The victim matters – experimental evidence on lying,moral costs and moral cleansing

In an experiment on moral cleansing with an endogenously manipulated moral self-image, we examine the role of the addressee of an immoral action. We find that cheating is highest and moral cleansing lowest when subjects cheat at the expense of the experimenter, while cheating is lowest and moral cleansing highest once cheating harms another participant. A subsequent measurement of subjects’ moral self-image supports our interpretation that the occurrence of moral cleansing crucially depends on the moral costs resulting from immoral actions directed at individuals in different roles. Our results can help to explain the different propensity to cheat and conduct moral cleansing when immoral actions harm either another person or representatives of organizations.     

论道德效力及其表征

道德效力不仅仅是道德规范的影响力,而是道德价值体系整体的效力,是道德价值体系本身所具有的能实现一定社会目标、达到某种社会效果的力量。它不仅是一个量的概念,因受各种因素的影响而在程度上有所不同,而且在性质上也有善与恶的区分。相对于法律效力,道德效力有其独有的特性。其外在表征主要体现在求善的执着、个体的自律和他律、社会秩序的良好三个方面。     

Input use under cost-of-production crop insurance: Theory and evidence

There have been a number of previous studies that examined the effects of yield- or revenue-based crop insurance products on input use of farmers. However, no study has specifically investigated the input use impacts of a cost-of-production (COP) crop insurance policy, even though this type of crop insurance is the predominant one used in several other countries outside of the United States (such as the Philippines and China). This article aims to theoretically and empirically examine the effect of a COP crop insurance product on farmers’ chemical input use. Our theoretical model suggests that the effect of COP insurance on input use can either be positive or negative, with the resulting impact depending on the strengths of (a) the traditional moral hazard effect of insurance (i.e., an input use decreasing effect); versus (b) the marginal incentives to apply more inputs due to input levels being the main determinant for expected indemnity amounts in this type of insurance (i.e., an input use increasing effect). A survey data set from corn farmers in the Philippines is then used to empirically illustrate how a particular COP insurance product influences input use in a real-life context. In this case, we find that COP insurance increases the use of chemical inputs (e.g., fertilizers and total chemical expenditure), implying that the positive marginal incentive to apply more inputs dominates the negative moral hazard effect.     

恩格斯婚姻家庭观

恩格斯的著作《家庭、私有制和国家的起源》,对于婚姻家庭的研究,有着重要的意义。在婚姻家庭的历史发展上,恩格斯认为婚姻家庭是历史发展的,具有连续性;在婚姻家庭的道德层面上,恩格斯认为人们在研究婚姻家庭时,要一分为二的看待不同时期、社会、地区的婚姻爱情观念和制度,认为婚姻家庭应该是合乎道德的,同时对资产阶级婚姻家庭进行了批判;在婚姻家庭的未来发展上,他对共产主义社会婚姻家庭也提出了自己的设想,形成了自己的婚姻家庭观。     

信息不对称对保险业的影响及治理措施

保险市场是一个典型的信息不对称市场,保险市场的不对称信息主要包括逆向选择和道德风险。保险市场信息不对称将导致保险市场资源配置的低效率,因此要加强保险市场信息披露,完善和发展保险技术,整顿市场秩序,以促进保险市场的健康发展。     

企业组织中特定人力资本的道德研究

道德逐渐成为现代企业组织竞争的基本条件和核心,是企业长期利润的来源之一。本文通过研究道德的载体—人力资本与道德的关系,提出动机—行为模式;通过研究对道德起更重要作用的特定人力资本道德,提出如何提高整个企业组织的道德水平并最终形成善的道德循环。     

Assessing effects of federal crop insurance supply on acreage and yield of specialty crops

Crop insurance may affect harvested acreage and yield by influencing producers’ behavior such as land allocation and input use. Although specialty crops are a major source of farm income, especially on the U.S. west coast, they have not received as much attention as field crops in previous empirical studies. This paper assesses the effect of moral hazard and adverse selection associated with the federal crop insurance program (FCIP) on the acreage and yield of major specialty crops in California. An econometric method that expands the switching regression model is developed to assess the effect. Results suggest that federal crop insurance can change specialty crop growers’ production responses to climate and soil conditions. The moral hazard effect tends to increase the acreage and yield of the specialty crops, whereas the adverse selection effect tends to have the opposite effect. The overall effect of the FCIP on acreage and yield of specialty crops is found to be moderate.     

Moral hazard and subsidized crop insurance

Along with adverse selection, moral hazard is one of the major hurdles that private and public insurance plans must contend with. Moral hazard occurs if risks are endogenous to a producer's behavior and if the insurer is unable to properly monitor the insured. We review the role of moral hazard in the US crop insurance program. We conduct an empirical analysis of one important aspect of the US crop insurance program—prevented planting. This provision provides indemnity payments if conditions are not suitable for planting. The program has been the subject of considerable controversy, especially during 2019, when the rate of claims is expected to be especially high. Because loss adjustors may encounter difficulties in assessing the weather conditions associated with prevented planting claims, the program is susceptible to moral hazard. We consider the extent to which prevented planting claims may be endogenous to prices. We find significant evidence of moral hazard. The likelihood of prevented planting claims increases as the expected market price decreases or as fertilizer costs increase for corn and soybeans in the Prairie Pothole Region and for grain sorghum and cotton in all states.     

定额结算下保险医疗费用支付制度安排

医疗保险机构与医院实行定额结算后,医院可通过分科定额结算办法将价格风险下移给科室,促使科室主动控费。而这种制度下,科室将通过牺牲患者利益实现自身效用;若医院按按实结算办法与科室结算医疗费用,则可在一定程度上解决上述问题。本文将针对按实结算办法建立数学模型,确定科室进行合理医疗的费用区间,并通过此模型说明按实结算下,科室通过均衡医患博弈,可在同时保证医院与患者双方利益的基础上有效地控制医疗费用。