An Adversarial Ethic for Business: or When Sun-Tzu Met the Stakeholder

In the economic literature on the firm, especially in the transaction–cost tradition, a sharp distinction is drawn between so-called “market transactions” and “administered transactions.” This distinction is of enormous importance for business ethics, since market transactions are governed by the competitive logic of the market, whereas administered transactions are subject to the cooperative norms that govern collective action in a bureaucracy. The widespread failure to distinguish between these two types of transactions, and thus to distinguish between adversarial and non-adversarial relations, has led many business ethicists to develop a “uniform” moral code. Yet in market transactions, the checks and balances built into the system of commercial exchange are such as to permit more instrumental forms of behavior. In administered transactions, by contrast, these checks and balances are absent, and thus the institutional context calls for much greater exercise of moral restraint. In this paper, I begin the task of developing an adversarial ethic for business. According to this view, the competitive environment licenses a greater range of “self-interested” behavior, but also imposes its own constraints on the strategies that firms may adopt in the pursuit of their interests. Joseph Heath is Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy and the Centre for Ethics at the University of Toronto. He is the author of three books: Communicative Action and Rational Choice (MIT Press, 2001), The Efficient Society (Penguin, 2001), and with Andrew Potter. The Rebel Sell (HarperCollins, 2004). His research focuses on practical rationality, normative economics, and critical theory.     

Price competition during and after promotions

We provide a framework for setting regular prices and using promotional discounts in a duopoly where long‐term promotional effects are present and the firms' pricing and promotional strategies are common knowledge (e.g., as in online markets). We show that at equilibrium, the two firms may not promote and instead adopt an Everyday Low Price (EDLP) strategy. Consumers' tendency to stockpile promoted products, the level of brand loyalty and product differentiation, and the possibility of a postpromotional sales increase critically influence regular prices, price discount rates, and profits. Under some conditions consumer stockpiling intensifies promotional competition and reduces firms' profits while the possibility of attracting new consumers reduces the need to heavily promote and ensures better profits. Managerial implications are discussed. Copyright © 2007 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

从竞争战略到价值革新战略的转变

目前企业战略管理基本都是以竞争为中心，这种基于竞争的战略是一种“零和”战略。企业采用竞争战略是受古典经济学的影响和由传统生产要素的稀缺性所决定的。随着IT技术的进一步发展和知识经济的到来，知识已经取代传统的资金、设备等成为主要的生产要素．知识的非稀缺性使得基于竞争的战略再没有生存的空间。本文讨论了一种新的战略即基于价值革新的战略，并对这两种战略的形成机制进行了分析和比较，最后重点讨论了价值革新战略的管理和运作．认为企业必须转向价值革新的战略。     

知识管理及其应用

知识管理就是在最恰当的时间传递最恰当的知识给最恰当的人,使他们能够做出最恰当的决策并避免重复性的劳动或重复性的错误;知识管理是一个整体的、综合的概念,包容了心理、组织、文化、信息技术等诸多方面的因素;知识管理系统地管理重要的企业知识以及知识的创造、收集、整理、传播和利用过程;知识管理需要将个人知识转变为企业知识,并在整个企业中以合适的方式进行应用和共享。它的实施是一个十分复杂的过程,涉及到企业管理的各个方面,对于不同的企业,实施的过程也不一样。     

Kinky perceived demand curves and Keynes–Negishi equilibria

The label "Keynes–Negishi equilibria" is attached here to equilibria in a monetary economy with imperfectly competitive product and labor markets where business firms and labor unions hold demand perceptions with kinks: as posited in Negishi's 1979 book Microeconomic Foundations of Keynesian Macroeconomics . Such equilibria are defined in a general equilibrium model, and shown to exist. Methodological implications are briefly discussed in a concluding section.     

MUNICIPAL CONTRACTING OUT: GOVERNANCE CHOICES,MISALIGNMENT AND PERFORMANCE IN SWEDISH LOCAL GOVERNMENT

In this paper we apply a Transaction Cost Theory framework to analyse the use and effects of contracting out in Swedish local government. During the last decade Swedish local authorities, like in many other countries, have, to a larger extent, started to contract external subcontractors to fulfil their responsibilities towards its citizens. It is not only in the traditional subcontracting sectors such as housing, infrastructure, and technical services that this trend is evident, but also in policy areas like education, social care, and elderly care. In fact, very little is known about the overall effects of, and the mechanisms underlying, governance choices. The overall results corroborate transaction cost reasoning. Supplier competition and specificity have anticipated effects on municipal de‐integration. Too little, but not too much, use of contracting out, in relation to theoretical predictions, worsens performance. The latter aspect is not fully in accordance with TCE‐propositions.     

港澳台商投资广东制造业的集聚效应及其对区域竞争力影响

本文根据产业集群理论,区域竞争力理论和突变理论的基本原理,采用突变级数法、弹性方法,以及回归分析方法,对港澳台商投资广东制造业的集聚程度及其整体的集群效应进行定量研究,并找出两个众多因素共同作用的系统——制造业集群系统与区域经济系统的内在数量关系。     

多重竞争模式和我国公共服务体制改革路径选择

市场化的公共服务必然要求供给主体的多重竞争,在市场经济中,可能提供公共服务的参与主体有政府组织、盈利企业、第三部门和社区自治组织。它们可以通过功能优势互补,来形成一种提供优质公共服务的多重竞争运行模式。我国的公共服务体制改革要实现政府和社会间的"非零和博弈"的双赢局面,就必须在明确政府"掌舵人"的角色定位的前提下,大力发展政府以外的公共服务主体,实现一种形式多样、和谐竞争的多重供给局面。     

我国出口贸易应对国外反补贴调查的思路

当前我国出口贸易面临国外反补贴调查的威胁,因此积极正确应对国外的反补贴,已成为当前我国政府和企业迫切需要解决的焦点问题。本文阐述了我国出口贸易遭遇反补贴调查的现状,分析了我国遭遇反补贴调查的根本原因,并从宏观和微观角度提出了我国应对国外反补贴调查的思路。     

竞技体育道德风险与逆向选择行为分析——基于博弈理论

竞技体育是一项机会成本相当大的事业，在运动成绩产权归属明晰的前提下，在社会保障制度供给短缺的条件下，竞技体育市场出现了不道德行为和逆向选择行为。文章对这一行为的产生进行探悉并运用博弈论的相关知识给出了一种解释。