碳交易和绿色补贴政策下的低碳供应链最优决策与协调

考虑政府的碳交易管制和绿色补贴政策,针对由政府、单个制造商和单个零售商组成的三级低碳供应链,运用博弈理论建立了政府主导下的三阶段Stackelberg博弈模型和集中决策模型。重点分析了消费者绿色偏好、碳交易价格和减排成本系数对低碳供应链最优决策和社会福利水平的影响。利用两部收费契约和低价促销策略分别对所建模型进行了协调研究,并利用数值算例对文中结论进行了验证。研究发现:较强的消费者绿色偏好有利于提高产品的绿色度、渠道成员的利润和供应链的社会福利水平;产品的绿色度和供应链的社会福利水平在集中决策模型下最高而在分散决策模型下较低;政府的最优绿色投资补贴率在消费者绿色偏好程度较强时降低而在碳减排难度较大时上升;在参数满足一定条件下,两部定价契约和低价促销策略可实现低碳供应链的完美协调。     

基于渠道竞争的双渠道供应链低碳协调策略

针对由一个制造商和一个零售商构成的双渠道供应链,将渠道竞争和产品的低碳性能引入消费者的非线性需求中,通过构建制造商为主导者的Stackelberg博弈模型,对比分析了分散决策和集中决策下的最优定价、碳排放水平和成员利润,并采用价格折扣-成本分摊契约实现了供应链的协调。研究结果表明:在分散决策和集中决策两种情况下,渠道竞争程度的增加均会造成碳排放水平、供应链利润和消费者效用的降低;集中决策下的直销价格大于分散决策下的直销价格,集中决策下的零售价格小于分散决策下的零售价格。最后通过算例验证了以上结论和协调机制的有效性。     

均值-标准差控制下的供应链渠道Stackelberg模型

本文研究了在均值-标准差方法控制下的一个具有风险偏好(风险规避、风险中性、风险喜好)零售商与两个风险中性供应商之间供应链渠道协作和竞争。首先,在考虑零售商风险偏好下,提出了供应商联盟与非联盟两种情况中的各方处于Stackelberg-leader或Stackelberg-follower不同权利地位时各决策模式及其对应决策模型;然后,通过对比分析各决策模式最优解及深入分析零售商风险偏好对各渠道成员最优决策影响,得到了基于零售商风险偏好下的供应链渠道各成员的领导者地位将较大影响各方期望效用,而对供应链渠道整体期望效用最大化并无影响,同时,零售商过度喜好风险或者规避风险都将会对供应链整体期望效用造成致命伤害;最后,通过数值分析进一步验证了前面结论。     

不对称信息下逆向供应链定价策略分析

逆向供应链与传统供应链不同,传统供应链中的定价策略在逆向供应链中不再适用。为了解决该问题,基于单一制造商和单一零售商构成的逆向供应链系统,在对称信息和不对称信息情况下,应用博弈理论对逆向供应链中废旧产品回收的定价策略进行研究,并将两种情况下的结果进行比较分析,得出一些有价值的结论。     

财险市场价格竞争有效性研究

我国国内财产保险业务自1980年恢复以来虽然取得了很大成绩,但依旧存在较多问题,特别是市场集中度偏高,导致市场竞争长期处于低水平竞争状态。本文根据市场份额将我国财险公司划分为在位者与竞争者两类,应用Stackelberg博弈模型,对在位者与竞争者的保险价格竞争从单时期和多时期两个层次进行分析,得出在财险市场中,单纯的价格竞争是无效的,并建议从产品和服务的创新、投资、成本管理和客户信息搜集与管理四方面协助价格竞争的展开。     

Oligopoly with a large number of competitors: asymmetric limit result

We address how profitable innovation is in a competitive market by investigating the asymmetric oligopoly model in which 1 firm (innovator) has a cost advantage that is not drastic enough for her to become a monopolist, and by inducing asymmetric limit outcomes when the number of the other firms (laggard firms) goes to infinity. If the innovator is the Stackelberg leader, two cases can arise: (i) the innovator behaves as in the competitive market or (ii) she occupies the entire market but cannot make the price. If we consider Cournot competition, the innovator becomes the partial monopolist. An erratum to this article can be found at     

Capacity decisions and supply price games under flexibility of backward integration

A key issue in supply chain design for manufacturing firms is how to make a trade-off between strategies of vertical integration and outsourcing. A two-echelon supply chain model with one supplier and one manufacturer is set up to study this issue. The manufacturer makes decisions on two types of capacities, one is core capacity that cannot be outsourced, the other is non-core capacity on which the manufacturer implements a strategy that includes three options—complete, partial or no outsourcing. Such a strategy is referred to as “flexibility of backward integration”. Optimal capacity decisions of the manufacturer are given and the supplier's pricing strategies are discussed. Managerial implications of partial outsourcing are investigated. The impact of the flexibility of backward integration is presented and finally, supply chain coordination is analyzed.     

Endogenous Stackelberg equilibria with incomplete information

In this paper, the endogenous order of quantity decision is studied in a duopoly model with incomplete information. One firm knows the state of the demand curve while the other firm remains uninformed. Firms have to commit to a quantity in one out of two periods. While, a priori, simultaneous-move Cournot equilibria are possible, only Stackelberg equilibria, with either the informed or the uninformed firm moving first, emerge endogenously.     

An experimental study of commitment in Stackelberg games with observation costs

We report on experiments examining the value of commitment in Stackelberg games where the follower chooses whether to pay some cost to perfectly observe the leader's action. Várdy [Games Econ. Behav. (2004)] shows that in the unique pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium of this game, the value of commitment is lost completely; however, there exists a mixed-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium where the value of commitment is fully preserved. In the data, the value of commitment is largely preserved when the cost of looking is small, while it is lost when the cost is large. Nevertheless, for small observation costs, equilibrium behavior is clearly rejected. Instead, subjects persistently play non-equilibrium strategies in which the probability of the follower choosing to observe the leader's action is a decreasing function of the observation cost.     

Pollution in strategic multilateral exchange: Taxing emissions or trading on permit markets?

We introduce polluting emissions in a sequential noncooperative oligopoly model of bilateral exchange. In one sector, a leader and a follower use polluting technologies which create negative externalities on the payoffs of strategic traders who belong to the other sector. By modeling emissions as a negative externality, we show that the leader pollutes more (less) than the follower when strategies are substitutes (complements). Then, we consider the implementation of public policies to control the levels of emissions, namely, two taxation mechanisms and a permit market. We study the effects of these public policies. Moreover, we determine the conditions under which these public policies can implement a Pareto-improving allocation.