Incomplete regulation, market competition and collusion

Regulators often do not regulate all firms competing in a given sector. Due to product substitutability, unregulated competitors have incentives to bribe regulated firms to have them overstate their costs and produce less, thereby softening competition. The best collusion-proof contract entails distortions both for inefficient and efficient regulated firms (distortion ‘at the top’). But a contract inducing active collusion may do better by allowing the regulator to ‘team up’ with the regulated firm to indirectly tax its competitor. The best such contract is characterized. It is such that the unregulated firm pays the regulated one to have it truthfully reveals its inefficiency. We finally compare those contracts.     

MSE-improvement of the least squares estimator by dropping variables

It is well known that dropping variables in regression analysis decreases the variance of the least squares (LS) estimator of the remaining parameters. However, after elimination estimates of these parameters are biased, if the full model is correct. In his recent paper, Boscher (1991) showed that the LS-estimator in the special case of a mean shift model (cf. Cook and Weisberg, 1982) which assumes no “outliers” can be considered in the framework of a linear regression model where some variables are deleted. He derived conditions under which this estimator outperforms the LS-estimator of the full model in terms of the mean squared error (MSE)-matrix criterion. We demonstrate that this approach can be extended to the general set-up of dropping variables. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the MSE-matrix superiority of the LS-estimator in the reduced model over that in the full model are derived. We also provide a uniformly most powerful F-statistic for testing the MSE-improvement.     

Market Structure and Risk Taking in the Banking Industry

We demonstrate that the common view according to which an increase in competition leads banks to increased risk taking fails to hold in an environment where homogeneous loss averse consumers can choose in which bank to make a deposit based on their knowledge of the riskiness incorporated in the banks outstanding loan portfolios. With an exclusive focus on imperfect competition we find that banks incentives for risk taking are invariant to a change in the banking market structure from duopoly to monopoly. Finally, we show that deposit insurance would eliminate the gains from bank competition when banks use asset quality as a strategic instrument.revised version received October 15, 2003     

旅游区(点)核心竞争力的实质及营建实证

旅游区(点)(以下简称旅游区)是旅游业发展的重要支撑,核心竞争力是反映一个旅游区素质和发展潜能的重要标志。文章运用竞争优势理论和核心竞争力理论并结合旅游业的自身特点,以重庆涪陵天台峡谷景区为例,探讨了旅游区核心竞争力的营造方法,并提出了以目标市场为导向,以彰显旅游资源特色、提供差异性体验为内核的旅游区核心竞争力建设思路。     

我国煤炭产业过度竞争原因及对策

目前我国煤炭产业低级低效、高度分散的竞争型市场结构,即理论上称的“原子型”结构,是造成我国煤炭产业过度竞争的原因。煤炭过度竞争使我国煤炭资源浪费、资源价格扭曲、部分国有企业亏损严重和煤炭行业效益持续低下,解决我国煤炭过度竞争必须通过提高产业进入门槛,降低产业退出门槛,提高煤炭产业的集中度,实施大型煤炭企业集团战略并对此给予必要的政策扶持。     

企业生态位与竞争战略

本文提出了企业生态位的概念,并运用生态位理论对企业生态位宽度和企业生态位重叠的内涵、测度作了尝试性的探索.在一个环境资源有限的企业生态系统中,企业之间的竞争程度与其生态位重叠的程度成比例关系.企业不仅要选择恰当的生态位,而且要根据环境的变化对生态位作出及时、适当的调整和优化.企业可以通过生态位分离来实现生态位共生,从而避免由于生态位的严重重叠而引起的过度竞争.     

物流服务市场供求关系研究

从认识物流服务市场的供求现状出发,使用经济学理论、竞争理论、物流业固有特性三个分析方法进行物流服务市场供求关系研究,对揭示我国物流服务市场的运行规律有一定的引导作用。     

基于博弈论的二层供应链网络竞争与结盟模型

就两个制造商和一个零售商所组成的供应链模型进行研究,运用博弈论方法来研究制造商间的竞争及制造商与零售商间的竞争和协调决策问题,给出了两种决策下相应的数学模型,并比较了制造商与零售商间有无联盟关系时对各自收益的影响。     

基于国际直接投资的城市竞争力研究——以长江三角洲为例

城市竞争力是区域竞争力的前沿阵地,提升城市竞争力是强化区域竞争能力的关键.基于FDI的区域城市群竞争力提升存在固有缺陷,据此研究了长江三角洲城市群竞争力提升中存在的不可避免的问题.并提出以提高城市竞争力为基础来提升城市FDI集聚能力,是长江三角洲所有城市必须认真面对的重要课题.     

防城港市旅游资源优势及旅游开发策略

防城港市地处中越边境,是我国大西南地区通往越南和东南亚的交通要道,区位优势明显。这里有辽阔的海滩,茂密的热带季雨林,成群的白鹭,生长在大海中的红树林以及迷人的京族民族风情等自然与人文旅游资源。要充分利用西部大开发这一难得机遇,大力发展旅游业,把本市建设成为环境优美、有一定影响力的旅游城市。