双寡头市场价格博弈分析——以我国国内成品油市场竞争主体为例

用博弈论分析市场行为是经济学的发展方向之一,本文从实证分析国内成品油市场中国石化与中国石油两大寡头的多种博弈情形及其收益变化过程,论证了在市场需求总量基本恒定状态下,双寡头市场价格博弈的纳什均衡解为(降价、降价),(不降价、不降价),前一种均衡解是双方在势均力敌、信息反馈充分的恶性竞争结果,后一种是在满足一定收益前提下的“双赢”策略。企业只有选择有别于竞争对手的非价格歧异性策略,形成自己的特色和优势,才能占领相应的市场,获得相应的经济效益。     

论环境经济的市场机理

本文以现代产权经济理论为基础,以排污权交易为主要对象,论述了环境经济市场机理的形成基础、作用特点及交易边界等方面的问题。     

不同战略导向对自主创新与合作创新的影响研究

在动态竞争的环境下,如何选择适合自身发展的创新方式已成为企业技术创新中面临的难题.文章在借鉴前人研究的基础上,把企业家导向、市场导向、自主创新及合作创新整合在同一理论模型中,针对相关因素之间的关系,提出4种命题,从而为企业提高自主创新效率提供了有效路径.     

Estimating Krugman’s Economic Geography Model for the Spanish Regions

This paper estimates Krugman’s (J Polit Econ 99:413–499, 1991) economic geography model using data from the Spanish NUTS 3 regions. The econometric formalization endogenously determines wages in a region as a function of income and wages in other regions. The specification adopted also allows us to study the relation between the agglomeration of economic activity, increasing returns and market access. The first result obtained is that the Spanish economy exhibits a spatial wage structure: wages in a region are positively determined by income and wages in neighboring regions. In second place it is found support for the structural relations of the underlying theoretical model, indicating the importance of scale economies and transport costs in shaping the Spanish economic geography.     

Learning by doing,spillovers and shakeouts

This paper studies industry evolution driven by non strategic learning by doing and spillovers. We characterize a dynamic process of cost and output changes and its effect on welfare and industry profits. The paper gives conditions for shakeouts to occur and analyzes the key factors affecting these conditions. Since shakeouts could lead to a long-run social loss due to higher market concentration, there is a role for a government to play in limiting unnecessary shakeouts. The most effective way to do so is to enhance spillovers.JEL Classification: L11, L13, O31Correspondence to: Michael TroegeWe would like to thank Hans Mewis, Christophe Moussu and an anonymous referee for valuable comments and suggestions. We also benefited from comments of seminar participants at WZB, Humboldt University, Northwestern University and the EEA/ESEM 1999 meetings. Part of the research was carried out while Michael Tröge was visiting Northwestern University. Financial support by the German Research Council (DFG) is gratefully acknowledged.     

生态经济理论与经济体制改革

经济体制改革的理论基础不仅仅是社会主义市场经济理论,生态经济理论也是其中之一,这是由生态经济理论原则及特点所决定了的。同时,改革的目标是建立社会主义市场经济体制,在新体制的建立过程中,也必须注意实现生态经济协调的几个问题。     

Government as a discriminating monopolist in the financial market: the case of China

We show that the many unusual features of China’s financial markets are consistent with a government choosing regulations to maximize a standard type of social welfare function. Under certain conditions, these regulations are equivalent to imposing explicit taxes on business and interest income, yet should be much easier to enforce. The observed implicit tax rates are broadly in line with those observed in other countries. The theory also forecasts, however, that China will face increasing incentives over time to shift to explicit taxes.     

上市公司会计信息生产模式改革的经济学思考

本文基于经济学的角度,从契约理论所决定的会计本质、会计信息市场失灵和会计管制等方面,探讨了改革上市公司现行会计信息生产模式的必要性,并且提出会计信息生产社会化是解决各种会计难题的根本途径。     

会计信息质量与市场定价分析

本文以应计质量、盈余持续性、盈余可预测性、盈余平滑度作为会计信息质量的代理变量,通过研究会计信息不同纬度的质量与权益资本成本之间的关系,为投资者的市场定价及对信息质量的关注程度提供证据。研究结果表明,除盈余的持续性不显著外,其他各项质量与权益资本成本之间均呈负相关关系;在对权益资本成本的影响程度方面,无论是单独影响还是条件影响,应计质量影响程度最大,其次是可预测性。     

Incomplete regulation, market competition and collusion

Regulators often do not regulate all firms competing in a given sector. Due to product substitutability, unregulated competitors have incentives to bribe regulated firms to have them overstate their costs and produce less, thereby softening competition. The best collusion-proof contract entails distortions both for inefficient and efficient regulated firms (distortion ‘at the top’). But a contract inducing active collusion may do better by allowing the regulator to ‘team up’ with the regulated firm to indirectly tax its competitor. The best such contract is characterized. It is such that the unregulated firm pays the regulated one to have it truthfully reveals its inefficiency. We finally compare those contracts.