风险投资股份转让的博弈分析

本文讨论风险投资股份转让的两种方式的比选问题,基于信息的不对称程度,可实现的交易范围相应变小,而随着风险企业控制方的不同,不同的转让方武是最优的.     

中国信用体系建设中的个人信用模糊评估

个人信用体系建设是中国信用制度建设的主要内容之一，个人信用评估是个人信用体系建设的主要应用领域。在信用评分模型和基于先验审批规则法基础上建立起来的模糊推理系统，充分利用了业内人员多年积累的从业经验，是适合我国实际情况的个人信用评估方式。在我国个人信用数据积累到一定程度和一定时期之后，这些数据既可以与专家经验互相补充用于生成模糊推理规则，也可以对模糊推理系统进行检验和修正。     

转贷政策下政府信用异化研究

表面上看,中央财政实行国债转贷,似乎仅仅是国债投资资金运作方式的改变,但是,只要对这一政策作理论和实践上的深入分析,就会发现:转贷政策在改变政府信用资金运作方式的同时,还引发了一些值得深入研究和讨论的制度性异化问题。     

农村信用合作社经营性风险因素探究

农村信用合作所具有的资金规模小、专业特色强、地域性经营等特点，使农信社面临着资本保障不足、融资能力不强、运营成本高等经营性风险因素，要防范和化解这些风险因素，就必须改革农村信用社的经营管理体制，加强业务监管，并给予必要的政策扶持。     

Forecasting recovery rates on non-performing loans with machine learning

We compare the performance of a wide set of regression techniques and machine-learning algorithms for predicting recovery rates on non-performing loans, using a private database from a European debt collection agency. We find that rule-based algorithms such as Cubist, boosted trees, and random forests perform significantly better than other approaches. In addition to loan contract specificities, predictors that refer to the bank recovery process — prior to the portfolio’s sale to a debt collector — are also shown to enhance forecasting performance. These variables, derived from the time series of contacts to defaulted clients and client reimbursements to the bank, help all algorithms better identify debtors with different repayment ability and/or commitment, and in general those with different recovery potential.     

Information processing and innovative choice

In this paper we examine how the information processing of subjects who make an innovative choice (innovators) differs from that of subjects who make a noninnovative choice (noninnovators). The task involves selection of an alternative within a range of prerated product category innovativeness. We propose that subjects who seek 1) impersonal/uncontrollable sources, 2) higher levels of information, 3) more detailed (versus summary) data, and 4) noncomparative (versus comparative) data are more likely to make innovative choices. The research method is a computerized process tracing experiment utilizing Search Monitor (Brucks 1988).The authors wish to express their gratitude to Merrie Brucks for the use of and help with Search Monitor and to Eric Johnson, Dave Schmittlein, and Mita Sujan for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.     

Pricing, learning, and strategic behavior in a single-sale model

Summary. We analyze an infinite horizon model where a seller who owns an indivisible unit of a good for sale has incomplete information about the state of the world that determines not only the demand she faces but also her own valuation for the good. Over time, she randomly meets potential buyers who may have incentives to manipulate her learning process strategically. We show that i) the seller's incentives to post a high price and to experiment are not necessarily monotonic in the information conveyed by a buyer's rejection; and ii) as the discount factors tend to one, there are equilibria where the seller always ends up selling the good at an ex-post individually rational price. Received: January 6, 1999; revised version: July 15, 2000     

Strategic freedom, constraint, and symmetry in one-period markets with cash and credit payment

Summary. In order to explain in a systematic way why certain combinations of market, financial, and legal structures may be intrinsic to certain capabilities to exchange real goods, we introduce criteria for abstracting the qualitative functions of markets. The criteria involve the number of strategic freedoms the combined institutions, considered as formalized strategic games, present to traders, the constraints they impose, and the symmetry with which those constraints are applied to the traders. We pay particular attention to what is required to make these strategic market games well-defined, and to make various solutions computable by the agents within the bounds on information and control they are assumed to have. As an application of these criteria, we present a complete taxonomy of the minimal one-period exchange economies with symmetric information and inside money. A natural hierarchy of market forms is observed to emerge, in which institutionally simpler markets are often found to be more suitable to fewer and less-diversified traders, while the institutionally richer markets only become functional as the size and diversity of their users gets large.Received: 5 June 2003, Revised: 18 November 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: C7, G10, G20, L10, D40, D50. Correspondence to: Eric SmithEric Smith, Martin Shubik: We are grateful to Lloyd Shapley, Duncan Foley, and Doyne Farmer for discussions in the course of this work.     

Punishment,counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment

We present the results of an experiment that explores the sanctioning behavior of individuals who experience a social dilemma. In the game we study, players choose contribution levels to a public good and subsequently have multiple opportunities to reduce the earnings of the other members of the group. The treatments vary in terms of individuals’ opportunities to (a) avenge sanctions that have been directed toward themselves, and (b) punish others’ sanctioning behavior with respect to third parties. We find that individuals do avenge sanctions they have received, and this serves to decrease contribution levels. They also punish those who fail to sanction third parties, but the resulting increase in contributions is smaller than the decrease the avenging of sanctions induces. When there are five rounds of unrestricted sanctioning, contributions and welfare are significantly lower than when only one round of sanctioning opportunities exists, and welfare is lower than at a benchmark of zero cooperation. We thank James Andreoni, participants in seminars at Emory University, the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the University of New South Wales, the University of Sydney, Deakin University, the 2004 North American Regional Meetings of the ESA in Tucson, Arizona, USA, the 2004 IMEBE Meetings in Cordoba, Spain, and the 2005 SAET meetings in Vigo, Spain, for constructive and helpful comments. We thank Elven Priour for programming and organization of the sessions. Instructions for the experiment are available from the authors.     

资本市场变迁及运行效率相关研究评析

资本市场变迁及运行效率是中外学者研究的重点，形成了许多理论流派，其中信息空间理论为资本市场制度变迁提供了新的分析框架。同时，中国资本市场正处在发展建设之中，亟需有效的理论指导其发展。然而，中国资本市场的不完备性和特殊性导致诸多理论的应用存在局限性。而信息是各理论流派研究的核心，只是角度和侧重点不同，故信息空间理论可为研究资本市场变迁和制度选择提供新的研究思路。