Identifying the Transition from Efficient-Market to Herding Behavior: Using a Method from Econophysics

We test whether “detrended fluctuation analysis” (DFA)—an econophysics method—identifies the transition from efficient-market trading to herding behavior and the rise of the NASDAQ dot.com stock market bubble. DFA divides a time series into “segments” of varying lengths and then tests whether power-law distributions exist within the segments. A power-law distribution of stock-price changes within a segment indicates herding behavior and the start of the dot.com bubble. The clarity of the transition indication depends on both segment lengths and segment starting dates. Our findings show that DFA can be used to identify the beginning of stock-market bubbles but not the beginning of crashes.     

信息披露、市场约束与银行风险承担行为

文章运用我国14家主要商业银行2000-2008年间的数据,实证研究了银行信息披露与其风险承担行为之间的关系,研究表明信息披露能否发挥其市场约束功能取决于相应的制度基础和市场环境,只有当金融体系的市场化程度较高,且银行能充分有效地披露其风险信息时,来自债权人的市场约束行动才能真正发挥对银行风险承担行为的约束作用.     

农户过度放牧行为产生原因分析--来自黑河流域肃南县的农户调查

我国草地资源位居世界第二位,但目前退化非常严重,已经成为牧区生态环境保护和经济发展的主要制约因素。导致草地退化的原因多种多样,自然因素是不可调控因素,并且在近50年内并非是导致草地大面积退化的主要因素,实际上,人为因素才是最为主要的因素,其中过度放牧是最主要因素之一。农户作为草地使用和经营行为的微观主体,其行为可直接或间接地响应所有管理行为和制度的最终效应。通过针对肃南县草地退化进行的农户问卷调查进行详细剖析,并结合有关统计资料,尝试从农户角度阐释过度放牧行为产生的内在机制,认为农户的支出需求增加、收入的增幅减缓与缺乏稳定的收入预期、收入渠道单一以及生态支付意愿不高是导致农户过度放牧行为产生的根本原因。     

多关系条件下多代理人行为分析与激励机制设计

针对多个代理人之间存在多种关系———竞争、合作和中立的情况,建立了信息对称和信息非对称条件下的多代理人行为选择模型,通过模型求解与模拟计算分析多关系条件下多代理人的行为选择和委托人的最优选择或激励机制。结果表明:信息对称条件下,员工薪酬与员工间的竞争程度无关,但合作关系更能激励员工努力工作;信息非对称条件下,员工间关系影响其薪酬和企业利润,合作关系下的企业总收益比其他关系下的企业收益高,员工间的合作关系会影响并提高处于其他关系下员工的努力程度。最后提出:企业面对多员工管理问题时应尽量构建合作的工作环境,以减小员工工作努力程度的不确定性、实现利益最大化。     

员工反生产行为组织控制的演化博弈分析

基于演化博弈理论和员工反生产行为组织控制的行为博弈演化过程,构建企业与员工共同参与的演化博弈模型.博弈的复制动态方程表明:员工选择显性反生产行为的比例、员工因选择反生产行为所获得的额外收益、企业对员工的反生产行为进行监管所投入的成本,企业观测到员工选择反生产行为时所作出的处罚都将对博弈均衡的结果产生影响.对此,应加强人力资源管理,加大组织支持力度,建立有效的控制机制.     

The effects of interorganizational governance on supplier's compliance with SCC: An empirical examination of compliant and non-compliant suppliers

Often, there is a huge gap between the requirements of the Supplier Codes of Conduct (SCC) imposed by buyers from advanced economies and actual compliance with SCC in developing countries. It is difficult for reseachers to reach suppliers who have violated SCC, especially within a large sample, because few disclose SCC violations to the public. In this paper, however, we identified 108 non-compliant Chinese apparel and textile suppliers. Through the investigation of these non-compliant suppliers and their compliant peers, this paper tests the impacts of antecedent factors (price pressure, production complexity, and contract duration) and buyer's governance mechanisms (peer-to-peer and buyer-to-supplier) on the likelihood of a supplier's compliance with SCC. While the buyer-to-supplier governance does not show significant effects, the peer-to-peer governance demonstrates the likelihood of supplier's commitment to SCC. This research reveals that if buyer's governance efforts move away from threat and toward cooperation, supplier's compliance with SCC could be more sustainable.     

THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE OF FIRMS: A CRITICAL REVIEW

Abstract.  New trends in studies on the governance of natural assets include substantial consideration of the role of voluntary initiatives. A traditional economic view states that there is a trade-off between being green and being competitive. According to that view, no voluntary environmental action is expected to occur. To undertake an in-depth analysis of the scope for voluntary action, this paper reviews empirical literature that analyzes the relationship between manufacturing firms' environmental initiatives or performance and economic results. This review moves beyond the general test of the 'pay to be green' hypothesis, preferring instead to systematize empirical results in more specific research questions. Empirical findings of the reviewed literature generally support that there is no penalty for being green. In addition, the typology of firms, the methods utilized for implementing environmental initiatives, the intensity of abatement efforts and stockholders' valuation of green firms have all been shown to have a sizeable influence on the actual economic results of environmental action or management. Consequently, the findings of this paper challenge the traditional strategic theory that predicts widespread free-riding; it holds major implications for environmental policy-making and environmental business decisions.     

植入"公平博弈"的委托-代理模型——来自行为经济学的一个贡献

本文通过将Rabin(1993)提出的"公平博弈"概念植入现有委托一代理模型,获得一个考虑了代理人表现出"互惠性"非理性行为的新委托一代理模型.由该模型给出来的最优委托一代理合约可以给委托人带来比现有委托一代理最优合约更高的利润水平.研究发现,现有的Holmstrom-Milgrom模型中的最优合约不是帕累托最优的.新模型可以解释企业人性化管理和许多有特色的人性化企业文化的形成.本文是行为经济学与现有激励理论相结合研究的一种初步尝试,是运用行为经济学原理重建信息经济学基本框架的原创性工作.     

Heterogeneous beliefs with herding behaviors and asset pricing in two goods world

We construct a incomplete information equilibrium model with heterogeneous beliefs and herding behaviors to identify their joint effects on the dynamics of asset prices. Herding behaviors make investors revise some of their estimations about expected growth rates of goods streams toward to the other one’s by a manner of weighted average of their own forecast and the other’s. As we expected, herding behaviors generate influences on the Radon Nikodym derivative, that is so-called “sentiment” as in Dumas et al. (2009), and in turn not only impact the dynamics of asset prices but also generate influences on investors’ survivals. We also show that introducing heterogeneous beliefs with herding behaviors permits to explain both the Backus–Smith puzzle and the mixed results about the influences of herding behaviors on asset prices. Moreover, we uncover that herding behaviors have positive influences on stocks’ risk premiums.     

Efficiency in overlapping generations economies with longevity choices and fair annuities

When individuals can influence their life-expectancies and save in annuities, suboptimal savings result from the lack of incentives to choose the optimal longevity, even when annuity returns can be made contingent to longevity-related choices. Specifically, the golden rule steady state maximizing the representative agent utility cannot be attained as a competitive equilibrium under laissez-faire, even with actuarially fair annuities contingent to longevity-enhancing choices. In order to decentralize through markets the golden rule, longevity-enhancing expenditures need to be taxed if the steady state old-age consumption exceeds the annuitized capital return, and subsidized otherwise—the government budget being balanced through lump-sum transfers or taxes. Interestingly, with positive population growth the expected net contribution is negative when longevity-enhancing expenditures are taxed, and positive when subsidized.