Abstract:Although welfare reform has not been one of the most highly visible policy agendas for the Trump administration, restricting access to public assistance programs has been a part of proposals and actions in a number of areas. The Trump administration’s overall approach to welfare reform was articulated formally in 2018 in an Executive Order and a Council of Economic Advisers Report. To provide some context for a discussion of these two documents, the article begins with a discussion of the different meanings of “welfare reform” identified in institutionalist literature, and a brief overview of some important findings on the impacts of the 1996 welfare reform. It then highlights some key aspects of the Trump administration’s approach to welfare reform and responses from the poverty research and advocacy community. 相似文献
Various theories suggest the existence of a negative relationship between the use of atypical employment contracts and productivity growth, arguing that firms’ utilisation of atypical contracts may reduce the incentive to innovate and internal training, inducing firms to follow a ‘low-road’ to competitiveness, based upon cost-cutting strategies.
This paper aims to provide new evidence on the occurrence of these effects in the Italian economy, where changes in labour legislation from the mid-Nineties onwards, associated with an ‘institutional’ wage moderation period, have brought about a significant process of job creation, but also an appreciable slowdown in labour productivity.
This issue is investigated using a microeconomic approach, taking a rich source of microdata for firms and estimating a dynamic model for labour productivity on a pseudo-panel of firms for the period 2003-2008.
The results support the hypothesis of a negative impact of external labour flexibility on labour productivity growth at firm level, such effect proving stronger for small and medium than for large enterprises and of varying magnitude for the different atypical contracts. 相似文献
Temporary contracts usually fall outside of employee protection litigation, thus they are often cheaper than permanent contracts and are offered on-demand by firms. In the last two decades, there has been a sharp growth in such contracts in the U.S. labor market. This paper investigates the welfare consequences of offering temporary contracts in the U.S., an environment with low employee protection litigation and high production risk for firms. Employee protection litigation creates firing rigidity in regular labor markets. Pairing firing rigidity with high production risk, firms reduce employment and output, which generates welfare loss. The inexpensive and flexible nature of temporary contracts offers firms a buffer strategy in making employment decisions under risk and navigating the firing rigidity of the regular labor sector, thereby reducing welfare loss. However, temporary contracts cannot fully compensate for the efficiency cost from rising firing rigidity and risk. 相似文献