世界贸易组织(WTO)确立与发展的基础

世界贸易组织(以下简称世贸组织)确立与发展的基础是有节制的自由贸易理论,市场经济体制,经济全球化,可持续发展和国际经贸利益的协调。     

Economic Integration: Systemic Measures in an Input–Output Framework

Countries are linked through trade and for their mutual benefits they often group together. Consequently, trade blocs are formed in some form or another, examples of which are the EU, EFTA, ASEAN, NAFTA, and SAARC. Depending upon the form and the nature of the grouping, trade relations among countries obviously vary across the trade blocs. The pattern and the volume of trade of the participating countries are different and thus cause different impacts on the growth and development of the countries concerned. Also, the nature of integration changes over time. To examine the strength of integration within trade blocs, systemic measures of integration hitherto not available are formulated in an input–output framework. The measures are used, as a case study, to assess the inter-temporal variations in the degree of integration of SAARC.     

Infrastructure provision and international market share rivalry

The paper examines a model of strategic infrastructure investment. Two oligopolistic firms compete on home and foreign product markets for market shares. The national governments support the firms in the market rivalry by providing cost reducing public infrastructure services that are financed out of taxing an input used in the production process. It is shown, that infrastructure policy can be used as an instrument for strategic trade policy. However, governments are facing the problem of balancing the burden of taxation and the benefits of infrastructures. The theoretical model also raises some critical issues with respect to the policy relevance of recent empirical infrastructure research.     

对我国外贸的循环经济战略初探

我国经济发展面临资源环境的约束,对外贸易中面临越来越多的贸易壁垒,尤其是绿色壁垒。鉴于我国目前所面临的情况和循环经济的大环境,我国要在对外贸易中实行循环经济战略。     

Preferential trade agreements and manufactured goods exports: does it matter whom you PTA with?

This article explores two questions. First, do preferential trade agreements (PTAs) affect manufactured goods exports of developing countries? Second, does it matter for developing countries whom they sign the PTAs with? We find that the answer to both questions is yes. Using bilateral manufactured goods exports data from 28 developing countries during 1978–2005; we find that South–South PTAs have a significantly positive effect on manufactured goods exports. In contrast, no such effect is detected in the case of South–North PTAs. We confirmed the robustness of these findings to estimation methodology, sample selection, time period, zero trade flows and multilateral trade resistance.     

Trade liberalization and the inter-industry wage premia: the missingf role of productivity

The literature concerning the effect of tariffs on the inter-industry wage premium has not addressed the role of total factor productivity (TFP) in determining both the wage premium and tariffs. This omission not only overlooks an important determinant of wage premium but also invalidates the use of the pre-reform tariff level as an instrument for the change in tariffs. Based on an analysis of Colombian data, I find that including TFP in the estimated model of the effects of tariffs on the wage premium leads to a 41% decrease in the effect of tariffs on the inter-industry wage premium relative to the model that omits TFP. More specifically, a 10 percentage point decrease in tariffs reduces the wage premium by 1.01%, whereas a 10% increase in TFP raise wage premium by 1.6%. This finding suggests the importance of using policies that boost productivity to offset the effect of tariffs on the wage premium.     

Impulse response analysis and Orcutt’s hypothesis in trade: evidence from developing countries

Orcutt’s hypothesis in international economics implies that trade flows respond to exchange rate changes faster than to changes in relative prices. Most previous studies used import and export demand models and tested the hypothesis by imposing and comparing lag lengths on the exchange rate and relative prices. One recent study, however, employed impulse response of trade flows to one SD shock to the nominal exchange rate and one SD shock to relative prices and tested the Orcutt’s hypothesis for several industrial countries. In this article we follow this study and test the hypothesis for six developing countries using impulse response analysis. Like the other study for industrial countries, we do not find much support for the hypothesis.     

Roy Harrod and traditional theory

In 1926 and 1936 Sraff and Keynes attacked the methodological core of traditional economic theory by showing that the premises of partial equilibrium analysis were mutually inconsistent.

this paper aims to show that Harrod neglected Sraffa and Keynes's logical arguments, and only admitted that the tacit assumptions under discussion restricted the domain of validityof the theory to special cases: perfect competition and statics. He then proceeded to generalize the theory to imperfect competition and dynamics by applying the principles (but not the instruments) of traditional analysis. The definition of these domains thus aimede at rescuing as mush as possible from the orthodox approach.     

Bilateral monopoly: a contribution by Francesco Ferrara

Abstract

In this paper, we propose an interpretation of the application of ‘cost of reproduction’ of Francesco Ferrara to the exchange between two agents to highlight its relevance for the theory of bilateral monopoly. In the Teoria delle Mercedi, Ferrara gives a numerical example to explain price determination in the exchange between one buyer and one seller. Here, this example is translated into a mathematical model that reproduces the fundamental issues of the neoclassical debate on the indeterminacy of price in the Cournot model, and anticipates the solutions proposed by Edgeworth at the end of this debate.     

Rule-based frameworks in historical perspective: Keynes’ and Friedman's monetary policies versus contemporary policy-rules

Abstract

This note suggests that Fazio's re-interpretation of Ferrara's discussion of distribution as a bilateral monopoly is incorrect. A more natural formalization of the work by Ferrara is proposed.