Stackelberg leadership and transfers in private provision of public goods

We consider transfers in a Stackelberg game of private provision of a public good. It turns out that the agent who is the follower in the process of making voluntary contributions to a public good may have an incentive to make monetary transfers to the Stackelberg leader even in a situation where neither has a comparative advantage in making contributions to the public good. The Stackelberg leader is willing to accept such transfers if the actual contribution game is fully non-cooperative because the transfer generates a Pareto superior outcome. If the contributions in the Stackelberg equilibrium is the threat point of a possible cooperative Nash bargaining game, the Stackelberg leader will refuse to accept the transfer if she can. Received: 30 June 1995 / Accepted: 18 February 1997     

一般需求函数下两级供应链定价博弈研究

研究需求函数为一般需求函数D=f（p）时,供应链中制造商和零售商不合作定价、合作定价的供应链利润。找出了两个充要条件,证明了在制造商和零售商之间不合作定价博弈存在纳什均衡时,该纳什均衡状态的供应链利润劣于合作定价的供应链利润。文中并且给出两个典型需求函数的例子：线性需求函数和柯布一道格拉斯需求函数。分别证明了它们均满足该两个充要条件,印证了所得结论。     

Competition and bargaining in vertical relationships with market uncertainty

We go through the decision to vertically integrate or its opposite, outsource, in an uncertain environment. We consider two different market strategies, price setting and quantity setting and two different vertical relationships: an (imperfectly) competitive one following Stackelberg mode and a more cooperative one with bargaining. In the first scenario, with certainty, price and quantity settings are alike, while with uncertainty the ranking changes. If a bargaining framework is adopted instead, quantity setting under uncertainty leads to an asymmetric distribution of realized gains along the vertical chain. Price setting turns out to be more equitable for firms and preferable even by consumers.

煤炭企业博弈行为与产业集中度————基于斯塔克尔伯格模型的研究

运用改良的斯塔克尔伯格模型探讨了煤炭企业行为与煤炭产业集中度的关系,发现煤炭产业市场进入门槛以及大型煤炭企业与小型煤炭企业的边际生产成本直接决定了煤炭产业的集中度,我国煤炭产业进入壁垒过低,导致小型煤炭企业有利可图,大型煤炭企业与小型煤炭企业之间的生产成本差异,是造成我国煤炭产业集中度偏低的重要原因。