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21.
We study electoral competition among politicians who are heterogeneous both in competence and in how much they care about (what they perceive as) the public interest relative to the private rents from being in office. We show that politicians may have stronger incentives to behave opportunistically if other politicians are more likely to behave opportunistically. A political culture may therefore be self-reinforcing and multiple equilibria may arise. We also show that politicians’ incentives to behave opportunistically increase with politicians’ pay and with polarization of policy preferences. JEL Code D72 · D78  相似文献   
22.
    
We find that members of the House of Representatives who vote for deregulation are more likely to be employed in the private sector after leaving Congress than those who do not vote for deregulation. An analysis of voting behavior in a major financial regulation—the Gramm‐Leach‐Bliley Act of 1999—shows that representatives use voting to enhance their careers. The results are consistent with politicians' public rent‐seeking and show that political capital is as valuable for politicians as it is for companies.  相似文献   
23.
In this paper, we use data on 2459 public claims made by 444 politicians from the leading US fact-checking site (PolitiFact) to provide an empirical analysis of false claims in politics, shedding light on their characteristics within an advanced democracy. The frequency of falsehoods differs according to party affiliation and topic, with false claims more likely on such topics as elections, health, labor, taxes and values. For Republican politicians, falsehood pays off in the short run, as it is associated with greater political support.  相似文献   
24.
Using the state level data from India, this paper investigates the size of the hidden economy in Indian states over the period 1974/75 to 1995/96. Our analysis has shown that after liberalization of the Indian economy in 1991/92, the growth in the size of the hidden economy has decreased on an average. Our results show that the growth in the size of the hidden economy is approximately 4% less in scheduled election years than in all other years. We also demonstrate that the growth is significantly lower in those states where the coalition government is in power. An increased growth of newspapers and the literacy rates translate to cleaner governance, e.g. to fewer amounts of shadow economy activities in the economy.  相似文献   
25.
U.S. states can implement programs to pursue damage recovery when firms cause natural resource damages (NRDs). We present new empirical evidence that such programs have effectively reduced oil spills in states that adopt them. However, only 34 states had implemented such programs by 2003. We analyze data on 50 states and the District of Columbia from 1980 to 2003 to ascertain the likely determinants of NRD program adoption. We find that states with many environmental accidents adopt programs more rapidly, while income and interest-group pressure have no significant impact on the process. While non-adopting states might benefit from such programs, at least NRD programs are being adopted most rapidly where they can do the most good.   相似文献   
26.
    
The performance of government activities, including law enforcement and regulation, depends on whether citizens perceive them as legitimate. Although substantial studies have explored the institutional sources of legitimacy, how non-institutional factors affect perceived legitimacy remains unclear. Human societies have a long history of employing symbolic icons to enhance the legitimacy of a given authority. This study reports a laboratory experiment of public goods that investigates whether (and to what extent) symbolic factors enhance perceived legitimacy. In the contexts of various incentive schemes and transparency levels, an “authority” in each group decides whether to target a “citizen” for punishment after observing the contributions of “citizens,” and untargeted citizens then choose to support or hinder the authority. A symbolic scepter is issued to the authority in the treated group, whereas this symbol is absent in the control group. The experimental results suggest that the political symbol significantly enhances the authority's legitimacy regardless of the payment scheme and information transparency. A further analysis shows that the political symbol is not associated with the authority's choices regarding enforcement. Rather, the symbol's effect on perceived legitimacy is primarily driven by the citizens' side—that is, the increasing intrinsic tendency to support authority.  相似文献   
27.
    
There has been relatively little investigation of the effect of constitutional transformations on the economic transition in post‐communist countries. We develop a simple signalling model in which constitutionalism – a commitment to limit political power and provide judicial defence of basic rights – reinforces the credibility of pro‐market candidates’ electoral promises and boosts public support for economic reforms. These findings are tested using opinion poll data on public support for reform in Central and Eastern Europe, and in the former Soviet Union, in the 1990s. In a two‐stage procedure we show that public support for market reforms is higher in countries where incumbents have taken deliberate steps to increase political accountability and judicial independence. Public support also spurs actual economic reform.  相似文献   
28.
Swiss direct democracy is often accused of being an obstacle to reforms, with the strong influence of interest groups being the reason. Actually, the referendum has a retarding effect: it implies a status quo bias. On the other hand, the initiative has an accelerating effect. The influence of interest groups is hardly larger in direct compared to representative democratic systems. Thus, it is highly questionable whether the abolition of Switzerland’s direct democracy (at the federal level) would—in the long-run—really lead to political decisions which are more open to reforms.  相似文献   
29.
Summary. The requirement that a voting procedure be immune to the strategic withdrawal of a candidate for election can be formalized in different ways. Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton (Econometrica, 2001) have recently shown that two formalizations of this candidate stability property are incompatible with some other desirable properties of voting procedures. This article shows that Grether and Plott's nonbinary generalization of Arrow's Theorem can be used to provide simple proofs of two of their impossibility theorems. Received: August 15, 2001; revised version: March 11, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" Parts of this article were previously circulated in somewhat different form in a working paper with the same title by the second author. We are grateful to Michel Le Breton and an anonymous referee for their comments. Correspondence to:J.A. Weymark  相似文献   
30.
    
In this work we examine how economic growth affects public debt when interacted with reelection prospects. Reelection considerations shorten political time horizons and give rise to political myopia that exacerbates debt accumulation. That laxer institutional reelection restrictions (e.g., no term limits) mitigate this effect due to electoral accountability is well known. Incorporating growth, we find that this mitigation can be reversed because less myopic, and more accountable, incumbents put more emphasis on smoothing the effects of growth across generations. We test these predictions using an annual-based panel of U.S. states over the period 1963–2010. Our identification strategy rests on constitutionally-entrenched differences in gubernatorial term limits that provide plausibly exogenous variation in reelection prospects, and aggregate national TFP shocks that are exogenous to individual states. Our estimates indicate that when reelection is possible a one standard deviation positive income shock induces, within the same year, a relative increase of approximately $40 in real per capita public debt.  相似文献   
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