孔孟儒家的德治学说与为己之学

认为孔孟儒家的德治学说并不是一种独立的治国理论,而是孔孟儒家为己修身的一种落实。德治虽然具有为己修身层面上的价值,但却不乏治理层面上的弊端,不具有国家治理层面上的价值。     

党员先进性教育必须以提升师德水准为长效机制

结合高等院校“保持共产党员先进性教育”活动,提出了建立高校先进性教育的长效机制的关键是提升师德水准。要从办学理念、服务育人理念及大学生德育工作入手,在先进性教育活动实践及制度建设中提高师德认识、培养师德素质、提高师德信念、保障师德建设。     

论道德需要与道德教育

道德需要是由人的本质所决定的,是人性内在的必然要求.它对人的道德品质的形成发展有着全面的动力作用.因此,要增加学校道德教育的有效性,就必须激活学生的道德需要,发挥学生主体作用,确定恰当的道德教育目标等.     

浅析商业银行对企业贷款中的道德风险问题

商业银行如何防范企业信贷中的道德风险一直倍受关注。先通过一个模型分析了企业偿贷中存在的道德风险及激励的作用，然后举例说明，最后给出了相应的建议。     

新时期加强高职院校德育工作的几点思考

通过对新时期加强高职院校德育工作的必要性和重要性的分析,提出以创新德育理念为先导、以延伸和优化德育途径和方法为突破、以提高德育工作队伍素质为保障,努力开创德育工作的新局面。     

校园信息化对高校德育的影响与教育对策

大学校园的信息化创造了一个新的德育环境 ,为培养大学生的现代文化精神 ,实现德育目标 ,提高德育效果提供了良好的机遇 ;同时 ,校园的信息化也增加了社会主义理想信念教育的难度 ,使学校德育面临着新的挑战。面对新的形势 ,我们必须树立新的德育观念 ,拓展新的多媒体式德育途径 ,探索新的主体性德育模式     

制度在经济绩效中的作用

中央计划经济的绩效与市场经济的绩效有显著性的差异，产权和资源配置方式的差异是决定不同经济体系经济绩效差异最为重要的因素。制度是经济体中经济个体博弈的基本规则。市场经济比中央计划经济提供了更强的激励．从而更有效地减轻了道德风险带来的效率损失，所以从消费者福利来看，市场经济比中央计划经济更有效。在一定的条件下，无论是从产出还是从消费者的福利来看，市场经济都比中央计划经济更有效率。     

Double Moral Hazard,Monitoring, and the Nature of Contracts

generalized double-sided moral-hazard model, with risk-averse parties who mutually monitor each other (to get a reasonable idea of outcome/effort). The model considers trade-off between monitoring costs and moral hazard costs, which are endogenously determined by the extent of monitoring. Using this model, we formally prove a generalized version of Coase's conjecture – that the optimal contract minimizes the agency and risk costs. We then show how varying assumptions about the feasibility or cost of monitoring of the outcome or the worker's effort lead to different contracts being optimal. The analysis is then used to explain the nature of contracts observed in practice under many different situations. We will give an explanation as to why industrial workers typically work under wage contracts, while share contracts are common in agriculture and will explain why profit sharing is more common for senior managers than for the production workers. Received September 19, 2000; revised version received October 30, 1997     

Corporate Lobbying, Regulatory Conduct and the Porter Hypothesis

Michael Porter, the influential Harvard management guru, has promoted the idea that compliance with stricter environmental regulations can afford secondary benefits to firms through improved product design, innovation, corporate morale and in other ways. Once these secondary benefits are factored, the net cost of compliance is argued to be lower than conventionally thought and may even be negative. Whilst environmental economists have rejected the Porter Hypothesis as being based on excessively optimistic expectations of the likely size of such secondary benefits the underlying ideas do enjoy significant credence in the business community. In the context of a lobbying model of regulatory policy-making we argue that the EPA should change the way it conducts regulatory policy to take account of Porter's views – even if it knows those views to be misguided. The model serves to illustrate the more general point that fashions in management thinking can be expected to impact the optimal conduct of regulatory policy.     

Incentive Contract and Weather Risk

We study contracts designed to remunerate a farmer for the production of an ecosystem service with the payment dependent on the results of the farmer’s actions and on weather conditions. Two contracts are proposed: the first takes into account both the results of the farmer’s actions and a weather variable that reflects the actual atmospheric conditions during the life of the contract; the second bases the payment on the results alone incorporating only the average effect of weather. Social welfare is optimal when both the results and the specific atmospheric conditions are taken into account; however, this type of contract may be less acceptable to the farmer due to his perception of the level of risk involved.We thank two referees for valuable comments.