国外政党发展视角下的党内民主

党内民主是党的生命,它不仅-是各类政党保持生机和活力的关键,也是执政党稳定执政地位的核心。近年来,国外政党纷纷注重和加大党内民主建设的步伐,并且坪乙得一定的成就．国外政党加强党内民主的经验和探索,不仅对于我们认识党内民主基拳规律、判断各国社会制度、意识形态和价值观念的差异有着重要的意义,而且对于中国共产党的党内民主建设也有着重要的启示。     

从个税修改论立法民主性原则的体现及其不足

立法民主性原则是指导立法工作的重要原则,也是实现社会主义法治国家的基础条件。个税法修改以人民主权原则和权力制约原则为理论基础,通过提高个人所得税的免征额,让人民直接参与立法等途径努力实现了立法内容和立法程序的民主性。但要进一步做到民主立法,还需要完善法律起草阶段和法律草案审议阶段的相关程序,并扩大公众参与立法程序的渠道。     

The Natural Economic Advantage of Dictatorship over Democracy: A “Gresham's Law” of Governance

We show that when democratic and autocratic governments peacefully compete for governance over the same jurisdiction the autocratic has a natural advantage. The autocratic government, which unambiguously reduces welfare for everyone except the autocrat, will drive the competing democratic government to voluntarily shut down in the interests of its own electorate. For instance, if an autocratic government allows the creation of democratic local governments, with the authority to tax and spend at will, these democratic local governments will remain inert and ineffective: A Gresham's Law of Political Economy.     

论反垄断法的效益观

效益原则是市场经济的必然规律。法律是对经济关系的翻译，因而作为“经济宪章”的反垄断法必然要树立效益法律观，追求效益的最优化。反垄断法所追求的效益是指通过有效竞争来实现的以经济民主为保障的社会整体效益。     

资本主义、社会民主主义和福利国家

在资本主义市场经济发展的进程中，产生了福利国家。工业主义理论家从工业化的视角把福利国家的发展看作是工业化发展的水平的结果；社会民主主义者把福利国家看作是实现社会主义经济发展的必要步骤，并借助干凯恩斯主义的福利国家来推行其福利国家的发展战略；一些从资本主义发展的角度认识福利国家原因的理论家，则把福利国家的出现看作是资本主义市场经济发展的产物，并分析了福利国家中的阶级利益的对立。     

党内民主应先行于人民民主

党内民主与人民民主应是一种互动关系，但党内民主是人民民主的先导和基础，是人民民主的核心和灵魂，应高度重视发展党风民主，以充分实现党内民主来推动人民民主，建设社会主义民主政治，发展党内民主的核心是完善民主集中制，关键是民主具体制度建设，根本途径是依法治党。     

Building resilient infrastructure in the face of climate change in African cities: Scope,potentiality and challenges

ABSTRACT

This article seeks to explain the capacity and limitations of African cities in building resilient infrastructure in the face of climate change. In this article, resilience means the ability of a social or ecological system to absorb disturbances while retaining the same basic structure and ways of functioning, the capacity for self-organisation, and the capacity to adapt to stress and change. To expose the capacity and limitations of African cities in building resilient urban infrastructure, the article presents comparative case studies on contemporary experiences in Harare, Nairobi, Abuja, Cairo and Johannesburg relative to the Latin American and Asian cities where resilient infrastructure practices are in vogue. We conclude that most African cities exhibit critical bottlenecks towards emulating the Asian prototypes. Corruption is among the key explanations for the shortcomings of African cities in the delivery of resilient infrastructure and services. Corruption and non-participatory approaches prevailing in most cities have only courted resistance by citizens in the reimbursement of loans obtained from both international and local financial houses.     

An Outline of the Mathematical Theory of Democracy and Its Applications

This paper summarizes the authors studies in mathematical theory ofdemoocracy (Tanguiane 1991, 1993, 1994, 1997). The main consideration is theformalization of the notion of representativeness measured by the weight ofthe coalition represented in each event of decision making. Therepresentativeness is used to estimate the quality of individualrepresentatives (president) and two forms of representative bodies likecabinet (named by analogy with the cabinet of ministers) and council(parliament). In particular, we suggest a solution to Arrows paradox byproving that there always exists an Arrovian dictator who is morerepresentative of the society than a dictator in a proper sense. We alsooutline possible applications of the model to Gallup polls, multicriteriadecision making, and analysis of political situations.     

电子治理的现状分析与前景展望

信息技术与治理理论的结合催生了以信息技术为手段的电子治理,它将成为信息时代政府实现善治的新思路。现阶段电子治理的发展还存在许多不足,在信息透明和交互服务两项功能的对比中,政府网站交互性服务水平普遍偏低。通过电子政府的建设来促进公民与政府之间的交流互动,加强公民的政治参与,从而推动电子民主的发展将是电子治理更高阶段的追求目标。     

Property and contract rights in autocracies and democracies

We present and test empirically a new theory of property and contract rights. Any incentive an autocrat has to respect such rights comes from his interest in future tax collections and national income and increases with his planning horizon. We find a compelling empirical relationship between property and contract rights and an autocrat's time in power. In lasting—but not in new—democracies, the same rule of law and individual rights that ensure continued free elections entail extensive property and contract rights. We show that the age of a democratic system is strongly correlated with property and contract rights.