网购市场鱼龙混杂现象的经济学解释：基于二维不对称信息的视角

网络购物市场存在商品鱼龙混杂的典型现象：高价格的商品不一定高质量,低价格的商品也不一定低质量,表现出明显的信息不对称特征。文章基于网络购物市场所存在的两个维度不对称信息的特征事实,即厂商在产品质量与产品生产成本两个方面拥有私有信息,通过构建二维不对称信息的分析框架,从市场均衡的视角首次解释了上述现象的经济机理。分析表明,由于二维不对称信息的存在,消费者和厂商决策的互动过程使得市场上产品价格与质量不再具有单调递增关系,从而网络购物市场可能出现鱼龙混杂的市场均衡,文章证明了这一均衡在合理的条件下是存在的。文章通过比较静态分析考察了市场环境的变化如何影响商品质量的价格信号显示效率以及消费者购买行为,并考察了网络购物行业商家披露信息、消费者对于商家的反馈评分机制和保证退货等手段对于消除商品鱼龙混杂现象的有效性,为进一步规范发展我国网络购物行业提供了参考。     

Optimal Self-Reporting Schemes with Multiple Stages and Option Values

We consider a model of optimal law enforcement where sanctions can be reduced for self-reporting individuals. We distinguish between a first self-reporting stage before the case is investigated and a second one where the criminal is detected, but not yet convicted. Since we assume that violators have private information in both stages, fine reductions for self-reporting individuals lead ceteris paribus to a higher violation frequency. Nevertheless, we show that fine reductions should be granted in both stages. We characterize the connection between the two fine reductions in the optimal policy and relate our results to self-reporting schemes observed in reality.     

信息技术现状及培训需求的调查

讨论了面向社会普及信息技术的重要性,通过问卷调查、统计等方法,对我国信息技术应用和需求的现状及问卷中所反映出的问题,如希望学习的内容,学习时间和费用等方面内容作了认真的分析,提出了解决问题的思路和对策。     

Incentives for motivated agents under an administrative constraint

Consider an agent who has an expertise in producing a non-marketable good. This good is valued by a single principal, and there is a verifiable measure of the agent’s performance. Crucially, the agent is intrinsically motivated due to ‘warm glow altruism’. In addition, the agent’s budget, which is controlled by the principal, must not be less than the monetary performance-cost faced by the agent. This gives rise to a limited-liability constraint. It also restricts the agent’s ability to under-report costs. In such environment, we determine the link between the agent’s budget and performance. Our results come in contrast to the received solution of the principal-agent problem and to most in the literature on mission-motivated organisations and public services provision.     

Contracts with endogenous information

I study covert information acquisition and reporting in a principal agent problem allowing for general technologies of information acquisition. When posteriors satisfy two dimensional versions of the standard First Order Stochastic Dominance and Concavity/Convexity of the Distribution Function conditions, a first-order approach is justified. Under the same conditions, informativeness and riskiness of reports are equivalent. High powered contracts, that make the agent's informational rents more risky, are used to increase incentives for information acquisition, insensitive contracts are used to reduce incentives for information gathering. The value of information to the agent is always positive. The value of information to the principal is ambiguous.     

Escalating penalties for repeat offenders: a note on the role of information

The severity of the sanction for a given offense is often determined by the offense history of the offender. We establish that this policy can be welfare-maximizing if individuals are imperfectly informed about the magnitude of the sanction. Imperfect information distorts individuals’ perception of the expected sanction of the first offense. Once detected, individuals learn about the sanction applicable to their act, making this argument less relevant for consecutive offenses.      

Toward a more practical approach to evaluating programs: The Multi‐Objective Realization approach

Emerging trends indicate that programs are being used to deliver benefits that may not be fully harnessed from single sets of uncoordinated projects. To support this movement, it is essential to have suitable measurement frameworks to assess the contribution of these activities and supply decision makers with valuable data on whether their objectives are being realized. This paper introduces the Multi‐Objective Realization Method (MORE) to help measure the strategic contributions of programs. The main principles of MORE underline the importance of a formal strategy to elicit and develop program objectives and to frame those objectives within defined measurement dimensions.     

Monopoly Rents and Price Fixing in Betting Markets

Betting markets provide an ideal environment in which to examinemonopoly power due to the availability of detailed information on product pricing. In this paper we argue that the pricing strategies of companies in the U.K. betting industry are likely to be an important source of monopoly rents, particularly in the market for forecast bets. Pricing in these markets are shown to be explicitly coordinated. Further, price information is asymmetrically biased in favor of producers. We find evidence, based on U.K. data, that pricing of CSF bets is characterized by a significantly higher markup than pricing of single bets. Although this differential can in part be explained by the preferences of bettors, it is reasonable to attribute a significant part of the differential as being due to monopoly power.     

基于信息交流技术的组织权威演化机制

沿袭巴纳德组织理论关于信息交流技术对组织权威影响的思路,对组织权威的本质进行了讨论,在此基础上,进一步讨论了信息交流技术对组织权威演化进程的影响。     

基于KIFA的物流外包服务商选择机制研究

本文主要研究昆明国际花卉拍卖交易中心(KIFA)物流外包服务商的选择机制,从KIFA拍卖交易完成后到最终的鲜花零售店的各个物流环节。本文提出了基于招投标的配送服务商的初选方法,再用AHP方法[1]最终确定最佳配送服务商。从而提高了昆明国际花卉拍卖交易中心的花卉物流服务、降低了成本、提高了客户满意度,同时,为同类花卉拍卖交易中心物流服务商的选择提供参考依据。