Government contracts and US bond yield spreads: A study on costs and benefits of materialized political connections

In a 1991–2013 sample of bonds issued by US public firms, we find that the cost of debt (yield spread relative to comparable Treasuries) of suppliers to government agencies is contingent on the strategic importance of the supplier's industry. The yield spreads for strategically unimportant government suppliers are higher than for firms that are not government suppliers. If government contracts serve as tangible evidence of political connections, these higher yield spreads indicate that weaker corporate governance as a cost of political connections outweighs the benefits of said connections. For the subsample of government suppliers from strategically important industries, where the benefits of implicit bailout guarantees and revenue stability outweigh the corporate governance problems, the cost of debt is lower than for firms that are not government suppliers. The higher (lower) cost of debt for strategically unimportant (strategically important) suppliers is confined to contracting with the federal government. Our findings are robust to alternative variable and sample specifications, and to endogeneity concerns.     

双边市场、不完全信息与二级价格歧视

本文研究了双边市场二级价格歧视问题。本文构建了包括广告商、消费者、垄断平台在内的两阶段博弈模型，研究了在最优与次优情况下平台的定价机制，分析了二级价格歧视对平台利润、社会福利等的影响。研究表明：（1）“顶部无扭曲”或“底部无扭曲”并不严格成立；（2）平台对观众提供的节目质量、广告插播量均可能出现类型逆转的情况；（3）二级价格歧视会增加社会总福利；（4）“会员制”是平台可能的占优定价机制之一。     

The role of stock ownership by US members of Congress on the market for political favors

I examine whether stock ownership by politicians helps to enforce noncontractible quid pro quo relations with firms. The ownership by US Congress members in firms contributing to their election campaigns is higher than in noncontributors. This bias toward contributors depends on the financial incentives of politicians and the relation's value. Firms with a stronger ownership–contribution association receive more government contracts. The financial gains from these contracts are economically large. When politicians divest stocks, firms discontinue contributions to the politicians, lose future contracts, and perform poorly. Politicians divest the stocks in contributors, but not in noncontributors, in anticipation of retirement.     

Termination fees and bilaterally efficient merger contracts

We present a simple model of exchange in which mutual gains from trade motivate the use of termination fees in merger contracts. The inclusion of a termination fee permits bilaterally efficient merger contracts that make merger consummation more likely and result in higher merger payoffs for both the bidder and the target compared to contracts without termination fees. Introducing risk aversion for either the bidder or the target has negligible effects upon the preferred contracts, revealing that termination fees are not primarily a form of bidder insurance, although they do increase the probability that a merger is consummated. The model provides a rich collection of predictions, all of which are consistent with the empirical regularities reported to date.     

Bidding for Firms with Unknown Characteristics

When a region successfully attracts a firm by offering subsidies, the firm often commits itself to performance targets in terms of employment. In this paper, we interpret these firm‐specific targets as a consequence of incomplete information. We analyze a model of two regions that compete for a firm, assuming that the firm's productivity is ex ante unknown. We show that performance targets often induce overemployment in high‐productivity firms, and that tax credits are often superior to lump‐sum payments. Moreover, when regions differ in wage rates, the low‐wage region wins the bid and has a higher surplus than under complete information. Finally, we show that, under incomplete information, bidding might not lead to efficient firm location.     

Anomalies in the Foundations of Ridge Regression

Errors persist in ridge regression, its foundations, and its usage, as set forth in Hoerl & Kennard (1970) and elsewhere. Ridge estimators need not be minimizing, nor a prospective ridge parameter be admissible. Conventional estimators are not LaGrange's solutions constrained to fixed lengths, as claimed, since such solutions are singular. Of a massive literature on estimation, prediction, cross–validation, choice of ridge parameter, and related issues, little emanates from constrained optimization to include inequality constraints. The problem traces to a misapplication of LaGrange's Principle, unrecognized singularities, and misplaced links between constraints and ridge parameters. Alternative principles, based on condition numbers, are seen to validate both conventional ridge and surrogate ridge regression to be defined. Numerical studies illustrate that ridge regression as practiced often exhibits pathologies it is intended to redress.     

现货市场波动与商品期货合约定价

通过构建商品期货合约定价模型,证明商品期货合约价格由资本市场系统风险溢价和标的现货市场特有(非市场)风险溢价两个部分构成.商品期货市场价格影响标的商品期货价格的前提条件是存在足够多的参与商品期货市场的交易者.当标的商品现货市场需求增加.在预期商品期货合约价格为正值的情况下,都将会使商品期货合约的价格上升,扩大交易风险并增加多头收益.相反,在预期商品期货合约价格为负值的情况下,需求增长引起初级产品价格上升将使商品期货合约价格的绝对值下降,减少交易风险和引起多头损失.如果标的商品现货市场需求减少,在预期商品期货合约价格为正值的情况下,将引起商品期货合约的价格下降,减少交易风险并降低空头损失.相反,在预期商品期货合约价格为负值的情况下,商品期货合约价格的绝对值增加,扩大交易风险和增加空头收益.     

Credit derivatives, capital requirements and opaque OTC markets

In this paper we study the optimal design of credit derivative contracts when banks have private information about their ability in the loan market and are subject to capital requirements. First, we prove that when banks are subject to a maximum loss capital requirement the optimal signaling contract is a binary credit default basket. Second, we show that if credit derivative markets are opaque then banks cannot commit to terminal-date risk exposure, and therefore the optimal signaling contract is more costly. The above results allow us to discuss the potential implications of different capital adequacy rules for the credit derivative markets.     

WTI crude oil Futures in portfolio diversification: The time-to-maturity effect

The aim of the paper is to analyze the diversification effect brought by crude oil Futures contracts, the most liquid commodity Futures, into a portfolio of stocks. The studies that have documented the very low- and essentially negative-correlations between commodities and equities typically rely on normally distributed returns, which is not the case for crude oil Futures and stocks indexes. Moreover, the particular time-to-maturity chosen for the Future contract used as an investment vehicle is an important matter that needs to be addressed, in presence of forward curves switching between backwardation and contango shapes.Our goal in this paper is twofold: (a) we introduce copula functions to have a better representation of the dependence structure of oil Futures with equity indexes; (b) using this copula representation, we are able to analyze in a precise manner the “maturity effect” in the choice of crude oil Future contract with respect to its diversification benefits. Our finding is that, in the case of distant maturities Futures, e.g., 18 months, the negative correlation effect is more pronounced whether stock prices increase or decrease. This property has the merit to avoid the hurdles of a frequent roll over while being quite desirable in the current trendless equity markets. Empirical evidence is exhibited on a database comprising the NYMEX WTI crude oil Futures and S&P 500 index over a 15 year-time period.     

心理契约破坏不利于组织认同?

在探讨心理契约破坏对员工组织认同影响中,可探讨以领导成员交换为中介变量和互动公平氛围为调节变量在此关系中的作用。通过对中小科技型制造企业的354名员工调查研究发现,心理契约破坏对员工组织认同有显著的负向影响;员工领导成员交换部分中介心理契约破坏对组织认同有负向影响;互动公平氛围调节心理契约破坏与领导成员交换有负向关系;进一步,互动公平氛围既调节心理契约破坏对组织认同的直接影响,也调节了心理契约破坏经过领导成员交换对组织认同的间接影响。