Carrot and stick: A role for benchmark-adjusted compensation in active fund management

Investors delegating their wealth to privately informed managers face not only an intrinsic asymmetric information problem but also a potential misalignment in risk preferences. In this setting, we show that by tying fees symmetrically to the appropriate benchmark investors can tilt a fund portfolio toward their optimal risk exposure and realize nearly all the value of managers’ information. They attain these benefits despite an inherent inefficiency in the choice of the benchmark, and at no extra cost of compensating managers for exposure to relative-performance risk. Under certain conditions, benchmark-adjusted performance fees are necessary to prevent passive alternatives from dominating active management. Our results shed light on a recent debate on the appropriate fee structure of active funds in contexts of high competition from passive funds.     

Investment busts,reputation, and the temptation to blend in with the crowd

We provide a real-options model of an industry in which agents time abandonment of their projects in an effort to protect their reputations. Agents delay abandonment attempting to signal quality. When a public common shock forces abandonment of a small fraction of projects irrespective of agents' quality, many agents abandon their projects strategically even if they are unaffected by the shock. Such “blending in with the crowd” effect creates an additional incentive to delay abandonment ahead of the shock, leading to accumulation of “living dead” projects, which further amplifies the shock. The potential for moderate public common shocks often improves agents' values.     

Share Holder Wealth Effects of Corporate Selloffs: Impact of Growth Opportunities, Economic Cycle and Bargaining Power

Most of the existing empirical evidence on corporate selloffs documents significant wealth gains for the seller's shareholders. We investigate the sources of these wealth gains by examining the impact of business and financial strategy, the economic environment during selloff, and the bargaining advantages of the seller including information asymmetry. We find evidence that sellers with growth opportunities and financially strong sellers enjoy higher returns. Selloffs during recessions generate larger wealth gains than those during economic boom. Information asymmetry due to the buyer's location being different from the purchased division's gives the seller a bargaining advantage leading to larger wealth gains. Relatively large divestments are more beneficial to seller shareholders than small ones. The study highlights the importance of both firm specific and environmental factors in explaining the wealth gains associated with corporate selloffs.     

Characteristics of Earnings-Leading Versus Price-Leading Firms

This study attempts to identify firm characteristics that explain the disparity between the information content of accounting earnings and stock prices. Granger's causality concept was employed to classify sample firms into four groups: price-leading firms, feedback-system firms, earnings-leading firms, and no-causation firms. The feedback-system firms were either combined with the no-causation firms or eliminated entirely to form three sample groups. The entire sample firms then were divided into two classes. The first is for estimation, and the second is for prediction. Results indicate that firm size, capital structure, R-square of regressing prices at time t against earnings at time t – 1, R-square of regressing earnings at time t against prices at time t – 1, and percentage of shares held by institutions are the significant explaining variables. The application of the coefficient estimates to the hold-out sample indicates that 76.2% of the firms can be correctly classified into the corresponding groups. These results were consistent with those from canonical discrimination and other multivariate statistical methods.     

Vacancies and Rent Dispersion in a Stochastic Search Model with Generalized Tenant Demand

I model imperfect information, derive a downward sloping market demand curve, and explain vacancies in a partial equilibrium model of a rental housing market. Tenants can be completely described by an exogenous demand curve, perhaps arising from differences in income, preferred location, or tastes, and view vacant units based on a stochastic arrival of rental information. Free entry of these landlords induces excess rental housing capacity (equilibrium vacancies). I determine the equilibrium distribution of rents for vacant units, show that this rent distribution may be discontinuous, and explore the equilibrium vacancy rate to changes in exogenous parameters. The resulting characterization of equilibrium distributions of rents may be amenable to econometric modeling exploring the relationship between market rents and vacancies.     

Uncertainty and the Cost of Reversal

For standard irreversibility theory the prospect of acquiring better information in the future should induce more flexible decisions: the “irreversibility effect”. This result relies on the definition of an irreversible position as one that would be technically or economically impossible to reverse. In practice, many positions can be reversed at an affordable cost. In this case an increase in informativeness alone is not enough to bias decisions in favour of more flexibility. We look for restrictions on decision sets, information structures and preferences that make possible to study the effect of information on flexibility. JEL Classification No: D81, D9     

Asymmetric Information in Fads Models

Fads models were introduced by Shiller (Am Econ Rev 71:421–436, 1981) and Summers (J Finance 41:591–601, 1986) as plausible alternatives to the efficient markets/constant expected returns assumptions. Under these models, logarithms of asset prices embody both a martingale component, with permanent shocks, and a stationary component, with temporary shocks. We study a continuous-time version of these models both from the point of view of informed agents, who observe both fundamental and market values, and from that of uninformed agents, who only observe market prices. We specify the asset price in the larger filtration of the informed agent, and then derive its decomposition in the smaller filtration of the uninformed agent using the Hitsuda representation of Gaussian processes. For uninformed agents we obtain a non-Markovian dynamics, which justifies the use of technical analysis in optimal trading strategies. For both types of agents, we solve the problem of maximization of expected logarithmic utility from terminal wealth, and obtain an explicit formula for the additional logarithmic utility of informed agents. Finally, we apply the decomposition result to the problem of testing the presence of fads from market data. An application to the NYSE-AMEX indices from the CRSP database shows that, if the fads component prevails, then the mean-reversion speed must be slow.     

试论银行上市后的投资者关系管理

上市银行投资者关系管理的特殊性包括复杂性和重要性， 其重要意义在于能使投资者支持银行发展，让市场正确理解银行的价值；其双向沟通机制能够使上市银行高级管理层及时了解市场的看法；良好的投资者关系管理能保证上市银行以后的融资活动成功完成。因此，上市银行必须认真做好投资者关系管理工作，全体员工都应该对此有充分的认识，积极参与这项工作。上市银行做好投资者关系管理工作有以下几个关键点需要把握，即重视制度建设，创新沟通手段，持续地对投资者关系管理进行分析研究工作，防止出现选择性信息披露，适时进行市值管理。     

银行资本管理工程化的逻辑框架与实施策略

银行资本管理是基于风险管理、财务管理基础上的战略管理,是衡量与协调风险、收益、规模和成长性的最有效工具之一,在现代银行经营管理中作用日益重要。本文首先总结了资本管理的相关理论,阐述了以经济资本管理为主,账面资本管理和资本充足率管理为辅的现代商业银行资本管理的总体架构。在此基础上提出了以工程化方式,统筹协调、循序渐进,逐步构建现代银行资本管理体系。现代银行资本管理体系建设内容主要包括过程管理、制度体系和信息系统三方面,其中,过程管理是资本管理体系的核心;现代化银行资本管理体系实施途径主要包括组织因素和阶段因素。     

Commodities and Macroeconomic Factors: Unconditional Volatility Measures

Abstract:

This study focuses on the measurement of spillover effects from macroeconomic factors to commodity volatility. It argues that such measurement is sensitive to volatility computation and to causality testing. To this end, I analyze two commodity data sets-gold and the Continuous Commodity Index (1969-2011), and twenty-four Dow Jones futures indexes (1991-2011)-and various macroeconomic indicators. I conclude that the macroeconomic factors that influence volatility generally depend on the commodity under consideration. I also explore whether commodities of the same class experience volatility shifts around the same dates, and find that this is not the case except for energy commodities.