大兴安岭林业持续发展的探讨

大兴安岭森林是受冻土控制下形成和发展的，保存了大量淡水资源，形成了冷湿生态环境。大兴安岭林业持续发展必须按特殊方式经营，建立生态林业，从而发挥其固有的多种效益。     

以历史发展的观点看公共财政与"三农"问题

“三农”问题是一个受到全社会普遍关注的大问题，本从历史发展的角度，追溯了“三农”问题产生的根源，并结合实际工作，提出了按照公共财政的要求对“三农”进行扶持的主要方面。     

超市进货交易关系法律调整的若干问题探讨——论“零供”关系法律调整

近年来，我国零售商供应商矛盾突出，引起了各方关注。商务部等五部委发布的《零售商供应商公平交易管理办法》，是近年来专门调整零供关系的政府部门规章，在稳定流通秩序方面发挥了一定的作用，但对此也有一些不同观点。为完善零供（买卖）关系的法律规范体系，推进和谐商业环境及商事法治建设，本文对调整零供关系的法律属性，少数零售企业恶意占压、骗取供应商贷款的综合治理，风险预誓机制等相关问题提出了自己的一些见解。     

利用OLE技术实现Excel与dBase的通信

论述了一种基于OLE自动化技术、利用Excel的OLE对象实现Excel与dBase数据库之间进行通信的方法，并给出了在VB下实现该技术的主要代码。     

Addressing the growth failure of the oil economies: The role of financial development

The oil exporting countries have experienced a relatively continuous fall in GDP per capita over the last 30 years. This is in spite of benefiting from a more than average of the rest of the world investment rate. The findings of this paper, report a lower level of financial development for the oil economies when compared with the rest of the world. We will show in this paper that the higher rate of investment of the oil economies can be explained mainly by the oil revenues and surprisingly, financial development has a net dampening effect on investment for these economies. The paper also shows that the weakness of financial institutions, contributes to the poor performance of economic growth of the oil economies and the weakness of financial institutions might be associated with the dominant role of government in total investment and the weakness of private sector.     

发展我国养老保险的思考

本文分析了现阶段养老保险中人口老龄化的压力日益加剧，覆盖范围明显过窄，已入保群体“空账运行”，养老待遇过低等问题，提出了提高退休年龄、降低缴费比率、将社会统筹基金与个人账户基金实行分账管理、让基金保值增值加快社会保障制度立法等若干相关政策建议。     

“万村千乡”推广悖论及其解决方案

在农村消费市场存在差异的条件下，全国范围的以行政补贴和市场推广相结合的“万村千乡”推广方式将面临“推广悖论”，即工程的普遍服务职能与企业追求利润的目标之间的冲突，进而可能会造成财政补贴资金的浪费。应在不同区域采用不同的推广策略：发达地区农村，应以企业自主经营为主；具有一定消费市场潜力但企业开拓成本还比较高的地区，应行政补贴和市场推广相结合；尚不具备经营条件的农村地区，应加强基础设施建设，并提高农民收入水平，待时机成熟后再逐步推进。     

浅谈客户关系管理和价值创新

现代企业客户关系管理是改善客户关系、降低交易成本、扩大市场份额、提高经济效益的一项非常重要的管理内容。它致力于最大化客户的价值和提高公司的利润。文章先对客户关系管理对企业的重要性进行了分析，指出其对企业的价值所在；接着以星巴克公司为例，分析说明了在企业客户关系管理过程中运用价值创新战略对企业价值创造的帮助。     

A Cross‐national Comparison of R&D Expenditure Decisions: Tax Incentives and Financial Constraints*

We provide evidence on the impact of tax incentives and financial constraints on corporate R&D expenditure decisions. We contribute to extant research by comparing R&D expenditures in the United States and Canada, thereby exploiting the differences in the two countries' R&D tax credit mechanisms and generally accepted accounting principles. The two tax incentive mechanism designs are consistent with differing views of the degree of financial constraints faced by firms in these economies. Our sample also allows us to explore the effects of capitalizing R&D on Canadian firms. Employing a matched design, we document relations between tax credit incentives and R&D spending consistent with both Canadian and U.S. public companies responding as though they are not financially constrained. We estimate that the Canadian credit system induces, on average, $1.30 of additional R&D spending per dollar of taxes forgone while the U.S. system induces, on average, $2.96 of additional spending. We also find that firms that capitalize R&D costs in Canada spend, on average, 18 percent more on R&D. Collectively, this evidence is important to the ongoing debates in both countries concerning the appropriate design of incentives for R&D and is consistent with the assumptions found in the U.S. tax credit system, but not those found in the Canadian system.     

Does a Switch of Budget Regimes Affect Investment and Managerial Discretion of State-Owned Enterprises? Evidence from Italian Firms

We investigate the investment decisions of Italian state-owned enterprises (SOEs) across budget constraint regimes and carry out a natural experiment that exploits a regime switch in 1987. Drawing on the theory of capital market imperfections, we apply an empirical framework for investment analysis to a panel of manufacturing SOEs in competitive industries. We identify parallels between SOEs and widely held, quoted companies afflicted by agency problems, managerial discretion, and overinvestment. We argue that, in the case of SOEs, the soft budget regime increases managerial discretion, facilitates collusion with vote-seeking politicians, and results in wasteful investment. Consistent with our predictions, we find that the regime switch disciplines SOE's investment behavior. Following a hardening of the budget constraint, managers lose discretion to indulge in collusion and overinvestment. J. Comp. Econ., June 2002 30(4), pp. 787–811. London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom; and CERIS–CNR, Institute for Economic Research on Firms and Growth, National Research Council, Via Avogadro, 8, 10121 Turin, Italy. © 2002 Association for Comparative Economic Studies. Published by Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E32, G31, G32, L32, M40.