《艺概·诗概》理路、使命及得失谈

从清诗及清代社会思潮的大背景考察《艺概.诗概》的使命,从中国文化的深厚背景找寻刘熙载诗评的理路,从清儒与宋儒的关系考察刘熙载之所失,是捕捉《艺概.诗概》目的的基本手法。     

Existence of a competitive equilibrium in a one sector growth model with heterogeneous agents and irreversible investment

Summary. We prove existence of a competitive equilibrium in a version of a Ramsey (one sector) model in which agents are heterogeneous and gross investment is constrained to be non negative. We do so by converting the infinite-dimensional fixed point problem stated in terms of prices and commodities into a finite-dimensional Negishi problem involving individual weights in a social value function. This method allows us to obtain detailed results concerning the properties of competitive equilibria. Because of the simplicity of the techniques utilized our approach is amenable to be adapted by practitioners in analogous problems often studied in macroeconomics. Received: September 13, 2001; revised version: December 9, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We are grateful to Tapan Mitra for pointing out errors as well as making very valuable suggestions. Thanks are due to Raouf Boucekkine and Jorge Duran for additional helpful discussions. We also thank an anonymous referee for his/her helpful comments. The second author acknowledges the financial support of the Belgian Ministry of Scientific Research (Grant ARC 99/04-235 “Growth and incentive design”) and of the Belgian Federal Goverment (Grant PAI P5/10, “Equilibrium theory and optimization for public policy and industry regulation”). Correspondence to: C. Le Van     

资本约束下我国商业银行的风险偏好现状与对策研究

随着巴塞尔协议Ⅲ和中国银监会印发的《中国银行业实施新监管标准指导意见》的出台,确立了我国银行业实施新监管标准的政策框架。受此影响,当一部分银行资本充足率不迭标时,可以约束盲目信贷扩张,抑制经济过热的手段之一,调控商业银行整体风险水平;当大部分银行都达到了最低资本充足率要求时,资本约束效应将明显弱化,其他政策工具将是调控信贷的主要手段;而大部分银行为了降低风险。会选择“分母”对策,调整其资产组合。监管部门应我国银行业现状出发,以平滑信贷供给的过度波动为目标,逆风向调整资本充足率,以满足监管要求。     

Whistle-Blowing for Profit: An Ethical Analysis of the Federal False Claims Act

This paper focuses on the 1986 Amendments to the False Claims Act of 1863, which offers whistle-blowers financial rewards for disclosing fraud committed against the U.S. government. This law provides an opportunity to examine underlying assumptions about the morality of whistle-blowing and to consider the merits of increased reliance on whistle-blowing to protect the public interest. The law seems open to a number of moral objections, most notably that it exerts a morally corrupting influence on whistle-blowers. We answer these objections and argue that the law is not objectionable on these grounds. Since there are no compelling moral objections to the law, it is appropriate and acceptable to judge the law in terms of its economic costs and benefits. We assess the most salient of these and conclude that the benefits outweigh the costs. We suggest that a mechanism similar to the Act should be considered for protecting stockholders’ interests in the private sector. We conclude by making several proposals for improving the existing legislation. The authors' names are listed in alphabetical order. An earlier version of this paper was presented to the Society for Business Ethics August 2004.     

Tourism and urban revitalization a case study of Pore , Yugoslavia

This article emphasizes the necessity of a multidisciplinary approach to revitalization of old urban areas through tourism. Historical urban values require special multidisciplinary care when transformed to suit the needs of both tourists and local population. The case study of the old urban area in Pore illustrates how this can be done. The study was aimed at identifying reasons for which tourists and local population visit Pore 's old urban core. It also intended to analyze the visitors' reactions to and expectations of old urban areas. The findings were to help make revitalization decisions and introduce new measures into the revitalization process itself, which in turn aimed at contributing to both future tourism developments and preservation of the area's historical and cultural heritage.     

