语言文化下的翻译信息走失及应对策略

不同种类的语言受到文化差异的影响,往往会出现信息走失的现象,本文从地域和自然环境、宗教文化、颜色词汇三方面来讨论引起语言文化下的翻译信息走失的原因,发现只有熟练掌握两国不同文化时才能进行准确翻译。     

自愿披露客户信息影响了债券违约风险吗？

以2010—2021年沪深A股上市公司发行的公司债为样本,实证检验了自愿披露客户信息对债券违约风险的影响。研究发现,自愿披露客户信息产生的额外风险加剧了债券违约风险,这种影响在高专有成本和高融资约束的企业中表现更为显著,但企业发行的绿色债券并未受到影响。机制检验表明,经营风险增加和机构投资者持股降低是自愿披露客户信息影响债券违约风险的重要途径。研究表明,企业需要慎重考虑披露客户信息带来的风险,审慎制定信息披露策略。     

The effect of banking crisis on bank-dependent borrowers

We provide causal evidence that adverse capital shocks to banks affect their borrowers’ performance negatively. We use an exogenous shock to the U.S. banking system during the Russian crisis of Fall 1998 to separate the effect of borrowers’ demand of credit from the supply of credit by the banks. Firms that primarily relied on banks for capital suffered larger valuation losses during this period and subsequently experienced a higher decline in their capital expenditure and profitability as compared to firms that had access to the public-debt market. Consistent with an adverse shock to the supply of credit, crisis-affected banks decreased the quantity of their lending and increased loan interest rates in the post-crisis period significantly more than the unaffected banks. Our results suggest that the global integration of the financial sector can contribute to the propagation of financial shocks from one economy to another through the banking channel.     

Embedded Options in the Mortgage Contract

Loss mitigation is the process by which lenders attempt to minimize losses associated with foreclosure. As competition increases in the mortgage industry, lenders and servicers are under great pressure to adopt loss mitigation tactics rather than simply use foreclosure as the means of dealing with borrowers in default. This study presents a mortgage-pricing model that fully specifies all borrower options with respect to default, including the ability to reinstate the mortgage out of default. We document the impact of various loss mitigation programs, including forbearance and antideficiency judgments, as well as the value of credit on borrower default behavior.     

Bias in estimates of discrimination and default in mortgage lending: The effects of simultaneity and self-selection

The common practices of estimating single-equation models of mortgage rejection to test for discrimination in mortgage markets or single-equation ex ante mortgage default equations to validate underwriting criteria produce biased and inconsistent parameter estimates. This is due to problems of simultaneous equations bias which arise because, in a world of imperfect information, mortgage terms are not exogenous to the rejection or default decision. In addition, mortgage default estimates are also subject to selection bias. Monte Carlo experiments are used to study the nature and extent of likely bias in single-equation estimation results. We find that rejection equation estimates indicate discrimination when none exists and that estimated coefficients of mortgage terms, such as the loan-to-value ratio, are also subject to significant bias in both rejection and default equations.     

How does competition affect bank systemic risk?

Using bank level measures of competition and co-dependence, we show a robust negative relationship between bank competition and systemic risk. Whereas much of the extant literature has focused on the relationship between competition and the absolute level of risk of individual banks, in this paper we examine the correlation in the risk taking behavior of banks. We find that greater competition encourages banks to take on more diversified risks, making the banking system less fragile to shocks. Examining the impact of the institutional and regulatory environment on bank systemic risk shows that banking systems are more fragile in countries with weak supervision and private monitoring, greater government ownership of banks, and with public policies that restrict competition. We also find that the negative effect of lack of competition can be mitigated by a strong institutional environment that allows for efficient public and private monitoring of financial institutions.