Location choices under strategic interactions

We explore a fundamental aspect of firms' location choices largely overlooked in the literature: strategic interaction. We formalize the notion that strategic interaction renders collocation less appealing by fostering competition, which erodes firms' profits. Strategic interaction also impacts location choices across time. Specifically, because firms learn by doing in markets, location choices are shaped by two novel effects: entrenchment benefits from entering early in a market and improving capabilities relative to rivals, and opportunity costs from postponing entry to other markets where rivals enter and learn. When learning is local, firms collocate more: rivals are preempted from improving relative capabilities in higher‐value markets. However, when learning is global, firms collocate less: they can transfer capabilities from lower‐value to higher‐value markets, blocking rivals from achieving entrenchment benefits. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Strategic factor markets,scale free resources,and economic performance: The impact of product market rivalry

This paper analyzes how scale free resources, which can be acquired by multiple firms simultaneously and deployed against one another in product market competition, will be priced in strategic factor markets, and what the consequences are for the acquiring firms' performance. Based on a game‐theoretic model, it shows how the impact of strategic factor markets on economic profits is influenced by product market rivalry, preexisting competitive (dis)advantages, and the interaction of acquired resources with those preexisting asymmetries. New insights include the result that resource suppliers will aim at (and largely succeed in) setting resource prices so that the acquiring firms earn negative strategic factor market profits—sacrificing some of their preexisting market power rents—by acquiring resources that they know to be overpriced. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

地方政府竞争与对策——基于Justmon-Thisse模型及其扩展的分析

政府竞争是政府运用税收、补贴、基础设施等手段吸引可流动的人力、投资等资源,目的在于促进本地经济的增长,迎合本地居民需要。但是在晋升博弈背景下的政府竞争则由于由官员的收益代替了居民的收益作为地区收益的代表,因此出现了地区基础设施同质化和以高额补助方式进行恶性竞争的招商引资大战。通过对贾斯特曼－蒂斯模型的拓展,我们论证了进行政治体制改革是解决我国政府间恶性竞争的关键,成立具有约束力的区域协调机构或区域合并能够提高本区域的收益水平,通过促进人口自由流动等方式建立“用脚投票”机制,可以作为对政治体制改革滞后的一种有益弥补。     

Do German security analysts herd?

We employ an innovative methodology suggested by Bernhardt et al. (J. Financ. Econ. 80:657–675, 2006) to examine the herding (or anti-herding) behavior of German analysts regarding earnings forecasts. This methodology avoids well-known shortcomings often encountered in related studies, such as correlated information signals, unexpected common shocks to earnings, systematic optimism or pessimism, or forecast target mismeasurement. Our findings suggest that German analysts anti-herd, that is, they systematically issue earnings forecasts that are further away from the consensus forecast than their private information indicates. Furthermore, we analyze the association between herding behavior and different characteristics, including the size of the brokerage, general or firm-specific experience, and the coverage of firms on the Neuer Markt. We mainly confirm findings for the United States, for example, that anti-herding is more severe in cases of higher competition among analysts. Contrary to anecdotal evidence, we also find anti-herding behavior in earnings forecasts for Neuer Markt firms during the “new economy” bubble.

政府采购的帕累托最优合同与监督博弈

我国政府采购制度自实施以来,在提高财政资金使用效益、增强政府宏观调控能力和促进廉政建设等方面取得了一定的成就。但其在相关法律法规、管理体制、运行环境、监督机制等方面仍存在诸多问题。运用博弈论的分析方法对政府采购中的帕累托最优合同与监督问题进行了探讨,并提出相应的解决策略,以供政府与供应商等参考。     

经济学中的"理性"思考

从古典经济学出发,全面分析现代经济学,从新古典经济学到博弈论,从行为金融学再到进化博弈理论、新制度经济理论等研究方法,通过分析现代经济学研究方法的演化发展,使我们可以清楚地认识到理性研究在经济学研究方法中从完全理性到弱化理性再到有限理性的不断发展变化。     

资产规模、资本状况与商业银行资产组合行为——基于中国银行业面板数据的实证分析

本文立足于我国转型期内的经济金融特征,构造了一个银行资产组合行为的局部均衡模型。在对中国银行业按照资产规模和资本状况进行分类的基础上,本文的实证分析证明了模型的基本含义:由于银行间的异质性,紧缩性货币政策之后商业银行的资产组合行为体现出了截面效应。基于此,本文提出了确立以银行资产组合行为为基础的货币政策决策体系,加强货币政策与监管政策之间的协调等政策建议,以提高货币政策的有效性。     

我国基金经理投资行为实证研究

我国证券市场快速发展,推动了基金业的迅猛增长,随着基金数量的增多,作为管理基金的基金经理的作用和地位正在迅速上升。基金经理的投资决策行为势必会影响到基金的业绩,如何综合评价基金经理的投资行为,是摆在我们面前的一大课题。本文在对国内外学者有关基金经理投资行为文献评析的基础上,提出了投资行为度的概念,并运用多元回归计量方法和突变评价法对我国基金经理的投资风格、投资策略、投资绩效、择股时机选择能力、风险管理能力以及个人行为模式和基金业绩之间的关系等进行了实证检验,得出了一些有意义的结论。最后从行为金融理论角度分析了中国证券投资基金经理行为偏离的根本原因,并提出相应的政策建议。     

改革预期、动态博弈与专项中央银行票据兑付北大核心

专项票据是新一轮农村信用社改革中主要的资金支持方式。本文通过分析认为,中央银行在专项票据兑付考核中建立的"威胁"具有不完全可置信,农村信用社对改革及专项票据的兑付存有强烈的预期,专项票据兑付是中央银行与农村信用社间的完全但不完美信息动态博弈,博弈的结果取决于中央银行设立的"威胁"的可信性,较低的"威胁"将引致农村信用社较高的作假行为,达不到"花钱买机制"的改革目标。为此,中央银行要提高"威胁"的置信度,降低农村信用社对专项票据兑付的预期,激励农村信用社通过真实努力深化改革,实现改革方案设计的目标。     

论采油企业成本管理控制长效机制的建立

为了完成生产经营任务，采油企业内某些单位客观上还存在一些短期行为。从最终影响来看，采取短期行为，可能使得采油成本在短期内趋于下降，但会导致后期成本急剧上升，不利于企业的可持续发展。因此，需要运用法律、行政、制度、政策等多种手段，建立成本管理控制长效机制，以克服各种短期行为的发生，从而实现采油企业成本的长期效能。