不应用西方经济学理论阐释生产要素按贡献参与分配的原则

我国实行“按劳分配与生产要素按贡献参与分配相结合”的政策符合我国初级阶段所有制结构状况,在理论上予以论证是必要的.但已有的讨论局限于生产要素贡献是指价值创造或财富创造或所有权的论争.实际上,“按生产要素分配”只是一个粗浅的表面现象,在历史上从来没有真正存在过.因此,有关研究和讨论应关注从现实中揭示所谓“按生产要素分配”的真实内容,以为实践我国现阶段的分配政策提供非学究式的、有用的指导.     

Risk sharing in supplier relations: an agency model for the Italian air‐conditioning industry

This study of risk sharing in the Italian high precision air conditioning (AC) industry confirms agency theory predictions that buyers absorb risk to a non‐negligible degree, and that they absorb more risk (a) the greater the supplier's environmental uncertainty, (b) the more risk averse the supplier, and (c) the less severe the supplier's moral hazard. The analyzed buyers accommodate for unforeseen and uncontracted‐for cost fluctuations, which is consistent with relational contract theory. The study clarifies the relationship between risk sharing and the supplier's size, technological capability, financial stability, and cost fluctuation. It also suggests how buyers may adjust their risk‐sharing strategy as suppliers grow, develop technological capabilities, and change financial structure. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Vilfredo pareto and contemporary economics: Social equilibrium, fiscal decentralisation and economic growth

During the second decade of the twentieth century, Vilfredo Pareto’s influence on the fiscal scholarship of Guido Sensini, Gino Borgatta and others in Italy was significant. In the 1920s a unique approach to fiscal thought developed which was grounded in the Paretian notion of social equilibrium. This study highlights the main features of this approach and considers why it went into decline from the 1930s and terminated in the 1950s. The paper also points to a potential benefit from integrating Aldo Scotto’s pioneering work on fiscal decentralisation with the Paretian fiscal thought of Sensini and Borgatta as part of a modern research program on the relationship between fiscal decentralisation and economic growth. (JEL:A12, B31, H00)     

Does fiscal redistribution discourage local public investment?

This paper studies the determinants of regional (oblast‐level) public investment in transitional Russia, focusing on the effects of federal fiscal redistribution. A model of local government expenditure in the presence of regional asymmetries shows that revenue redistribution from wealthy to poor regions discourages local public investment. Random‐ and fixed‐effects estimation of regional panel data for 1994–97 supports the existence of a disincentive effect from fiscal redistribution on regional public investment, which varies according to a region's federal status and wealth: non‐republics have a lower propensity to invest out of transfers than out of own income, as do regions with above‐median per capita income. Republics reduce public investment more than current spending in response to higher federal taxation. Russia's ‘asymmetrical federalism’ thus creates different fiscal incentives for different types of regions.     

Debt, Growth and Budgetary Regimes

Within the Barro (1990) model of productive public services, but with the inclusion of public debt, we derive and characterize on the balanced growth path, a set of welfare‐maximizing fiscal rules under two budgetary regimes – one with only the standard dynamic government budget constraint, and the other involving the golden rule of public finance. We demonstrate analytically that the optimal fiscal policy differs in the two budgetary regimes considered. We also analyse two cases within the second regime: one, where the ratio of current spending to tax revenues is parametrically given, and another, where this ratio is optimally chosen by the government.     

Tax Evasion and Auditing in a Federal Economy

This paper analyzes the relation between tax auditing and fiscal equalization in the context of fiscal competition. We incorporate a model of tax evasion by firms into a standard tax competition framework where regional governments use their audit rates as a strategic instrument to engage in fiscal competition. We compare the region’s choice of audit policies for three different cases: A scenario of unconfined competition without interregional transfers, a scenario with a gross revenue equalization (GRS) scheme and finally, a scenario with net revenue sharing (NRS), where not only the revenues from taxation but also the regions auditing costs are shared. Without regional transfers, fiscal competition leads to audit rates which are inefficiently low for revenue-maximizing governments. While in general GRS aggravates the inefficiency, NRS makes the decentralized choice of auditing policies more efficient.JEL Code: H26, H71, H77     

