国际银行业监管标准嬗变途径分析

国际银行业监管标准从旧协议向新资本协议嬗变途径中有两个交叉方向的变化——监管性的资本与经济性的资本、基于规则的监管与面向过程的监管。虽然新协议中保留了一些监管性和规则性的资本监管因素,就象在旧协议中也吸收了经济性和过程性方法的要素一样,但是新协议中监管方式的转变仍然是实质性的和很重要的,并且是同时发生在两方面的转变。     

Regulatory ‘Balancing’ and the Efficiency of Green R&D

We identify and analyse several dynamic implications of setting environmental standards such as to balance marginal costs and benefits. The adoption of such a regulatory approach is shown to effect (i) the speed of improvement of abatement technologies; (ii) the direction (in a sense to be defined) of that improvement; (iii) its source and the distribution of the rents from it; and (iv) the rate of development of defensive (averting) technologies. Existing views are thoroughly synthesised in the context of a simple diagrammatic model, several new results are derived and at least one conventional wisdom questioned. The message of the analysis for legislators and regulators is that cost–benefit balancing should be done with care.     

Accounting regulation, inertia and organisational self-perception: Double-entry adoption in a Spanish casa de comercio (1829-1852)

This paper analyses the influence exerted by compulsory mechanisms and cognitive and social factors on the adoption and implementation of double-entry bookkeeping. The study focuses on a small, commercial and family owned company located in Spain in the period 1829-1852. As our main conclusion we suggest that the adoption of double-entry bookkeeping in 1851 was influenced more by the managers' self-perception as traders, and the belief (internal and environmental) that the company must employ an accounting method appropriate to its new commercial status, than by State pressures derived from the enactment of a new accounting regulation in 1829.     

上市公司分部信息披露动因与约束

分部信息的披露主体主要是上市公司.公司出于竞争投资者有限的资金等目的有自愿披露分部信息的动因.由于分部信息披露存在成本,在没有管制的情况下,企业出于自身利益最大化考虑,将通过对收益和成本的权衡来决定分部信息披露.由于分部信息披露的外部性、分部信息分布的不对称性等,不能完全依赖于自愿披露,必须对分部信息披露进行适度的管制,强制公司披露分部信息.     

Regulation and investment behaviour in the telecommunications sector: policies and patterns in US and Europe

This paper reports the results of the quantitative analysis of international experience of the relationship between infrastructure investment in the deployment of capacity that can carry large volumes of voice and data traffic and regulatory policy changes in the telecommunications sectors. It looks at the relationship between infrastructure investment for these infrastructure assets and the access pricing régimes for local exchange carriers in the United States and Europe. It then looks at the relationship between various aspects of regulatory and institutional policy changes in Europe and how they affect access prices.The paper finds that a lower access price promotes greater deployment of digital technology among US incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs). Based on this finding, it suggests that it is in the ILECs interest to have access to their networks encouraged.The European data for interconnection are recent and far reaching conclusions are not feasible, but the findings, however, suggest that competition has worked by facilitating new entry through decreasing interconnection prices, although path dependencies, of existing and traditional concepts, in the mindsets of operators as well as regulators, may account for these findings.     

银行监管的微观基础和战略监管体系选择

本探讨了银行监管的微观基础，认为在信息不对称以及银行业不完全竞争的作用下，银行业具有内在的不稳定性，需要外部监管力量的支撑来维护稳健经营，但是政府机构监管作为监管垄断力量会引发一系列新的道德危害从而导致监管失灵。中详细分析了各种重要的监管措施带来的正负影响，在此基础上提出监管的战略体系至少应当包括监管、激励结构、市场约束和公司治理。     

法国公开要约收购制度的最新改革——以2006年《公开要约收购法》为中心

2006年3月31日，依欧盟转化《要约收购指令》之要求，法国颁布了《公开要约收购法》，对现有的公开要约收购制度进行了多方位、深层次的改革。从宏观上看，此次改革主要涉及四个方面，即金融证券管理局监管范围的改革、强制要约收购制度的改革、要约透明机制的改革以及反要约收购防御措施的改革。尽管改革的效果仍有待评估，但法国在此次改革中所体现的提高欧盟范围内企业竞争力的决心和表率作用无疑为欧盟经济一体化注入了新的活力。     

构建与金融业全面开放相适应的金融监管体制

我国的金融监管体制近20年来几经制度变迁和改革调整，已形成了人民银行、银监会、证监会、保监会（一行三会）的架构，但在实际运行中出现了不少矛盾，如何从我国金融业即将全面开放的要求和特点出发，特别是适应金融综合经营时代的到来，有必要对宏观金融监管体制进行改革。     

政府监制与电力监管

阐述了政府管制的内涵及研究视角,论述了电力监管作为政府管制的重要组成部分的组成要素、基本任务、主要内容和监管体系。     

On the Merits of Vertical Divestiture

This paper demonstrates that vertical divestiture may increase consumer welfare even when the divestiture eliminates substantial scope economies and precludes only limited sabotage. More generally, the merits of vertical divestiture are shown to vary with: (1) the type and the intensity of competition in the retail market; (2) the locus of scope economies under vertical integration; and (3) the relative social values of consumers’ surplus and profit.