We consider a game in characteristic form played by firms and an outside patent holder of a cost-reducing innovation. The worth of a coalition of players is the total Cournot profit the coalition can guarantee to obtain when it operates an optimal number of its firms while the complement operates any number of its firms as to minimize the profit of the coalition. Only firms in a coalition with the patent holder are allowed to use the efficient technology. We prove that when the number of firms is large, the Shapley value of the patent holder approximates the payoff he obtains in the non-cooperative auction game traditionally studied in the literature.We thank an anonymous referee for very helpful comments that significantly improved the paper. The second author is being partially supported by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), Grant-in-Aid for 21 Century COE Program. He wishes to thank his advisor Yair Tauman and co-advisor Pradeep Dubey for their intellectual guidance, Akira Okada and Haruo Imai for their encouragement, and Shigeo Muto for his helpful comments to the first draft of this paper at the autumn meeting of the Japanese Economic Association in 2003. 相似文献
Aims: Percutaneous closure of a patent foramen ovale (PFO) is known to lower the risk of recurrent stroke in patients with a cryptogenic stroke. However, the economic implications of transcatheter PFO closure are less well known. From a UK payer perspective, a detailed economic appraisal of PFO closure was performed for prevention of recurrent ischemic stroke in patients with a PFO who had experienced a cryptogenic stroke.
Materials and methods: A Markov cohort model was constructed using a 5-year time-horizon with a patient mean age of 45.2 years, reflecting the characteristics reported in the REDUCE trial. Transition probabilities, clinical inputs, costs, and utility values were ascertained from published and national costing sources. Total costs, incremental costs, quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs), and incremental cost-effectiveness ratios were calculated, utilizing a discount rate of 3.5%. A range of univariate and probabilistic sensitivity analyses were also performed.
Results: When applying a willingness-to-pay (WTP) threshold of £20,000/QALY in accordance with NICE guidelines, PFO closure compared with antiplatelet therapy alone showed a beneficial cost/QALY of £18,584, attained at 4 years. Applying discount rates of 0% and 6% had a negligible effect on the base-case model findings. PFO closure demonstrated a 76.9% probability of being cost-effective at a WTP threshold of £20,000/QALY at a 5-year time-horizon.
Limitations: This model focused specifically on UK stroke patients and typically enrolled young (mean age <65 years old) patients. Hence, caution should be taken when comparing data vs non-UK populations, and it remains unclear how older patients might have affected cost-effectiveness findings, as the risk of paradoxical embolism can persist as patients age.
Conclusion: Percutaneous closure of a PFO is cost-effective compared with antiplatelet therapy alone, underlining the economic benefits potentially afforded by this treatment in selected patients. 相似文献