Market Structure and Fiscal Policy Effectiveness

In a monopolistic competition macromodel with endogenous market structure, the fiscal multiplier is shown to consist of two components. The first depicts the response of output to a fiscal expansion through the conventional channels that disregard the role of market imperfections. The second component captures the effects of firms' market power as well as the policy-induced change in market structure. The latter effect—which has not been taken into account in existing studies—is shown to be quite significant in raising the fiscal multiplier (even above unity) and in improving consumers' welfare when the labour market is competitive.     

我国电力改革中的垄断问题分析

针对新一轮的电力体制改革中存在或将出现的电力垄断问题,文章从发电企业的规模、电力改革的发展阶段和电网三个方面进行了分析,并指出形成竞争性的发电市场、改造电网企业、互联电网和加强政府监管等用以解决垄断形成的对策。     

美国航空业放松规制研究及对我国的借鉴

本文详细介绍了美国航空业放松规制的历程,从这个放松规制的案例分析中证明了放松规制有利于提升产业绩效。随后通过介绍我国航空业的放松规制的事实,批驳了我国行政垄断行业不能放松规制的观点。基于此,笔者提出我国需要进一步放松仍在行政垄断的产业,放松规制势在必行。     

ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE AND INTERNATIONAL INTERACTIONS : THE IMPACT OF MARKET POWER ON DYADIC CONFLICT AND COOPERATION

This article presents a theoretical approach to analysing how a country with market power could affect international relations. The liberal view and trade‐conflict model claim that if countries seek to protect their trade gains, trade will reduce conflict between pairs of countries, designated “actors” and “targets”. The main purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of market power on the gains from trade. Once the distribution of trade gains is changed between countries, the conflict and cooperation relationships between countries will also alter. We apply the trade‐conflict model to derive two propositions as follows: (1) the more monopoly power over exports a monopolistic target has, the greater the amount of actor‐to‐target conflict; (2) the more monopsony power over imports a monopolistic target has, the greater the amount of actor‐to‐target conflict. To summarise, these hypotheses will predict that a country with market power reaps the gains from trade and will exhibit less conflict and more cooperation, whilst the country that is exploited will exhibit more conflict and less cooperation.     

中国垄断行业改革的整体评价

20世纪80年代中期和90年代中后期,我国对垄断行业先后进行了两轮改革。时至今日,电信、电力、民航、铁路和邮政都不同程度地进行了以引入和强化竞争为主题的变革。客观地评价我国垄断行业改革的现状,总结主要经验,正视垄断行业改革面临的现实矛盾,对推进垄断行业的进一步改革和可持续发展,无疑十分必要与重要。     

垄断行业的效率、改革与规制重构——转型经济中的经验与教训研讨会观点综述

行政垄断的判定与垄断程度的测度需要一个完善的标准。实证表明,行政垄断造成了巨大的经济效率损失,而消除行政垄断只能分步骤有序进行。竞争政策的设计应结合本国国情,竞争政策的目标也应该是多元的,同时需要构建完善的反垄断体系。垄断行业的改革应根据行业自身特点与市场空间来确定其市场化的程度和规制的程度,需要系统设计改革时序,重构并建立科学的规制体系。     

One Monopoly Is Better Than Two: Antitrust Policy and Microsoft

The Department of Justice recent case against Microsoft is that it should not be allowed to aggressively maintain control over the internet browser market with the objective of preventing the internet from becoming the platform that could ultimately destroy Microsoft's operating system market. The aim of this paper is not to attack the Department of Justice case. Rather, it is to argue that for consumers one monopoly dominating both the operating system and applications is better than two separate monopolies. In our model we integrate Cournot's theory of two goods that are jointly used in the production of a third composite good with the fixed-proportion model. Utilizing our model we develop a possible explanation for Microsoft's actions – protection of its monopoly profits in the operating systems package market. Additionally we show that the price of the final product is lower if one firm monopolizes all markets. Consequently, the ordered split-up of Microsoft by Judge Thomas P. Jackson, aiming at creating two separate companies, one that will produce the windows and the other the operating systems, will harm consumers.     

国际信用评级体系改革与中国评级业发展展望

国际金融危机和欧洲主权债务危机的爆发,凸显出现行国际信用评级体系存在的种种弊端。该文指出,现行国际信用评级体系的根本缺陷在于高度垄断,为此应通过加强内部治理和外部监管推动现有评级行业的改革,并推动国际信用评级行业新秩序的建立。中国应从宏观政策层面出台措施,扶持和推动本国自主信用评级体系的做大做强,并参与到国际信用评级体系的重建中。     

Obtaining a hub position: A New Economic Geography analysis of industry location and trade network structures

We present a linear New Economic Geography model with three regions, one remote region and two regions that entertain a trade agreement with low bilateral trade costs. Only one of these two integrated regions has the outside option to conclude an additional trade agreement with the remote region and to obtain a hub position. We show that the new trade agreement has a substantial impact on industry location and trade patterns and that the effects strongly depend upon level of integration between the initial two regions. It is not always the region with the outside option that profits from using it. Finally, we also show that higher firm mobility may lead to complex dynamics.