Symmetry and order in the portfolio allocation problem

Summary. This research studies the role of multivariate distribution structures on random asset returns in determining the optimal allocation vector for an expected utility maximizer. All our conclusions pertain for the set of risk averters. By carefully disturbing symmetry in the distribution of the, possibly covarying, returns, we ascertain the ordinal structure of the optimized allocation vector. Rank order of allocations is also established when a permutation symmetric random vector is mapped into the returns vector through location and scale shifts. It is shown that increased dispersion in the vectors of location and scale parameters benefit, ex-ante, investors as does a decrease in the rank correlation coefficient between the location and scale parameter vectors. Revealed preference comparative static results are identified for the location and scale vectors of asset returns. For most issues addressed, we arrive at much stronger inferences when a safe asset is available. Received: August 8, 2000; revised version: January 8, 2001     

Discounting long run average growth in stochastic dynamic programs

Summary. Finding solutions to the Bellman equation often relies on restrictive boundedness assumptions. In this paper we develop a method of proof that allows to dispense with the assumption that returns are bounded from above. In applications our assumptions only imply that long run average (expected) growth is sufficiently discounted, in sharp contrast with classical assumptions either absolutely bounding growth or bounding each period (instead of long run) maximum (instead of average) growth. We discuss our work in relation to the literature and provide several examples. Received: July 26, 2000; revised version: July 10, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" I am specially grateful to Cuong Le Van and to anonymous referee for detecting an error in a previous version of this paper and for suggestions that sensibly improved the paper. Comments and suggestions are also acknowledged to Michele Boldrin, Raouf Boucekkine, Fabrice Collard, Tim Kehoe, Omar Licandro, and Luis Puch. I am also indebted to participants to the III Summer School on Economic Theory held at the Universidade de Vigo, the Macroeconomics Workshop at the Universitat Autò}noma de Barcelona, and the Econometrics Seminar at Tilburg University. Financial support from the Belgian government, under project PAI P4/01, at the IRES-UCL, from a European Marie Curie fellowship, Grant HPMF-CT-1999-00410, at the CEPREMAP, and from IVIE and Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and FEDER, under project BEC2001-0535, at the Universidad de Alicante, is gratefully acknowledged.     

Effect of credible quality investment with Bertrand and Cournot competition

We show how credible revelation and ability to commit to quality choice effect equilibrium qualities and welfare when product market is either Bertrand or Cournot competition. We show that results depend on the type of competition but not generally on the cost of quality function. We show that with Bertrand competition, the equilibrium qualities are lower with credible commitment. Competition is moderated and producer surplus is higher and consumer surplus lower. With Cournot competition, higher quality will be better but lower quality will be worse with credible commitment. Consumer surplus is always greater with credible commitment and if cost does not increase too quickly with quality, producer surplus will also increase. Thus credible commitment is a collusive device with Bertrand competition but it can improve social welfare with Cournot competition. Received: February 8, 2000; revised version: February 14, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" The idea of this paper originated in the weekly workshops of Mordecai Kurz at Stanford. I am forever in debted to Mordecai and fellow students – Luis Cabral, Peter DeMarzo, John Hillas, Michihiro Kandori, Steve Langois, Patrick McAllister, Steve Sharpe, Peter Streufert, Steve Turnbull and Gyu-Ho Wang – for their criticism and encouragement. I also benefited from comments from Yi-Heng Chen, Jin-Li Hu, Kala Krishna, Jinji Naoto, Thomas J. Prusa, and Shyh-Fang Ueng at various later stages of this work. Last but not least, I am grateful for the detailed comments of the referee.     

An algebraic theory of portfolio allocation

Summary. Using group and majorization theory, we explore what can be established about allocation of funds among assets when asymmetries in the returns vector are carefully controlled. The key insight is that preferences over allocations can be partially ordered via majorized convex hulls that have been generated by a permutation group. Group transitivity suffices to ensure complete portfolio diversification. Point-wise stabilizer subgroups admit sectoral separability in fund allocations. We also bound the admissible allocation vector by a set of linear constraints the coefficients of which are determined by group operations on location and scale asymmetries in the rate of returns vector. For a distribution that is symmetric under a reflection group, the linear constraints may be further strengthened whenever there exists an hyperplane that separates convex sets. Received: May 15, 2001; revised version: March 20, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" Journal paper No. J-19797 of the Iowa Agriculture and Home Economics Experiment Station, Ames, Iowa. Project No. 3463, and supported by Hatch Act and State of Iowa funds. Correspondence to: D. A. Hennessy