Rethinking determinants of ICT acceptance: Towards an integrated and comprehensive overview

In the contemporary ICT environment, we are confronted with a growing number of failing innovations. New technological innovations often fail because too much attention is still given to (technical) product-related features without taking into account the most important parameters of user acceptance. In addition, suppliers of ICT products often lack accurate insight into the distinguished profiles of their (potential) target audience. In this article theoretical considerations and empirical results on this matter are highlighted. First of all, an approach is proposed in which more traditional and often scattered vision(s) on adoption determinants are broadened into an integrated framework. The approach provides a stronger base for better targeting of (new) users of technologies. Secondly, the authors elaborate on this by rethinking these determinants with regard to later adopters. Later adopters (or even non-adopters/users) are often ignored in technology acceptance research. However, especially for policy purposes, the understanding of why people do not adopt or do not use ICT is strongly relevant in the light of the development of an inclusive information society. Both approaches are illustrated by case studies starting from a common list of nineteen ICT appropriation determinants. This framework enables to better profile both earlier and later adopters as well as it allows to formulate recommendations how to bring innovations in the market. Summarizing, this contribution offers an integrated approach on technology acceptance research by bridging the gap between a market and a policy-oriented point of view.     

On evolutionarily stable behavior in contests

It is argued in this paper that the solution concept of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) is an adequate analysis tool for contest theory. Moreover, it is shown that in a contest ESS always differs from Nash equilibrium, the hitherto dominant solution concept in contest theory. Finally, an interpretation of finite population ESS contest behavior in terms of Nash behavior is supplied.Received: 10 February 2002, Accepted: 8 July 2002, JEL Classification: C79, D72, D 74Wolfgang Leininger: I have benefited from the comments and suggestions of Burkhard Hehenkamp and two anonymous referees.     

Strategic resources and performance: a meta‐analysis

Resource‐based theory (RBT) has emerged as a key perspective guiding inquiry into the determinants of organizational performance. Since the early 1990s, numerous studies have examined RBT's assertion that the extent to which organizations possess strategic resources is positively related to performance. Although many studies appear to support this assertion, there is no consensus regarding how strongly strategic resources relate to performance. To help resolve this issue, we meta‐analyze 125 studies of RBT that collectively encompass over 29,000 organizations. Our conservative estimate is that the effect size of the strategic resources–performance relationship is r?_c = 0.22. Moderator tests suggest that the resources‐performance link is stronger (1) when resources meet the criteria laid out in RBT and (2) for those performance measures that are not affected by potential value appropriation. When resources meet RBT's criteria and when performance measures are not affected by potential appropriation, the strength of the relationship grows to r?_c = 0.29. This suggests that the identification, development, and distribution of value from strategic resources should be a primary consideration for scholars, managers, and shareholders. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Modularity and intellectual property protection

Modularity is a means of partitioning technical knowledge about a product or process. When state‐sanctioned intellectual property (IP) rights are ineffective or costly to enforce, modularity can be used to hide information and thus protect IP. We investigate the impact of modularity on IP protection by formally modeling the threat of expropriation by agents. The principal has three options to address this threat: trust, licensing, and paying agents to stay loyal. We show how the principal can influence the value of these options by modularizing the system and by hiring clans of agents, thus exploiting relationships among them. Extensions address screening and signaling in hiring, the effects of an imperfect legal system, and social norms of fairness. We illustrate our arguments with examples from practice.© 2014 The Authors. Strategic Management Journal published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.     

Response to mason and drakeman's commentary on “fishing for sharks: Partner selection in biopharmaceutical R&D alliances”

We respond to Mason and Drakeman's comment on our published paper titled “Are All ‘Sharks’ Dangerous? New Biotechnology Ventures and Partner Selection in R&D Alliances” (Diestre and Rajagopalan, 2012). We discuss both their survey analysis and alternative explanation and conclude that neither of them invalidates our theoretical premise and our empirical conclusions. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Information diffusion and value redistribution among transaction partners of the IPO firm

This paper examines the diffusion of information around the initial public offering (IPO) process and identifies transaction partners on which IPO firms are dependent. Using a resource payments perspective, we argue that this dependence will lead to greater cumulative abnormal stock returns for transaction partners when this information is revealed in the market (when the initial form S‐1 is filed with the SEC). Moreover, we examine the uniqueness of the resource configuration between the IPO firm and transaction partners and find that greater uniqueness is associated with higher valuation for these transaction partners. We also find that multiple dependencies (by the IPO firm) reduce the valuation effect for transaction partners, indicating that a bargaining effect reduces the potential value that any transaction partner can appropriate. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When is cash good or bad for firm performance?

Research summary: Cash can create shareholder value when used for adaptation to unfolding contingencies, but can also reduce value when appropriated by other stakeholders. We synthesize arguments from the behavioral theory of the firm, economic perspectives like agency theory, and the value‐creation versus value‐appropriation literatures to argue that the implications of cash for firm performance are context‐specific. Cash is more beneficial for firms operating in highly competitive, research‐intensive, or growth‐focused industries that are typical of contexts requiring adaptation in the face of uncertainties. Conversely, cash is more detrimental to performance in firms that are poorly governed, diversified, or opaque, as are typical of contexts where stakeholder conflicts, information asymmetries, or power imbalances can encourage value appropriation by other stakeholders. Managerial summary: Cash can create shareholder value when used for adaptation to unfolding contingencies, but can also reduce value when appropriated by other stakeholders. While cash‐rich firms have higher performance on average, with those in the 75th percentile having a market‐to‐book value 15 percent higher than those in the 25th percentile, we find that the performance benefits of cash depend on the context. Cash is more beneficial for firms operating in highly competitive, research‐intensive, or growth‐focused industries that are typical of contexts requiring adaptation in the face of uncertainties. Conversely, cash is more detrimental to performance in firms that are poorly governed, diversified, or opaque, as are typical of contexts where stakeholder conflicts, information asymmetries, or power imbalances can encourage value appropriation by other stakeholders. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Spontaneous (non)emergence of property rights

The paper analyses preferences of private owners over the degree of property rights protection. It is shown that inequality in resource ownership and/or relative inefficiency of production technologies could make wealthier agents favour less than full protection of property rights. If such agents control the choice of a property rights regime, fully secured property rights will not emerge from the grassroots. This conclusion is consistent with the failure to create an efficient property rights system in Russia.