CEO／CFO特质与财务报告质量文献综述

管理者特质是影响公司财务报告质量的一个重要因素，特别是作为核心高管的CEO／CFO个人特质作用尤为明显。通过回顾西方现有研究CEO／CFO特质与财务报告质量关系的文献，发现可以将其区分为两个分支：一支围绕着显性特质如性别、年龄、资格和资历等，另一支围绕隐性特质如过度自信、自恋情结等展开。监管层为提高财务报告的可靠性而设计治理结构和制定相关政策时，不能忽略CEO／CFO的特质属性。     

Pensions as a Form of Executive Compensation

This paper investigates the role of pensions as an element of total executive compensation, and the relationship between pensions and performance‐based compensation in executive pay. Using hand‐collected data on FTSE 100 CEOs and senior executives from 2004?2011, we document that pensions function as a substitute for performance‐based compensation (primarily bonuses) in both cross‐sectional and time‐series settings. We also examine the effect of corporate governance characteristics on executive pensions. We find that corporate governance characteristics associated with stronger board monitoring play a constraining role on the magnitude of pensions. Our evidence of substitution effects between pensions and performance‐based compensation is consistent with a managerial power view of executive compensation‐setting, and the use of pensions as a ‘stealth’ element of compensation. Our findings are robust to considering different types of pensions, product market competition, and cross‐listing. Sub‐period analysis shows that pensions decrease and substitution effects weaken following the 2008 financial crisis. Moreover, we find no evidence that the use of compensation consultants with potential conflicts of interest is associated with higher pensions. Overall, our study contributes to a greater understanding of the role of pensions in executive compensation, and shows the importance of including pensions in analysis of executive compensation.     

Toward more accurate contextualization of the CEO effect on firm performance

We introduce multiple refinements to the standard method for assessing CEO effects on performance, variance partitioning methodology, more accurately contextualizing CEOs' contributions. Based on a large 20‐year sample, our new ‘CEO in Context’ technique points to a much larger aggregate CEO effect than is obtained from typical approaches. As a validation test, we show that our technique yields estimates of CEO effects more in line with what would be expected from accepted theory about CEO influence on performance. We do this by examining the CEO effects in subsamples of low‐, medium‐, and high‐discretion industries. Finally, we show that our technique generates substantially different—and we argue more logical—estimates of the effects of many individual CEOs than are obtained through customary analyses. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

CEO Ownership and Discretionary Investments

Abstract:  This study investigates empirically the relationship between CEO ownership and discretionary investments such as R&D and capital expenditures. We assert that the under-investment problem is high for R&D-intensive projects, while the over-investment problem is high for capital expenditures because of differences in risk between the two types of investments. Building on the linkages between investments and investment-related agency problems, we hypothesize that the relationship between CEO ownership and investments depends on whether increasing ownership mitigates or exacerbates the under- or over-investment problem. We find a non-linear association between CEO stock ownership and R&D investments; R&D investments increase and then decline across increasing levels of ownership. Further, we find that R&D investments and CEO stock options are positively associated at high levels of option holdings. In contrast, capital expenditures do not vary with CEO ownership (stock or options). Finally, consistent with our underlying assumption, we find that the influence of R&D investments on future firm risk is significantly larger than that of capital expenditures. Our findings indicate that managerial risk aversion affects discretionary investments.     

景区经营权转让的缔约分析——以碧峰峡和马万景区为例

目前我国景区整体转让有两种方式,一是整体转让经营权,一是整体转让特许经营权。本文选取碧峰峡和马万景区,通过对二者缔约过程进行对比分析,认为景区经营权的明晰是整体转让实现成功缔约的前提,受让者的经营能力对整体转让至关重要,同时授权者的影响力也直接关系着转让的缔约过程。     

Managers,Workers, and Authority

In this paper, I examine the case made by Christopher McMahon for managerial democracy. Specifically, I examine the extent to which McMahon’s account is able to address a series of objections against the case for managerial democracy as articulated by Thomas Christiano. Christiano articulates two sets of objections. First, Christiano argues that McMahon does not succeed in ruling out the possibility that managerial authority is best understood as promissory in its basis, in which case there is no presumption in favor of its democratic exercise. Second, Christiano raises a series of objections to the effect that even if we accept McMahon’s account of the nature of managerial authority, the conclusion for the democratic exercise of that authority by workers at the level of individual economic enterprises does not follow. In the end, I argue that McMahon’s account contains the resources to address these objections if one adopts a specific view about the moral limits to relationships that involve the submission of the will on the part of one person to another. Adoption of this view, however, appears to come at the expense of what I take to be the account’s commitment to liberalism. As such, what I understand this paper to reflect more generally is the apparent difficulty for liberals in arguing that there is something inherently morally troubling about capitalist work relations.     

Do Prior Experiences of Top Executives Enable or Hinder Product Market Entry?

How firms achieve entry into new‐to‐the‐firm product markets is an important but overlooked topic. Some aspiring entrants fail during product development, and they miss the opportunity to enter. In such contexts, firms often take action to de‐risk entry, for example, by drawing upon the experience of top executives with market‐specific expertise obtained in prior jobs. However, the empirical evidence from this study shows that beyond a narrow threshold, greater prior experience in the top executive team was associated with a greater likelihood of failed entry attempts among the firms that I tracked over two decades in the biotechnology industry. This result held across product markets with low and high degrees of dynamism. Based on the literature on dynamic managerial capabilities, where entry into new markets indicates managers’ ability to reconfigure organizational resources and adapt to a changing environment, this study’s main contribution is to illustrate how and why experience matters for entry.     

Comparative Efficiency of Family and Corporate Farms: Does Family Labour Matter?

We examine the comparative efficiency of family relative to corporate farms, using FADN data for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania and Spain. We estimate a non‐parametric non‐separable farm production function, and derive efficiency scores for both family and corporate farms. We decompose efficiency into two distinct sources – organisational differences and management capabilities. We find evidence for organisational efficiency gains from family farming, relative to corporate farming, and these appear to increase with family involvement. However, with regard to management capabilities, family farms do not compare so favourably. Furthermore, family involvement does not seem to have any systematic effect on the efficiency derived from management capabilities. Our findings suggest that further investigation of the way family farms employ and build management capabilities is needed to substantiate any ‘superiority’ claims.     

对巨额财产来源不明罪量刑的思考

刑法修正案（七）对刑法第395条第1款的修改,虽然将巨额财产来源不明罪的最高刑由5年提高到10年,但仍弥补不了该罪的缺陷。因此,建议将＂修正案＂修改为：＂国家工作人员的财产或者支出明显超过合法收入,差额巨大的,应当责令说明来源。本人不能说明其来源的,以非法所得论,予以追缴。非法所得财产折半后比照贪污贿赂罪量刑。＂     

Managerial ability and bank‐loan pricing

This paper examines the impact of borrowers’ managerial ability on lenders’ bank‐loan pricing and the channels through which managerial ability affects bank‐loan pricing. Using a large sample of US bank loans, we provide evidence that higher managerial ability is associated with lower bank‐loan prices. This effect is stronger in firms with high information risk, suggesting that an important channel for managerial ability to affect bank‐loan pricing is through improved financial disclosure to mitigate information asymmetry. The relationship is also stronger for firms with weak business fundamentals, implying that another channel is through improved business performance. Of these two mechanisms, path analysis suggests that the business‐fundamentals mechanism is the more important channel through which managerial ability affects bank‐loan pricing.