Making the same mistake all over again: CEO overconfidence and corporate resistance to corrective feedback

Firms often make mistakes, from simple manufacturing overruns all the way to catastrophic blunders. However, there is considerable heterogeneity in the nature of corporate responses when faced with evidence that an error has taken place, and, therefore, in the likelihood that such errors will reoccur in the future. In this paper, we explore an important but understudied influence on firms' responses to corrective feedback—a CEO's level of overconfidence. Using multiple distinct measures of overconfidence and the empirical context of voluntary corporate earnings forecasts, we find strong, robust evidence that firms led by overconfident CEOs are less responsive to corrective feedback in improving management forecast accuracy. We further show that this relationship is moderated by prior forecast error valence, time horizon, and managerial discretion. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

从创新资本经理型企业家到经理革命：管理革命形成机理的一个产权经济学分析

本文分析了代理化制度变迁与创新资本形成、经理型企业家兴起及管理革命发生的内在联系,揭示了代理化制度变迁是西方企业家成长历史上创新资本形成与经理型企业家兴起的关键,而经理型企业家的兴起及其主导的经理革命则是管理革命的本质     

培训迁移影响因素分析及其管理策略研究

培训迁移作为培训的应用阶段,因为受到来自个人动机、组织学习氛围、培训迁移气氛、组织工作节奏等因素的影响,员工不能有效的将从培训中学到的知识、技能迁移到实际工作中,从而导致培训投入与产出严重失调.组织可以通过相应的管理策略控制影响因素的作用,促进培训迁移的发生,实现提高个人、组织绩效的目的.     

管理报酬机制的构建

两权分离制度形成了企业所有者和经营者的委托代理关系,由于双方利益的冲突,委托人必然采取措施促使两者利益的趋同,报酬机制就是其中的一种有效的激励措施。本文以S=S0 aS1 bS2 E作为报酬方案的简化模型,具体分析了模型相关的构成因素,并以美国大企业管理人员报酬构成为例加以说明。     

Optimal Discretion

We investigate the desirability of adopting a rule in favor of discretionary monetary policy in a model exhibiting Kydland and Prescott's dynamic inconsistency problem but no fundamental incompatibility between the policymaker's price stability and full employment objectives. We show that if discretion provides a policy flexibility benefit, then a rule is optimal only when inflation exceeds an endogenously determined threshold. This gives rise to a discretionary policy zone for inflation with the central bank taking more drastic action towards stabilizing inflation when inflation veers outside the zone. Imperfect credibility narrows the scope for discretion and enhances the benefits of adopting a rule.
JEL classification : E 58; D 82; C 72     

大陆企业中层经理管理才能比较研究

本文通过建构中层经理的素质模型,采取问卷调查形式,对大陆企业中层经理的管理能力进行了调查研究,并且将调查结果与香港地区中层经理的能力现状进行了对比研究。研究结果显示:调查者认为的大陆和香港企业中层经理所需的管理才能差异明显;训练与辅导下属能力是大陆企业中层经理需要改善提高的核心才能。     

The Effects of the Perceived Behavioral Integrity of Managers on Employee Attitudes: A Meta-analysis

Perceived behavioral integrity involves the employee’s perception of the alignment of the manager’s words and deeds. This meta-analysis examined the relationship between perceived behavioral integrity of managers and the employee attitudes of job satisfaction, organizational commitment, satisfaction with the leader and affect toward the organization. Results indicate a strong positive relationship overall (average r = 0.48, p<0.01). With only 12 studies included, exploration of moderators was limited, but preliminary analysis suggested that the gender of the employees and the number of levels between the employee and the manager are potential moderators of the relationship. In the current sample of studies, country where the research was conducted did not seem to have any moderating effects. In addition to suggesting further investigation of potential moderators, we call for research that examines the relationship between behavioral integrity and outcomes that include individual behavior and organizational performance.     

Managerial Role Motivation and Role-related Ethical Orientation in Hong Kong

Journal of Business Ethics - Is there a relationship between the psychological construct of hierarchic managerial role motivation and the moral construct of role-related ethical orientation? In...     

Bidder CEO and Other Executive Compensation in UK M&As

This paper investigates the impact of M&As on bidder (CEO and other) executive compensation employing a unique sample of 100 completed bids in the UK over the 1998–2001 period. Our findings indicate that less independent and larger boards award CEOs significantly higher bonuses and salary following M&A completion both for the full sample and for the UK and US sub‐samples. UK CEOs and executives are rewarded more for the effort exerted in accomplishing intra ‐ industry or large mergers than for diversifying or small mergers and their cash pay is unaffected by other measures of their managerial skill or performance. US bidders are rewarded at higher levels than their UK counterparts and their remuneration is related only to measures of CEO dominance over the board of directors. Overall our findings offer support for the managerial power rather than the agency theory perspective on managerial compensation.     

Uniform Versus Discretionary Regimes in Reporting Information with Unverifiable Precision and a Coordination Role

We examine uniform and discretionary regimes for reporting information about firm performance from the perspective of a standard setter, in a setting where the precision of reported information is difficult to verify and the reported information can help coordinate decisions by users of the information. The standard setter's task is to choose a reporting regime to maximize the expected decision value of reported information for all users at all firms. The uniform regime requires all firms to report using the same set of reporting methods regardless of the precision of their information, and the discretionary regime allows firms to freely condition their sets of reporting methods on the precision of their information. We show that when unverifiable information precision varies across firms and users' decisions based on reported information have strong strategic complementarities, a uniform regime can have a beneficial social effect as compared to a discretionary reporting regime. Our analysis generates both normative and positive implications for evaluating the necessity and effectiveness of reporting under standards.