企业持续成长模式探讨——“变异”与持续成长

本文讨论了企业的持续成长模式．在借鉴生物生存机理的基础上．提出了“前变异”与“后变异”的概念．认为“前变异”是企业获取突破性技术的基本模式．“前变异”具有随机性和无指向性的特点．企业中大量存在的非分工合作是产生“前变异”的基础。     

Choice of Distribution System in the New Zealand Life Insurance Industry

Using 1988–93 panel data drawn from the New Zealand life insurance industry, this paper examines empirically the notion that the choice of distribution system is an efficient contracting solution to incentive conflicts between owners, managers and sales agents in life insurance firms. Consistent with what was hypothesised, the empirical results suggest that choice of distribution system is distinguished by organisational form, firm size, and sales commission. However, contrary to expectations, the variables representing product diversity and asset specificity were found not to be statistically significant. The empirical results thus lend mixed support for prior predictions.     

Accrual accounting and Australian fiscal policy

Australian governments have recently moved from cash accounting to accrual accounting. Accrual accounting has been accompanied at the national government level by the introduction of a new key fiscal policy measure: the ‘fiscal balance’. This paper explains and evaluates this new fiscal measure. It concludes that, given the present fiscal policy of the Australian government, fiscal balance is a superior fiscal policy measure to the ‘cash’ budget balance measure which it replaced. However, from the alternative ‘golden rule’ policy standpoint, fiscal balance is not a meaningful fiscal policy measure — although its stock counterpart, net financial liabilities, certainly is.     

Inferring repeated-game strategies from actions: evidence from trust game experiments

Summary. Combining a strategy model, an inference procedure and a new experimental design, we map sequences of observed actions in repeated games to unobserved strategies that reflect decision-makers’ plans. We demonstrate the method by studying two institutional settings with distinct theoretical predictions. We find that almost all strategies inferred are best responses to one of the inferred strategies of other players, and in one of the settings almost all of the inferred strategies, which include triggers to punish non-cooperators, are consistent with equilibrium strategies. By developing a method to infer unobserved repeated-game strategies from actions, we take a step toward making game theory a more applied tool, bridging a gap between theory and observed behavior.Received: 23 December 2002, Revised: 19 April 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, C80, C90.The authors are indebted for discussions with Ray Battalio, David Cooper, Robin Dubin, John Duffy, Ellen Garbarino, Susan Helper, Margaret Meyer, John Miller, Jim Rebitzer, Mari Rege, Al Roth, and John Van Huyck. The authors also benefited from discussants at economic department seminars at Case Western Reserve, McMaster and McGill University, University of Pittsburgh, SUNY-Stony Brook, and Texas A&M, and participants at the 2002 European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society. We are grateful for the financial support provided by the Department of Economics at the University of Pittsburgh and Case Western Reserve University.     

试论市场经济条件下的经济计划

在商品货币关系广泛存在的情况下,要想恰当有效地按比例分配社会劳动时间,既离不开市场的作用,也离不开计划的作用。这既为资本主义社会的实践所证明,也为社会主义社会的实践所证明。对这个问题进行深层次的分析,可以从生产关系与生产力、上层建筑与经济基础的关系上,从计划与市场的内在统一性上。从计划与市场两种手段的不同特点上找到理论根据。在市场经济条件下,并不排斥计划的作用,但计划工作必须进行改革使之与发展市场经济相适应。     

全面理解人力资本的经济价值——教育经济学与培训经济学的融合

教育经济学不应只是正规学校教育的经济学,在终身学习的理念下,正规学校教育的结束并不意味着学习步伐的停滞和人力资本投资的终结。教育经济学未来拓展的路径,除了理论基础上的"外延式"发展外,还可以在原有的人力资本理论框架内走一条"内涵式"发展的道路,即强调综合考察人力资本投资的多种途径,特别是教育和培训这两种最主要的人力资本投资形式,让教育经济学走出正规学校教育经济学的固有领地,团结在人力资本理论的名义下,与培训经济学融合,走向人力资源开发研究的广阔天地,惟其如此,才能全面、深入地研究人力资本的经济价值及其实现机制。     

Towards a complete real-time electricity market design

The general design for the real-time electricity market presented in this paper optimizes and prices both real and reactive power simultaneously in an AC setting, where all assets—generation, load and transmission—are allowed to bid and are financially settled at the locational price times energy consumed or produced. The result is that transmission lines are compensated for both capacity and admittance, providing incentives for efficient operation of transmission-related assets such as FACTS devices, if price-taking behavior is assumed. Losses are incorporated into the design and become an operating cost for transmission. The market design is shown to be revenue neutral and, under some assumptions, nonconfiscatory.      

基于“行为经济学理论”的旅游者行为分析

传统的旅游者行为分析方法,主要是进行定性的分析,将各个因素进行框架分析,而对旅游者行为的影响因素分析深度不够。借助行为经济学的理论和分析方法,从旅游者的心理活动角度入手,注重旅游者的心理变量分析,应用前景理论和心理账户分析旅游者行为,充分考虑了情境因素和体验因素,使得关于旅游者的行为分析更加细化和接近现实生活。     

Evolutionary Stability in the Investment-Opportunism-Retaliation Game

Can economically efficient outcomes be obtained and sustained in the absence of externally enforced property rights? We study the evolutionary properties of a game that exhibits two well-defined Nash equilibria: one generates an inefficient outcome while the other set generates an efficient outcome supported by the potential for retaliation. Although standard forward-looking refinements eliminate the efficient equilibrium, neither equilibrium type satisfies strict evolutionary stability criteria. However, both types of equilibrium define strategies that are neutrally stable, which makes them vulnerable to drift in dynamic environments. We conduct computer simulation experiments in which players learn adaptively via a tournament selection mechanism called sophisticated experimentation. Our simulations demonstrate that while the system spends a disproportionately high proportion of time in the inefficient equilibrium set, the efficient equilibrium is pervasive as the system drifts back and forth between the equilibrium sets, never settling on one or the other.     

经济学不是数学

对经济学的不加限制的“数学化”可能正在阉割经济学的本质。只要人类的思想、情感、行为还不能“精确”为一组数字，那么经济学就只能是一门关于“人”的科学，而不是一门关于“数字”的科学，经济学和数学就始终存在着一个不可逾越的界限。经济学的根本方法并不是数学，而是唯物辩证法。数学只是经济学的分析工具。远离了人文精神，抛弃了唯物辩证法，经济学就只剩下了一堆数字、图表、模型，经济学中的主体——人就被消解了。