紧密的相关性，是促进产业集群发展的有效工具和手段。     

Unemployment insurance: The role of electoral systems and regional labour markets

Levels of insurance against unemployment vary considerably across countries. Replacement rates, the ratio relating income from unemployment to what people earned when they were employed, are higher in countries with proportional electoral systems than in countries with majoritarian systems. Also, replacement rates are positively correlated with per capita income and negatively correlated with the countries' unemployment rates. I develop an electoral competition model that replicates these stylized facts.     

Taxation of Mobile Factors as Insurance under Uncertainty

This paper considers the effects of the taxation of mobile factors, i.e., capital, under uncertainty. The wages earned by residents of a jurisdiction are uncertain due to random shocks. Since the uncertain wages in a jurisdiction depend on the amount of mobile capital employed in the jurisdiction, and since taxation alters the quantity of capital employed, taxation affects the riskiness of uncertain wages. In particular, the taxation of capital moderates the fluctuation of uncertain wages, thereby providing insurance. For this reason, jurisdictions use distortionary capital taxation even if lump‐sum taxation is available. In addition, this insurance effect counteracts the tendency toward too low tax rates on capital arising from tax competition, and possibly improves the efficiency of tax competition.     

银行竞争、专用性人力资本投资激励与国有商业银行的公司治理

本文结合中国银行业竞争日趋激烈的现实背景,从商业银行专用性人力资本投资激励的独特视角入手,分别讨论了银行高层管理者和普通员工的专用性人力资本投资激励与他们参与银行公司治理机制的有关问题.研究发现,在国有商业银行公司治理结构改善过程中,更需要增加专用性人力资本投资的有效激励,并通过积极引入境外战略投资者和加强职工代表在银行监事会中影响力的办法,进一步激励银行员工进行能够提高银行经营绩效的专用性人力资本投资.     

Growth,Employment and Taxation with Distortions in the Goods and Labour Market

Abstract. This paper analyses taxation in the presence of distortions in goods and labour markets in an endogenous growth model. The government disposes of capital, labour and consumption taxes. It is shown that the market solution leads to suboptimally low levels of growth and employment. However, available tax instruments are sufficient to attain the first‐best growth path in this economy. The paper further explores the relative distortion of capital and labour taxes. For plausible parametrisations of the model, lowering capital taxes dominate reductions in labour taxes in welfare terms.     

云南旅游品牌发展与对策分析

随着国际国内旅游市场竞争的日益激烈,我们应该意识到,旅游市场之争实质上是品牌之争。云南旅游业应该在充分认识自身旅游品牌发展存在的问题基础上,找出问题,寻求改进的措施,从简单的资源要素竞争转化为品牌经营竞争战略,不断地进行品牌建设和品牌创新,实现从旅游品牌到旅游名牌的飞跃。     

Full-cost pricing in the classical competitive process: A model of convergence to long-run equilibrium

In the last 10–15 years a lot of attempts has been devoted to study the calssical process of convergence of market prices toward natural prices. The two forces that one has thought could achieve this target were capital mobility, that determines the dynamics of output, and demand-supply forces, that determine the dynamics of prices. In this article a model of classical competition is proposed in which a full-cost pricing mechanism is adopted in the rule of evolution of market prices. An asymptotical stability result of long-run equilibrium is proved for a two-commodity model with and without a final demand.     

企业网络组织协同竞争的理论与效应解析

竞争与合作相统一的协同竞争已成为企业网络竞争战略发展的必然趋势。通过对企业网络组织协同竞争研究脉络的梳理，可构建协同竞争研究的评析架构。其理论演进是：以系统思维作为理论逻辑的基点，以合作竞争为行动策略，以价值创造作为网络协同竞争的本质属性；在实践效应上，协同竞争具有提升竞争优势的特征，而博弈模型对协同效应发挥着解析工具的作用。     

物流管理--零售企业致胜之道

物流管理是企业管理的一个重要分支，对于零售企业来说，系统的物流管理尤为重要。物流管理是零售企业建立成本优势的有效手段，是提高顾客满意度的有力武器，也是赢得市场竞争优势的重要支撑。因此，零售企业要改变传统的物流管理观念，设计适用的物流管理系统，运用先进的物流管理技术，提高物流竞争力。     

The knowledge management strategy and the formation of innovative networks in emerging industries

This paper presents an agent-based simulation model with local network externality to analyze strategic interactions over investment on new economic knowledge. R&D knowledge flows and spillovers are the results of non-cooperative games played between neighboring agents in the model. The model demonstrates a situation where no agents have incentives to hide their economic knowledge, a situation that is observed in open source software development projects. The likelihood of obtaining a stable situation where new economic knowledge is openly shared is increased when heterogeneity of agents is introduced.