Immunization in Developing Countries: Its Political and Organizational Determinants

The factors that most affect immunization coverage involve the global policy environment and contact with international agencies. Except in very poor countries, democracies have lower coverage rates than autocracies. The quality of a country’s institutions and its level of development are also strongly related to immunization rate coverage and vaccine adoption. There is no evidence that disease outbreaks or polio eradication campaigns affect immunization rates. In the current structure of immunization programs, coverage rates respond more to supply-side than demand effects.     

对基于自由民主角度的分裂权利理论的简评

关于分裂权利的研究,一直是国际学界在分裂主义研究中重点关注的一个问题。许多西方学者基于自由民主的角度,对分裂权利的正义性进行辩护。这些为分裂权利进行辩护的理论大体可以分为自决权理论、基本权利理论和唯一补救权利理论三类。这些关于分裂权利正义性的论述对相关国家的反分裂工作造成了消极的影响,但中国学界未能发出自己的声音。虽然这些理论打着自由民主的旗号,但在理论上却是反自由、反民主的,而且在实践上也是矛盾和缺乏解释力的。同时,这些理论未能把握分裂主义的本质性要素,即领土的因素,无视这种单方的领土分裂诉求对所在国领土和主权完整乃至于国际秩序的冲击;它们也忽视了分裂主义常常表现出来的暴力性和恐怖性以及这种极端政治诉求对人权、和平与自由的践踏;在分裂主义的领土性和暴力性的挑战下,分裂并非解决民族冲突、保护少数权利的可行路径。     

国际政治中的国家利益

国家利益是国际政治中影响各个国家对外行为的最根本性要素,而国家利益是在国际政治中发挥作用最持久、影响力最大的因素,是国家对外行为的最基本动因。但是,什么是国家利益,如何在理论上对其加以认知,在国际政治理论中可以说是五花八门。     

论生育政策的制定与调整——一个过程论的分析视角

生育政策主要以立法、行政决策和党的规范性文件为表达形式。生育政策在生育数量、社会抚养费和对违反法律、法规生育者行政处分等方面面临着一系列问题,产生这些问题的重要原因之一便是生育政策制定和调整过程中科学性和民主性的缺失。良好的生育政策的制定与调整,需要多领域专家的论证,以专业性和中立性来保证政策的科学性;同时也需要广大公众的积极参与,以通过组织化的基本权利之利益诉求的表达来保证政策的民主性。     

韩国财阀改革的政治经济学：以小股东运动为例

正如自由放任非自然形成，韩国财阀的形成也是一个政治的产物。除了政府的金融和产业等政策支持。不少韩国财阀直接源自韩国国有企业和公共资产的贱价私有化。以财阀为中心的经济增长也成为了当下韩国资本主义的不稳定力量之源。为了拯救处于困境中的韩国财阀资本主义，作为一种社会运动和公司治理的方式，股东积极主义被引介到韩国。过去十多年里，韩国小股东运动在抵制财阀力量扩张、改善公司治理、促进经济民主等方面取得了一些成就，但也面临着不少挑战。处于十字路口的小股东运动及财阀改革是理解当下韩国资本主义的极好注脚。     

Empowering Firm Owners by Separating Voting from Buying and Selling Shares

This paper discusses a new system of firm governance. In the system, the responsibility for voting the shares of a firm (“voice”) is given to the people who ultimately provided the money, who, however, have to delegate it to proxy voting institutions. The system helps overcome collective action problems and conflicts of interest within firms, and it reduces the private benefits of control. The disadvantages for firm governance may be relatively modest. However, since the new system of voice is a conceptual innovation, the analysis of its effects is rather tentative. Further research and experimentations are required for firmer conclusions.     

关于充分发挥党员主体作用的思考

确立党员主体地位,发挥党员的主体作用,是当前党建理论研究和实践探索的前沿课题,这一课题的突破,将带来党的建设的理念上和工作上的重大推进.从党员主体地位及主体作用提出的背景入手,通过对党员主体地位的基础建设的论述,阐明了发挥党员主体作用,努力构建新型的党内关系.     

DELIBERATIVE MONETARY VALUATION: IN SEARCH OF A DEMOCRATIC AND VALUE PLURAL APPROACH TO ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

The use of deliberative methods to assess environmental values in monetary terms has been motivated by the potential for small group discussion to help with preference formation and the inclusion of non‐economic values. In this review, two broad approaches are identified: preference economisation and preference moralisation. The former is analytical, concentrates upon issues of poor respondent cognition and produces a narrow conception of value linked to utilitarianism. The latter emphasises political legitimacy, appeals to community values and tends to privilege arguments made in the public interest. Both approaches are shown to embrace forms of value convergence, which undermine the prospects for value pluralism. As a result exclusion and predefinition of values dominates current practice. In order to maintain democratic credentials, the importance attributed to monetary value needs to be left as an open question to be addressed as part of a process determining an “agreement to pay”. To this end we identify a discourse‐based approach as a third way consistent with the democratic and value plural potential of deliberative monetary valuation.     

Redistributive policies with heterogeneous social preferences of voters

There is growing evidence on the roles of fairness and other-regarding preferences as fundamental human motives. Call voters with fair preferences, as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999), fair-voters. By contrast, traditional political economy models are based on selfish-voters who derive utility solely from “own” payoff. In a general equilibrium model with endogenous labor supply, a mixture of fair and selfish voters choose optimal policy through majority voting. First, we show that majority voting produces a unique winner in pairwise contests over feasible policies (the Condorcet winner). Second, we show that a preference for greater fairness leads to greater redistribution. An increase in the number of fair voters can also lead to greater redistribution. Third, we show that in economies where the majority are selfish-voters, the decisive policy could be chosen by fair-voters, and vice versa. Fourth, while choosing labor supply, even fair voters behave exactly like selfish voters. We show how this apparently inconsistent behavior in different domains (voting and labor supply) can be rationalized within the model.