产品研究开发的知识管理研究

文章运用管理知识及科技信息,帮助研发部门掌握相关知识,作为产品研发的整体策略规划、管理及创新,以缩短产品开发周期,增加产品在市场的竞争力,进而协助企业适应多变、不确定的竞争环境。     

网络出版的电子商务智能模型的研究

文章首先介绍了网络出版的概念和相对于传统出版业的优势,并对网络出版的电子商务的特点、运行情况以及所面临的问题进行了分析,引入了商务智能的概念。最后给出了一种网络出版的电子商务智能模型,并对模型的效能进行了论证。     

谈我国信用标准的方案设计

信用标准为征信机构的设施建设、技术和操作提供了规范,对征信产品质量提出了明确的要求,必将对我国征信行业的发展产生重要影响。借鉴国际经验,加快信用标准化工作并把握好标准的设计是当前的一项重要任务。     

论会计国家化与会计国际化

会计国际化是经济全球化和金融市场国际化的必然要求,会计国际化实质上是各国的利益相互协调。本文首先定位会计国家化,然后就如何协调会计国际化与国家化的辨证关系展开论述,最后就我国会计的国际化问题进行了分析。     

企业科室人员定额管理的探讨

阐述了企业科室人员实行定额管理的必要性，定额管理的关键与步骤及定额标准的确定方法。     

渐开线圆柱齿轮的形位误差探讨

从误差角度分析，综述ＧＢ１００９５－８８《渐开线圆柱齿轮精度》误差的表达方法。     

知识型企业链级双轨激励模型探究

知识型企业组织结构依然存在的等级层次,不同层级的人需要不同而应采取异质激励,同一层级的人也因个体的差异也需要异质激励,而异质激励总的来说都归于物质轨道与精神轨道.据此构建出知识型企业链级双轨激励模型.     

The Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism Needs Better Categories: Clearing up the Confusions that Result from Blurring Analytic and Lay Concepts

Synopsis It has been difficult to make progress in the study of ethnicity and nationalism because of the multiple confusions of analytic and lay terms, and the sheer lack of terminological standardization (often even within the same article). This makes a conceptual cleaning-up unavoidable, and it is especially salutary to attempt it now that more economists are becoming interested in the effects of identity on behavior, so that they may begin with the best conceptual tools possible. My approach to these questions has been informed by anthropological and evolutionary-psychological questions. I will focus primarily on the terms ‘ethnic group’, ‘nation’, and ‘nationalism’, and I will make the following points: (1) so-called ‘ethnic groups’ are collections of people with a common cultural identity, plus an ideology of membership by descent and normative endogamy; (2) the ‘group’ in ‘ethnic group’ is a misleading misnomer—these are not ‘groups’ but categories, so I propose to call them ‘ethnies’; (3) ‘nationalism’ mostly refers to the recent ideology that ethnies—cultural communities with a self-conscious ideology of self-sufficient reproduction—be made politically sovereign; (4) it is very confusing to use ‘nationalism’ also to stand for ‘loyalty to a multi-ethnic state’ because this is the exact opposite; (5) a ‘nation’ truly exists only in a politician’s imagination, so analysts should not pretend that establishing whether something ‘really’ is or is not ‘a nation’ matters; (6) a big analytic cost is paid every time an ‘ethnie’ is called a ‘nation’ because this mobilizes the intuition that nationalism is indispensable to ethnic organization (not true), which thereby confuses the very historical process—namely, the recent historical emergence of nationalism—that must be explained; (7) another analytical cost is paid when scholars pretend that ethnicity is a form of kinship—it is not.     

Domestic and international strategic interactions in environment policy formation

Summary. In this paper, we establish the most possilbe general formulation of the technology governing carbon-gas emission, giving rise to global external diseconomies, and ty to explore into the strategic interactions,both domestic and international, when an individual country decides on the environmental policies. Through the comparison among emission taxes, quotas, and standard in the perfectly competitive private economies, we find that the first two policies are equivalent but they are different in effects by virtue of what we may call the tax-exemption effect of emission standards. Such a difference in the policy effect further affects the other country's welfare through the global externalities, amplified through whether the government can precommit to either the emission tax or the emission standard. Received: January 16, 2001; revised version: April 16, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" The authors thank the valuable comments by an anonymous referee. Ministry of Education and Science for its financial support is also greatly acknowledged. Correspondence to:K. Kiyono     

Public pricing of final and intermediate goods in the presence of externalities

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of externalities on pricing decisions by a public or a private regulated firm selling both final and intermediate goods. The externalities generate feedbacks in demand that affect both consumers and producers. The model is very general in that it does not impose constant returns to scale on private production, allows for distributional effects of both the publicly determined prices and private sector profits, and captures the general equilibrium effects of public pricing. Socially optimal pricing rules are derived, and the relation of the results with previous models of pricing in the presence of externalities is investigated.