Dynamic Effects of Extending the 2001 and 2003 Income Tax Cuts

This paper focuses on the impact of permanently extending most of the provisions in EGTRRA and JGTRRA, coupled with potential legislative changes to the AMT, on the federal deficit, the distribution of after-tax income, and economic growth. The paper shows that including moderate behavioral responses offsets 16 percent of the static revenue loss estimate from 2005 to 2014. In addition, including behavioral responses implies that the percentage change in after-tax income from permanently extending the 2001 and 2003 income tax cuts would be largest for taxpayers with incomes ranging from $20,000 to $40,000. Finally, the simulation results suggest that extending the 2001 and 2003 income tax cuts and reducing the growth rate of government spending (excluding Social Security and Medicare), assuming that government expenditures are cut to avoid dramatic increases in government consumption relative to GDP in comparison to historical norms, would increase investment, employment, and output. However, postponing the implementation of tight spending controls would more than offset the positive benefits of lower tax rates on the size of the economy and leave future generations with fewer resources for private consumption and production.JEL Code: E62, H20, H30, H60The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect those of the Baker Institute for Public Policy or any other organization. This paper was partially written while the author was employed by the Joint Committee on Taxation.     

Explaining Differences in Economic Growth among OECD Countries

This paper re-examines the determinants of growth of GDP per capita using panel data for OECD countries for the period 1970–1999 with data averaged over five-year periods from new perspectives. First, we introduce indicators of innovation input and technological specialization simultaneously into the empirical growth equation. Second, we employ the system-GMM (Generalized-Method-of-Moments) panel estimator that controls for (a) the possible specification bias when variables are highly persistent over time and (b) the possible simultaneity bias. We find a large and statistically significant impact of business enterprise R&D (BERD) intensity on GDP per capita with an elasticity of 0.22. The share of high-technology exports is also significantly positively related to GDP per capita, but the magnitude suggests that BERD is more important than technological specialization in explaining the level of GDP per capita. Furthermore, we find that the budget deficit and government consumption (both measured as percentages of GDP) and the volatility of growth are significantly negatively related to GDP per capita.The authors would like to thank Gunther Tichy for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. We also thank the participants of the Austrian economic association conference (NOEG) and the Empirical Industrial Organization workshop at the WU WIEN for helpful comments. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the OeNB Jubiläumsfonds Project and the Austrian Federal Ministry for Economy and Labor (BMWA).JEL codes: E62, H20, H50, O23, O40     

What are the Trade Spill-Overs from Fiscal Shocks in Europe? An Empirical Analysis***

We use a Vector Auto Regression (VAR) analysis to explore the (trade spill-over) effects of fiscal policy shocks in Europe. To enhance comparability with the existing literature, we first analyse the effects of these shocks at the national level. Here, we employ identification based on Choleski decomposition and a structural VAR, both of which lead to the same results. Then, we turn to study the cross-border spill-overs of fiscal shocks via the trade channel. Fiscal expansions in Germany, France and Italy lead to significant increases in imports from a number of European countries. In order to mimic the case of monetary union, we also shut off the effects via the short-term interest rate and the nominal exchange rate and find a slight strengthening on average of the cross-country spill-overs from a fiscal expansion. These results suggest that it may be worthwhile to further investigate the possibility of enhanced fiscal coordination.*** This research is part of the RTN project ‘Macroeconomic Policy Design for Monetary Unions’, funded by the European Commission (contract number HPRN-CT-2002-00237). We thank two anonymous referees, a referee for the ECB Working Paper series, Peter Claeys, David-Jan Jansen, Franc Klaassen, Roberto Perotti and audiences at the Dutch Central Bank and the CEPR/CREI Conference ‘Designing a Macroeconomic Policy Framework for Europe’ (Barcelona, 2004) for many helpful comments. A large part of this paper was written while Beetsma was visiting the Directorate-General for Research of the ECB. He thanks the ECB for the stimulating research environment. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not commit any of.cial institution. The usual disclaimer applies.     

IS—LM模型与财政货币政策的有效性

IS—LM模型是凯恩斯理论体系的主要分析工具。本文通过对我国IS曲线斜率、LM曲线斜率的分析,我们认为很难比较出目前财政政策作用与货币政策作用的大小,而考察开放经济下的IS—LM—BP模型,我们认为财政政策在目前起主要作用,而货币政策起配合作用。