浅论工程量清单计价模式下施工组织设计的编制

通过介绍工程量清单计价模式的特点，分析了施工组织设计在工程量清单计价模式下的重要性，并对其编制方法进行了探讨。     

数字时代企业环境审计模式创新——基于环保政策响应机制的研究

企业规避环保责任的机会主义行为导致政府环保政策成效不显著。基于利益相关者理论构建环保政策利益相关者模型,并从环保权力、责任和信息三个角度分析企业的环保政策响应机制。研究发现：由于消费者缺位以及信息不对称等因素的影响,企业的环保政策响应水平较弱。政府应将环保政策施加于消费者,通过消费者来约束企业的行为;审计主体应当转变现有的审计模式,运用数字技术,与消费者合作共同完成审计监督的工作。基于此,提出一种基于消费者需求引导的综合环保政策及新型企业环境审计模式,建议政府应重视数字技术对产业的改造升级,充分考虑消费者的因素来制定环保政策并加大对企业污染数据实时监控的普及。     

标尺竞争法在公司投资决策中的应用

论文主要分析了标尺竞争法在公司投资决策中应用的问题。标尺竞争法是一种相对常见的对配电行业公司进行监督的方法,论文将其应用到配电行业公司的投资决策中,并运用标尺竞争法的“影子公司”概念构建“虚拟模型公司”。论文对“虚拟模型公司”的选择问题与选择对策进行分析,找出适合标尺竞争法在公司投资决策中应用的模式。     

协同发展背景下的公共管理创新模式初探

在当前社会发展的新形势下,公共管理面临一系列的问题,需要相关管理人员将该项管理工作与经济发展衔接在一起,明确公共管理创新与经济发展之间的关联性,并针对公共管理创新实践的现状进行综合分析,采取强有力的管理措施,强化公共管理的实效性,提升公共管理的整体水平与效率,以期让公共管理创新更好地协助经济发展。论文针对协同发展背景下的公共管理创新模式展开论述。     

基于云计算与物联网技术的数据挖掘

在科学技术快速发展的今天,信息通信行业已经与我们的日常生活完全融为一体,并且推动了整个社会的发展,所以在科学技术快速进步的过程中,信息通信相关技术也在不断发展,其中,基于云计算的物联网发展越来越受到人们的重视。论文对基于云计算的物联网数据挖掘模式进行分析及探讨,从而为互联网数据挖掘技术发展提供相应的参考。     

跨境电子商务物流模式创新与发展趋势研究

随着我国经济社会的不断发展,城市化进程加快,对物流模式的发展也有了新的要求。从目前的发展情况来看,跨境电子商务物流模式得到了广泛的应用,这种物流模式打破了传统方式的弊端,给电子商务的发展带来了新的机遇与挑战。为进一步加强跨境电子商务物流模式的发展,需要分析其发展过程中存在的问题及其创新与发展趋势,进而促进跨境电子商务物流模式的发展。     

“互联网+”背景下,打造农特产品新型营销模式

在互联网兴盛的当代,电子商务成为新潮流,农民对于线上销售流程较为陌生,但消费者更倾向于线上买卖。打造农特产品新型营销模式,政府、企业、高校三主体参与建设,开展透明化生产+故事化销售,注重有爱消费+健康饮食,实现公众号+第三方小视频平台+农特产APP三位一体,促进企业发展、大学生创业、线上助农巧妙结合,从而推动经济收益与社会效益双提升。     

Variable labour supply, specialisation-based external economies, and capital inflow

This paper examines the impact of exogenous capital inflow on prices, production, labour supply, and welfare in the presence of specialisation-based externalities. The paper utilises a simple model of an economy that produces one-final good by means of capital, labour, and a large number of varieties of an intermediate good. The intermediate good is produced by means of capital and labour. The supply of capital is exogenous but the supply of labour is endogenous. The presence of internal economies of scale in the intermediate good industry gives rise to specialisation-based external economies in the production of the final good. Perfect competition prevails in the final good industry whereas the intermediate good industry operates under Chamberlinian monopolistic competition. It is shown that exogenous capital inflow decreases labour supply and increases welfare only if the elasticity of substitution between leisure and the final good is equal to or less than unity. The paper also shows that, if trade opens up between two otherwise similar economies, a capital rich country would be a net importer of varieties of the intermediate good.     

Winner-take-all price competition

Summary. We analyze an oligopoly model of homogeneous product price competition that allows for discontinuities in demand and/or costs. Conditions under which only zero profit equilibrium outcomes obtain in such settings are provided. We then illustrate through a series of examples that the conditions provided are “tight” in the sense that their relaxation leads to positive profit outcomes. Received: April 7, 2000; revised version: September 14, 2000     

Delegation and polarization of platforms in political competition

Summary. We consider a model of political competition among two ideological parties who are uncertain about the distribution of voters. The distinguishing feature of the model is that parties can delegate electoral decisions to candidates by nomination. It is shown that if the credible platform commitments of the candidates is feasible, then at least one of the parties nominates in equilibrium to a candidate who has an ideology that is more radical than the delegating party's ideology. In a variety of circumstances, this, in turn, yields a polarization of equilibrium policy choices of the candidates. It is thus argued formally here that strategic nomination of the candidates may well be one of the major reasons behind the well documented observation that the platforms associated with the political parties in two-party democracies are often surprisingly polarized. Received: January 10, 2002; revised version: May 8, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We thank Alberto Alesina, Levent Ko?kesen, Antonio Merlo, Ronny Razin, Vijay Krishna, Alessandro Lizzeri, and seminar participants at Alicante, Columbia, Copenhagen, and NYU for helpful comments. We also thank an anonymous referee for its useful suggestions. A good fraction of this research was conducted while Ok was a visitor in the Department of Economics at University of Alicante; he thanks for the kind hospitality of this institution. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education through grant CICYT BEC2001-0535 (Faulí-Oller) and BEC2001-0980 (Ortu?o-Ortín). Correspondence to:I. Ortu?o-Ortin