铁路枢纽工程咽喉区复杂道岔组织施工技术研究

站场咽喉改造需在不影响铁路运营的前提下在封锁点内完成。如何安全、高效、可行地完成施工任务,关键在于制定详细可行的方案,而施工组织是决定方案是否可行的关键。因此,论文结合哈尔滨站咽喉区组合道岔的施工情况,对施工组织设计及施工技术方案进行了论述。     

民营企业建立现代企业制度相关问题分析

我国民营公司制企业,特别是非上市有限责任公司,仍然是封闭式家族企业。既使是上市公司,其目的也是通过上市筹集资金,现代公司治理结构的改造进展缓慢。我国民营企业进行现代企业制度改造,其重点不是消除家族企业色彩,改制主要围绕完善内部管理,提高经营管理水平和企业决策的科学性。通过建立健全企业内部规章制度,规范企业行为,使民营企业能够按政府颁布的法律法规开展生产经营活动。     

Double Moral Hazard,Monitoring, and the Nature of Contracts

generalized double-sided moral-hazard model, with risk-averse parties who mutually monitor each other (to get a reasonable idea of outcome/effort). The model considers trade-off between monitoring costs and moral hazard costs, which are endogenously determined by the extent of monitoring. Using this model, we formally prove a generalized version of Coase's conjecture – that the optimal contract minimizes the agency and risk costs. We then show how varying assumptions about the feasibility or cost of monitoring of the outcome or the worker's effort lead to different contracts being optimal. The analysis is then used to explain the nature of contracts observed in practice under many different situations. We will give an explanation as to why industrial workers typically work under wage contracts, while share contracts are common in agriculture and will explain why profit sharing is more common for senior managers than for the production workers. Received September 19, 2000; revised version received October 30, 1997     

Incentive Contract and Weather Risk

We study contracts designed to remunerate a farmer for the production of an ecosystem service with the payment dependent on the results of the farmer’s actions and on weather conditions. Two contracts are proposed: the first takes into account both the results of the farmer’s actions and a weather variable that reflects the actual atmospheric conditions during the life of the contract; the second bases the payment on the results alone incorporating only the average effect of weather. Social welfare is optimal when both the results and the specific atmospheric conditions are taken into account; however, this type of contract may be less acceptable to the farmer due to his perception of the level of risk involved.We thank two referees for valuable comments.     

岩溶山地土地整理模式研究

西南岩溶山地是典型的脆弱生态环境,与经济发达地区相比,有其自身的土地资源特点、生态特点和社会特点。文章以此为基础,提出岩溶山地土地整理的原则、思路,认为岩溶山地的土地整理应从高标准基本农田建设、阶梯式还林退耕和辐射式生态重建、实行土地双轨制、直接对农户投资着手等,提出不同空间尺度如县市、乡镇、村组、农户土地整理的具体模式。非耕地资源开发是岩溶山地土地整理的重点。     

我国农业生态系统营养循环链的断裂与重建

完整的营养循环是农业生态系统健康、可持续发展的重要保障。我国传统农业属于环境友好型生态农业。农业生态系统的营养循环结构完整，持续健康、繁荣。但是，随着工业化、城市化、市场经济的发展以及农业耕作方式的转变，农业生态系统营养循环的结构遭到严重破坏，导致一系列资源、环境、经济与社会问题。通过秸秆还田以及城市生活废弃物（排泄物、厨房垃圾等）向农业生态系统的返还，重建农业生态系统完整的营养循环，是我国农业生态系统持续健康发展的必由之路。     

道德风险存在下董事责任保险市场的保费水平分析

本文通过对董事责任保险市场的介绍,指出在董事责任保险市场中存在着严重的道德风险问题,通过对市场中保险双方行为的博弈分析,得到在道德风险存在下的保费变动范围,并指出防止或减轻董事责任保险市场中道德风险的方法.     

浅谈建设项目招投标无标底报价的投标机制选择

无标底的投标机制有利于形成有效的市场竞争环境,能鼓励各建筑承包企业提高管理水平、降低生产成本、提高生产水平.应用信息经济学中的信息不对称理论分析了建设项目招投标过程中的信息不对称,并在此基础上建立了基于委托代理关系的建设项目招投标模型,并探索较合理的投标机制.     

风险投资家的最优激励契约模型研究--一种基于逆向选择和道德风险条件下的博弈模型分析

为减少风险投资融资中风险投资家的逆向选择和道德风险,风险投资者必须设立一套有效的激励机制来让风险投资家选择,从而根据风险投资家选择的结果来甄别其真实能力类型,同时又能激励其努力工作。文章建立了风险投资家能力类型和努力都是不可观测条件下的最优激励契约模型,并根据显示原理,利用最优控制理论求出了最优解进而进行了分析。得出的结论是:最优激励契约能使高能力风险投资家乐于选择具有高强度激励、低固定收入和风险小的项目,同时又能激励其签约后更加努力工作。     

Capital needs in Eastern countries

This paper reviews estimated capital needs for Eastern Europe and rejects most of the claimed foreign capital contributions as too high and, in fact, unnecessary. It argues that whilst foreign investments may usefully assist reforms, they can neither substitute for reforms nor assure the success of reforms. Historically there is no evidence of sustained growth predominantly financed by foreign capital anywhere. The West's effort should therefore focus on assisting reform efforts, providing some capital but, above all, opening its markets to Eastern products.Opinions expressed in this paper are strictly personal. I would like to thank H. Handler for his comments.