对于我国公平与效率关系的经济学思考

本文主要通过对我国公平与效率关系的描述及当前面临的现状的分析,运用帕累托效率的分析方法,得出公平与效率本质上具有一致性的结论,在此基础上提出公平与效率可以实现最优结合。我国目前正值“十一五”规划纲要的实施初期,大力发展和谐社会,应该在微观领域体现效率优先的原则,宏观领域公平优先的原则,来实现二者的最优结合。     

郑州地铁盾构选型及刀盘设计研究

文章紧密结合郑州地铁二号线的地质和线路情况,阐述了盾构选型的原则及郑州地铁选型建议,对区间的施工盾构选型作了优化设计研究,阐述了盾构刀盘的形式,并提出了适合郑州地区盾构刀盘的形式。     

可持续发展背景下地方政府竞争过程中的合作困境剖析——博弈论的分析视角

尽管现阶段促进和实现区域可持续发展的战略目标已成了国家和地区社会经济发展的共识,然而目前在区域可持续发展战略实施过程中的制度保障、基础设施建设等方面的博弈,不仅难以实现区域可持续发展战略中的"帕累托改善",而且也还极易引发区域可持续发展战略实施中的"搭便车"问题,进而最终形成可持续发展背景下的地方政府竞争过程中的合作困境.     

家庭农场退出诱发的利益冲突与化解策略研究

研究目的:借助埃奇沃斯盒状图阐述家庭农场退出的"帕累托改进"过程,深入分析家庭农场退出可能诱发不同主体间的利益冲突以及应对策略,为家庭农场的合理有序退出提供理论支撑。研究方法:经济学交换的一般均衡分析法、理论分析法、文献梳理法、综合分析法。研究结果:在家庭农场退出时,会在家庭农场主、农户、债权人、集体经济组织、家庭农场的其他成员等主体之间围绕土地合同违约、债务清偿次序、债务承担比例、资产处置等问题诱发激烈的矛盾冲突,这些问题的妥善解决对于构建家庭农场的合理有序退出机制、盘活退出家庭农场的整体资产、维护退出家庭农场主和债权人的合法权益都具有重要意义。研究结论:家庭农场退出所诱发的不同主体间的利益冲突应当依据法律政策、土地流转合同等科学合理地加以解决。对于家庭农场退出的资产采取整体转让、转租、托管经营等方式处理;明确家庭农场退出需要承担的法律责任,参照相关法律政策,明确家庭农场退出的债务偿还规则;明确集体经济组织在家庭农场退出时的职能定位;通过制定内部规章制度明晰家庭农场成员间的"权责利"关系格局。     

区域旅游合作的动力系统研究

区域旅游合作组织是区域旅游合作主体合作行为的必然结果,对经济利益的追求是区域旅游合作主体产生合作行为的根本动因。笔者提出区域旅游合作的动力系统主要由引力系统、干扰系统和辅助系统组成。引力系统和干扰系统导致主体之间的合作与竞争行为,在辅助系统的支持和保障下,区域旅游合作就成为现实,其中,引力系统和辅助系统是拉力,干扰系统是阻力,拉力和阻力共同作用于行为主体,形成稳定的区域旅游合作组织。     

产学研协同创新成本分摊机制研究

产学研协同创新是推动技术创新的一条重要路径,但创新成本分摊机制是影响产学研协同合作的一个重要问题。通过构建充分竞争市场下的多阶段博弈模型,从成本分摊机制角度探究了如何有效推进产学研协同创新。通过模型扩展与求解,获得成本分摊后的帕累托改善以及产学研协同创新的可行路径。结果表明：企业和学研方基于自身收益最大化而进行的成本分摊协商无法实现帕累托最优,而轮流出价博弈模型下的成本分摊形成机制能够有效改善各方收益,并使整体收益达到帕累托最优,因此是一条现实可行的帕累托改善路径,其中,各方获得的收益增量与耐心程度的对比有关。     

Pareto-improving social optimal pricing schemes based on bottleneck permits for managing congestion at a merging section

Akamatsu, Sato, and Nguyen (2006 Akamatsu, T., Sato, S., &; Nguyen, X. L. (2006). Tradable time-of-day bottleneck permits for morning commuters (in Japanese). JSCE Journal of Infrastructure Planning 62(4), 605–620.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) proposed a first-best pricing scheme based on the concept of bottleneck permits. The scheme allows permit holders to pass a bottleneck at specified times and is shown to be able to minimize social cost. However, the scheme is not always Pareto-improving in that it may harm some drivers. The objective of this study is to design Pareto-improving pricing scheme with bottleneck permits for a V-shaped two-to-one merge bottleneck. First, the paper formulates the morning commute model in the network and describes the arrival time choice equilibrium in the network with merging bottleneck. Secondly, we show that the first-best pricing scheme with bottleneck permits for this V-shaped network does not always achieve a Pareto improvement, with the cost of one group of drivers is increased by the permit pricing, a phenomena akin to the bottleneck paradox of Arnott, de Palma, and Lindsey (1993 Arnott, R., de Palma, A., &; Lindsey, R. (1993). Properties of dynamic traffic equilibrium involving bottlenecks, including a paradox and metering. Transportation Science 27(2), 148–160.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). We propose three implementations of bottleneck permits for Pareto-improving: (1) merging priority rule is included in the bottleneck permits scheme by creating different market for each origin; (2) the permit revenues are refunded as monetary compensation to drivers whose cost is increased; and (3) the permit revenues are used to expand bottleneck capacity. For each implementation, we derive their equilibrium solutions and demonstrate that the Pareto improvement is achieved and social cost is decreased by using the permit revenues for expanding the bottleneck capacity.     

三级生物质供应链的奖惩与回馈契约协调研究

为了优化生物质能供应链,降低成本,在无扰动因素情况,需求不确定且与价格有关的条件下,研究了由能源公司、基地和农户组成的三级生物质供应链中,奖惩与回馈契约对供应链的协调问题,建立了满足渠道协调的条件和供应链内各级参与者实现互赢的数学模型,最后将其用于数值算例中验证。结果证明契约参数的合理选择可以实现供应链各方利益最大。     

Spatial externalities and agglomeration in a competitive industry

We introduce spatial spillovers as an externality in the production function of competitive firms operating within a finite spatial domain under adjustment costs. Spillovers may attenuate with distance and the overall externality could contain positive and negative components with the overall effect being positive. We show that when the spatial externality is not internalized by firms, spatial agglomerations may emerge endogenously in a competitive equilibrium. The result does not require increasing returns at the private or the social level, increasing marginal productivity of private capital with respect to the externality, or location advantages. In fact agglomerations may emerge with decreasing returns to scale, declining marginal productivity of private capital with respect to the externality, and no location advantage. The result depends on the interactions between the structures of production technology and spatial effects as shown in the paper. No agglomerations emerge at the social optimum when spillovers are internalized and diminishing returns both from the private and the social point of view prevail. Numerical experiments with Cobb–Douglas and CES technologies and an isoelastic demand confirm our theoretical predictions.     

电涡流缓速器试验台组合飞轮的研究与设计

本文对汽车制动过程进行分析,确定了要正确模拟汽车制动过程惯性力所需的各转动部分的转动惯量,提出了用飞轮组、电机和转动轴共同模拟的多分流加载方法。并对组合飞轮的进行优化设计和检测,使电涡流缓速器试验台能有效地模拟不同转动惯量的汽车。