休闲位置消费的经济分析及对策研究

争名与逐利一样都是人的经济本性,因而位置消费现象在休闲消费领域也同样存在。运用经济学的相关理论对休闲消费中的位置消费行为进行分析发现:该行为既无法使休闲消费资源达到帕累托最优状态,也不能使人们从休闲消费中获得最大效用,且个人休闲位置消费的理性选择还会导致集体消费的非理性结果。因此,政府应加强引导,采取有效措施降低位置消费的负面影响,促进休闲经济健康发展。     

城镇社区安全管理模式的经济学分析

城镇社区安全是社会安全与稳定的基础。本文基于纳什均衡和帕累托理论，对城镇社区安全管理模式进行了经济学分析。结果显示，为实现社区安全管理资源的帕累托最优，需要改进现有的安全管理制度，通过契约协作的方式，协调社区联盟中每户居民的安全支出，以避免“搭便车”现象的发生。基于上述经济学理论分析，最后提出了有关实现社区安全管理制度创新的模式及相应对策措施。     

Policy Discrimination with and without Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility

Can the Pareto criterion guide policymakers who do not know the true model of the economy? If policymakers specify ex ante preferences for agents, then Pareto improvements from a distorted status quo are usually possible, and with more commodities than states, one can implement almost every Pareto optimum. Unlike the standard second welfare theorem, planners cannot dictate allocations: agents must trade. Unfortunately ex ante preferences impose interpersonal comparisons. If policymakers merely aim to maximize some social welfare function then optimal policies form an open set; hence small changes in the environment do not necessitate any policy response. Planners with symmetric information about agents can sometimes intervene without making interpersonal comparisons.     

Simulation Analysis of Public Debt and Fiscal Deficit in Austria – Optimal Economic Policies for the Past and the Future

The macroeconometric simulation model AMOD1 and the optimization algorithm OPTCON are used to evaluate fiscal policies for Austria since the late seventies. In particular, the question of optimal (debt stabilizing) fiscal policies for the past and for the future is analyzed within the framework of a medium-scaled simulation model. The first set of optimization experiments aims to assess optimal fiscal policies for debt stabilization for the historical period 1978–2000 while trying to maintain reasonable growth rates of approximately 2 percent of real GDP. Optimal values of the instruments and the targets are compared to empirical data for Austria. A second set of simulations calculates optimal paths for the fiscal instruments for the period 2001-2010, particularly with respect to the criteria of the Stability and Growth Pact, which is mandatory for member states of the Euro zone.     

Real exchange rates: are they dominated by fundamental factors?

Using Bayesian model averaging, we determine which fundamental pair-wise differences suggested by the literature on optimum currency areas give the best explanation of medium-term variability of bilateral real exchange rates. The intercept in the best specification is statistically insignificant, implying that for a hypothetical pair of economies for which the differences were zero, the bilateral real exchange rate would not move. Thus, the ‘non-fundamental’ element of the medium-term real exchange rate variability is, in our sample at least, negligible on average. In other words, floating exchange rate does not in itself imply, on average, more real exchange rate variability in the medium term than an exchange rate peg.     

Positive and normative judgments implicit in U.S. tax policy,and the costs of unequal growth and recessions

Calculating the welfare implications of changes to economic policy or shocks requires economists to decide on a normative criterion. One approach is to elicit the relevant moral criteria from real-world policy choices, converting a normative decision into a positive inference, as in the recent surge of “inverse-optimum” research. We find that capitalizing on the potential of this approach is not as straightforward as we might hope. We perform the inverse-optimum inference on U.S. tax policy from 1979 through 2010 and argue that the results either undermine the normative relevance of the approach or challenge conventional assumptions upon which economists routinely rely when performing welfare evaluations.     

Arrow–Debreu equilibria for rank‐dependent utilities with heterogeneous probability weighting

We study Arrow–Debreu equilibria for a one‐period‐two‐date pure exchange economy with rank‐dependent utility agents having heterogeneous probability weighting and outcome utility functions. In particular, we allow the economy to have a mix of expected utility agents and rank‐dependent utility ones, with nonconvex probability weighting functions. The standard approach for convex economy equilibria fails due to the incompatibility with second‐order stochastic dominance. The representative agent approach devised in Xia and Zhou (2016) does not work either due to the heterogeneity of the weighting functions. We overcome these difficulties by considering the comonotone allocations, on which the rank‐dependent utilities become concave. Accordingly, we introduce the notion of comonotone Pareto optima, and derive their characterizing conditions. With the aid of the auxiliary problem of price equilibria with transfers, we provide a sufficient condition in terms of the model primitives under which an Arrow–Debreu equilibrium exists, along with the explicit expression of the state‐price density in equilibrium. This new, general sufficient condition distinguishes the paper from previous related studies with homogeneous and/or convex probability weightings.     

One size may not fit all: Welfare benefits and cost reductions with optional differentiated household electricity rates

We consider optional time-of-use (TOU) pricing for residential consumers, offered by a publicly regulated electricity supplier, as an alternative to a single TOU or flat rate structure. An equilibrium model explores and quantifies the effects of such pricing on welfare, consumption, and production costs. The supplier offers to each household a menu of possible rate structures obtained by maximizing a collective welfare function subject to three restrictions: Pareto efficiency, incentive compatibility, sufficiency of supplier revenue to cover costs. Simulations based on realistic calibration of the model demonstrate that optional pricing can increase overall consumer welfare and reduce average cost.     

Innovation and antibiotic use within antibiotic classes: Market incentives and economic instruments

We analyze a monopolist's incentive to innovate a new antibiotic which is connected to the same pool of antibiotic treatment efficacy as is another drug produced by a generic industry. We outline the differences of antibiotic use under market conditions and in the social optimum. A time- and state-dependent tax-subsidy mechanism is proposed to induce the monopolist and generic industry to exploit antibiotic efficacy optimally.     

Comparing Interpersonal Comparisons in Utility Theory and Happiness Research

Social scientists are reluctant to make explicit interpersonal comparisons of well-being. However, implicit comparisons are made on a surprisingly regular basis. These comparisons are based on the wealth and the Kaldor–Hicks concept in utility theory and on self-reported well-being in happiness research. Taking a utilitarian stance, this paper tests the ethical foundations of both principles. While self-reported well-being serves as an acceptable proxy for utilitarian decision-making, the Kaldor–Hicks concept does not appear so. Implications for evaluating policies are outlined.