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101.
102.
研究在零售商引入自有品牌的条件下,供应链渠道各成员的定价和广告决策问题。运用Stackelberg博弈模型分析不同的广告和定价决策顺序下,供应链最优决策组合以及决策顺序的改变对利润的影响。研究结果表明:在引入自有品牌的条件下,制造商对定价和广告决策顺序的改变会影响零售商引入自有品牌后的利润,尤其是当交叉弹性较高时,制造商在引入自有品牌前后改变决策顺序可以实现制造商和零售商利润的增加。 相似文献
103.
优化收入分配格局是实现共同富裕的关键,资源代际传递又是收入分配公平的一大阻碍。本文借助二阶段Stackelberg博弈思想,引入生产性和非生产性资源代际传递构建子代对自身资源进行最优分配的博弈行为选择模型。基于资源形成权力、权力决定利益分配的逻辑,阐释资源代际传递过程中起决定性作用的家庭代际权力,即子代凭借家庭优势在资源竞争和利益分配时形成对他人的控制力或影响力。数值模拟发现制度选择对代际权力、社会产出和收入差距有较大影响,政府应着眼于预分配来缓解再分配压力,在子代进入市场前合理配置经济和非经济资源以缩小代际差异。利用资源调配权力制衡家庭代际权力,畅通向上流动通道,形成兼顾公平与效率的发展环境。 相似文献
104.
Marc Escrihuela-Villar 《Journal of Economics》2009,96(2):137-147
We use the concept of cartel stability defined by d’Aspremont et al. (Can J Econ 16(1):17–25, 1983) to obtain that the sequence
of play between the cartel and the fringe affects cartel stability in a quantity-competition setting where firms tacitly collude.
We also prove that an endogenous sequence of play between a cartel and a fringe depends on the discount factor. If the discount
factor is large enough, the cartel and the fringe simultaneously choose quantities since the stable cartel may contain more
firms under simultaneous play than under cartel leadership. This is due to the fact that under simultaneous play cartel firms
have incentives to participate in the cartel because otherwise no collusion is possible.
相似文献
105.
Is there is a warming trend in the earth's climate caused by an increase in concentrations of greenhouse gases in the upper atmosphere, it may be sensible to try to slow down that process by reducing emissions of greenhouse gases and, in particular, the emissions of carbon dioxide produced by the energy sector of world economies. For a number of reasons, a consensus on such reductions is difficult to reach. In this article, we model the problem as a dynamic game with national governments, or coalitions of such governments, as players. Clearly, the negotiations on worldwide reductions in CO2 emissions can succeed only if there exists a cooperative solution superior to the noncooperative one. According to our model, the existence of a collectively preferable cooperative solution depends on the degree of concern among national governments about negative impacts of increased CO2 concentrations. In addition to this unsurprising conclusion, the model can provide insights as to whose concerns will count most for the success of the negotiations and who will have to be induced by side payments to participate. 相似文献
106.
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108.
We analyze the impact of product bundling in experimental markets. One firm has monopoly power in a first market but competes with another firm à la Cournot in a second market. We compare treatments where the multi-product firm (i) always bundles, (ii) never bundles, and (iii) chooses whether to bundle or not. We also contrast the simultaneous and the sequential order of moves in the duopoly market. Our data indicate support for the theory of product bundling: with bundling and simultaneous moves, the multi-product firm offers the predicted number of units. When the multi-product firm is the Stackelberg leader, the predicted equilibrium is better attained with bundling, especially when it chooses to bundle, even though in theory bundling should not make a difference here. In sum, bundling works as a commitment device that enables the transfer of market power from one market to another. 相似文献
109.
This paper analyzes the dynamic interaction between two regions with interconnected river basins. Precipitation is higher in one river-basin while water productivity is higher in the other. Water transfer increases productivity in the recipient basin, but may cause environmental damage in the donor basin. The recipient faces a trade-off between paying the price of the water transfer, or investing in alternative water supplies to achieve a higher usable water capacity. We analyze the design of this transfer using a dynamic modeling approach, which relies on non-cooperative game theory, and compare solutions with different information structures (Nash open-loop, Nash feedback, and Stackelberg) with the social optimum. We first assume that the equilibrium between supply and demand determines the optimal transfer price and amount. We show that, contrary to the static case, in a realistic dynamic setting in which the recipient uses a feedback information structure the social optimum will not emerge as the equilibrium solution. We then study different leadership situations in the water market and observe that the transfer amount decreases toward a long-run value lower than the transfer under perfect competition, which in turn lays below the social optimum. In consequence, the water in the donor's river-basin river converges to a better quality in the presence of market power. Finally, we numerically compare our results to the Tagus-Segura water transfer described in Ballestero (2004). Welfare gains are compared for the different scenarios. We show that in all dynamic settings, the long-run transfer amount is lower than in Ballestero's static model. Further, we show that the long-run price settles at a lower level than in Ballestero's model, but is still higher than the average cost-based price determined by the Spanish government. 相似文献
110.
This study aims to show that the product proliferation strategy in multi‐product duopoly is first‐mover advantage. We consider simultaneous and Stackelberg variety competitions. A firm producing more varieties charges a higher price, produces larger total quantities, and earns higher total revenue. When firms sequentially choose the masses of varieties and then simultaneously decide prices, the leader produces more varieties and enjoys first‐mover advantage. The masses of varieties can be regarded as strategic substitutes in the same way that quantities are. Finally, the market is likely to provide too few varieties relative to the social optimum. 相似文献