How Has Rural Tax Reform Affected Farmers and Local Governance in China？

Using nationally representative data, the present paper examines the impact of China's ongoing rural tax reform on farmers. The difficulties in further local governance restructuring are also discussed. It is argued that the issues associated with rural taxation and local governance in China result from inherent tension between an increasingly liberalized economic system and a still centralized political system. Although rural tax reform has helped to reduce farmers' tax burdens in the short term, the establishment of an effective local governance regime requires coordinated reforms to downsize local bureaucracy by providing social security for laid-off cadres, to strengthen local accountability by granting higher local formal tax autonomy, and to promote meaningful participation by expanding local democracy.     

A note on the existence of unique equivalent martingale measures in a Markovian setting

Simple sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique equivalent martingale measure are provided. Furthermore, these conditions give us a handle on situations where an equivalent martingale measure cannot exist. The existence of a unique equivalent martingale measure is of relevance to problems in mathematical finance. Two examples of models for which the question of existence was unresolved are studied. By means of our results existence of a unique equivalent measure up to an explosion time is proved.     

我国市场经济初建时期知识经济的思考

债转股是防范金融风险和加快国有企业扭亏为盈的重要举措 ,但债转股的推行又产生了一系列的法律问题 ,本文借鉴国外的相关立法并结合我国的具体情况 ,就债转股的四个方面法律问题进行了讨论 :债转股与资本真实原则 ;债转股与公司治理结构 ;债转股与债权人利益保护 ;债转股与股     

How to get firms to invest: A simple solution to the hold-up problem in regulation

Abstract. Many governmental programs are effective only if firms make costly investments. The inability of authorities to precommit to a regulatory scheme creates incentives for firms not to invest and to hold-up the regulator. This paper describes a simple subsidy/tax scheme embedded in a four-stage mechanism that solves the hold-up problem. We design a self-financing subsidy/tax scheme which benefits a complying firm at the expense of a non-complying firm. In order to be credible, the subsidy and tax rates must maximize social welfare for any combination of investment decisions. We show that there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which all firms invest and no actual implementation with subsidies and taxes is required. We discuss in which cases the mechanism can work under incomplete information. Received: 30 December 1998 / Accepted: 12 October 2001     

Whose Capital is It? Putting Owners Back in Control

John Bogle, founder of The Vanguard Group, looks at corporate governance issues. JEL Classification G3     

Village Elections,Accountability and Income Distribution in Rural China

1. Introduction The village election was first envisioned by the late chairman of the National People’sCongress (NPC), Mr Peng Zhen, in the mid-1980s to enhance village governance after the commune system was dissolved in China in the early 1980s. In 1987, the NPC passed a tentative version of The Organic Law of the Village Committee (OLVC), and started a 10 year experiment of village elections. In 1998, the NPC formally passed the law and elections quickly spread to the whole count…     

建立法人股东为主导的股权治理模式

股权结构是公司治理结构的基础,其设置状况是否合理对公司治理结构的效率有着决定性的影响.文章针对当前上市公司股权治理的弊端,设计出一种股权持有者多元化、股权集中程度分散化的股权结构,并提出我国上市公司应建立以法人股东为主导的治理模式.     

“棘轮式”代理问题与子公司经理人激励:家族集团治理

家族集团中,在企业家通过本期产出水平来确定子公司经理人所应上缴的产出分配收益的情况下,经理人会通过调整自己的努力水平,间接控制自己在下期的上缴额度,从而导致激励效率损失.但是,如果企业家能收取固定的产出分配收益,并确定高额违约金,就能够有效地规避子公司经理人代理问题.