独立董事报酬水平和薪酬结构设计分析

目前，我国独立董事薪酬制度存在严重的效率问题。研究发现，最优薪酬水平取决于独立董事的风险偏好、收入预期、工作能力和生产函数；最优薪酬结构取决于独立董事的风险偏好、收入预期，与其工作能力和生产函数无关；风险厌恶程度较高的独立董事适宜偏重货币工资激励。     

地方政府预算自主权的缺失问题研究

在政府理财过程中,高效的预算编制模式是科学民主的选择.而我国多级政府与多级预算体制下,预算职权纵向配置多表现为中央政府对地方预算权利的诸多限制与约束,地方预算自主权严重缺失.本文对这一问题展开论述.     

Board governance and corporate performance

We examine the link between the monitoring capacity of the board and corporate performance of UK listed firms. We also investigate how firms use the flexibility offered by the voluntary governance regime to make governance choices. We find a strong positive association between the board governance index we construct and firm operating performance. Our results imply that adherence to the board‐related recommendations of the UK Corporate Governance Code strengthens the board's monitoring capacity, potentially helping mitigate agency problems, but that investors do not value it correspondingly. Moreover, in contrast to prior UK findings suggesting efficient adoption of Code recommendations, we find that firms at times use the Code flexibility opportunistically, aiming to decrease the monitoring capacity of the board, which is followed by subsequent underperformance. This finding questions the effectiveness of the voluntary approach to governance regulation followed in the UK and in many countries around the world.     

股权制衡、非国有股东委派董事与公司绩效

从公司治理层面完善国有控股企业的股权制衡是国企混合所有制改革的重点和难点,以往学者仅仅研究了股权制衡与公司绩效之间的关系,很少研究两者关系的作用路径和影响机理.因此,引入非国有股东委派董事这一概念,研究非国有股东委派董事在股权制衡与公司绩效之间发挥的中介效应.结果表明:股权制衡有利于公司绩效的提升,非国有股东委派董事在股权制衡与公司绩效两者之间发挥了中介效应.     

Independent directors and earnings management: The moderating effects of controlling shareholders and the divergence of cash-flow and control rights

The research results on the suppressing effect of independent directors on earnings management are not consistent in existing literature. In addition, it has been argued that using financial statements provided by top management to investigate top management's earnings management is not appropriate. Therefore, the purpose of this study is twofold. First, we used external auditors (including the auditors of Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation and the auditors of two Big Four accounting firms – Deloitte & Touche and KPMG in Taiwan) as respondents in order to obtain less biased data. Second, we investigate the moderating effects of controlling shareholders and the divergence of cash-flow and control rights on the relationship between independent directors and earnings management. The results show that both the existence of controlling shareholders and the divergence of cash-flow and control rights have significant suppressing effects on the relationship between independent directors and earnings management. Theoretical and practical implications are also discussed.     

Board changes and CEO turnover: The unanticipated effects of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act

The board independence requirements enacted in conjunction with the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) provided motivation for firms that were already compliant with the regulations to alter their board structure. We consider actual board changes made by compliant firms and how such changes affect the monitoring efficiency of the boards. We find that the majority of compliant firms (approximately 56%) add independent directors following SOX. However, we find a nontrivial number of firms (approximately 26%) actually decrease the number of independent directors to move closer to the stated 50% requirement. For firms that decrease independence, the CEO turnover performance sensitivity significantly decreases following SOX. We also find that large board independence changes seem to be most detrimental to the monitoring function of the board. Our results highlight that SOX may have had unintended consequences.     

A saddlepoint approximation to the distribution of the sum of independent non‐identically uniform random variables

Calculating the probability of the corresponding significance point is important for finite sample sizes. However, it is difficult to evaluate this probability when the sample sizes are moderate to large. Under these circumstances, consideration of a more accurate approximation for the distribution function is extremely important. Herein, we performed a saddlepoint approximation in the upper tails for the distribution of the sum of independent non‐identically uniform random variables under finite sample sizes. Saddlepoint approximation results were compared with those for a normal approximation. Additionally, the order of errors of the saddlepoint approximation was derived. © 2014 The Authors. Statistica Neerlandica © 2014 VVS.     

Does CEO duality constrain board independence? Some evidence from audit pricing

This study examines whether CEO duality affects the association between board independence and demand for higher quality audits, proxied by audit fee. The findings show that there is a positive association between board independence and audit fees. This result is consistent with findings of Carcello et al. (2002) that more independent boards demand higher audit quality and effort. However, this positive association is only present in firms without CEO duality, thus suggesting that CEO duality constrains board independence. The results support recommendations against CEO duality by showing that dominant CEOs may compromise the independence of their board of directors. Additionally, evidence is provided that board size (the number of directors on the board) is positively associated with audit fee pricing. This is consistent with prior studies that indicate that larger board sizes are associated with inefficiency and negative firm performance.     

浅谈独立学院贫困生资助管理工作的几点思考——以江苏科技大学苏州理工学院为例

当前高校贫困生人数和比例呈上升趋势,高校贫困生资助管理工作应与时俱进,应把高校贫困生帮扶与教育相结合,把物质救助手段与精神鼓励手段结合起来,全面、系统的做好高校贫困生的资助管理工作。     

辽宁上市公司董事会报告透明度影响因素研究

以46家辽宁上市公司为样本,对影响董事会报告透明度因素的研究发现:股权集中度、管理层持股比例、董事会规模、独立董事比例与董事会报告透明度呈正相关关系;股权制衡度,董事长与总经理是否两职合一,审计意见类型与董事会报告透明度呈负相关关系。上市公司应该通过股票期权等方式提升管理人员的持股比例,激励他们积极治理公司,提高董事会报告信息披露的透明度;上市公司第二大股东应适度提高持股比例,防止一股独大现象;同时减少董事长与总经理两职合一,也会有助于提高董事会报告的透明度。