The formation and early development of German audit firms

This paper examines the emergence of audit firms in Germany through an analysis of contemporary sources. Special attention is paid to the range of services offered, their legal forms and ownership structure. In Germany, the demand for external audits developed because the corporate supervisory boards had been unable to fulfil their monitoring task satisfactorily. As a consequence of the major economic crisis of 1929-1931 and the collapse of large corporations caused by the fraudulent actions of managing directors, statutory audits for stock corporations were introduced in 1931. The first German audit and trust company, the Deutsche Treuhand-Gesellschaft, was established much earlier in 1890. Like other trust companies which emerged from 1905 onwards, it was owned by large banks. After the First World War, large commercial groups on the one hand, and the state on the other hand, started to form their own audit firms. Most of the audit and trust companies used the legal form of a corporation. Originally, the main activities of the trust companies were trustee activities and audits. Subsequently, they also offered tax and business advisory services. These features (a broad range of services offered, the corporation as the dominant legal form, and clients who are also owners) help us to understand key characteristics of modern German audit firms such as their limited liability to third parties.     

Seasoned Equity Issues in a Closely Held Market: Evidence from France

This paper examines seasoned equity offerings in France.Even though a rights offering is the primary flotation method, French companies are increasingly usingthe relatively expensive public offering method. We show that the market reaction to the announcementof seasoned equity issues is significantly negative for rights issues and insignificantly negative forpublic offerings. Our results suggest that the adverse selection effect is greater for rights issues thanfor public offerings, due to stronger underwriter certification for the public offerings. We find that theshare price effect is positively related to blockholders take-up renouncements for firms with priorconcentrated ownership. For these firms, the favourable ownership dispersion effect offsets the adverse selection effect.     

论市场所有权

本文作者首次在国内外提出了市场所有权理论，作者认为，过去我们对企业微观产权（包括有形产权和无形产权）研究较多，而忽视了对这些微观产权赖以存在的基础和实现条件－－市场产权的研究。实际上，市场本身也有一个产权界定及其制度安排问题，本文在界定产权概念的内涵，本质与功能的基础上，认为市场产权由狭义市场所有权，市场使用权（经营权），市场占有权和市场收益权等四个要素构成，认为市场产权具有五个方面的基本特征；市场所有权的稀缺性，市场所有权的准资本属性；市场所有权的排他性；市场经营权的可转让性；市场所有权收益的可计量性等，市场产权具有三种基本形式；市场国家所有制；市场区域共享制；市场全球共享制等，虽然市场市场产权天生具有国家排他性，归一国政府所有，但市场经营可以转让，各种贸易战的实质是争夺市场经营权，控制权和收益权，区域经济一体化和经济全球化是市场经营经营权的有限互换和交叉分享。     

JD-1同步电动机微机控制机在整流励磁装置中的应用

为了解决同步电动机在启动过程中的脉振现象以及在运行中因励磁电流不稳而使电动机跳闸等可靠性问题,在整流励磁装置中采用了JD 1同步电动机微机控制机。介绍了控制机的励磁技术性能、励磁可靠性及其维护,较好地改善了电网的功率因数,提高了同步电动机的运行可靠性。     

Antecedents and consequences of corporate governance reform: the case of Germany

The paper examines the antecedents and consequences of the voluntary adoption of corporate governance reform in firms embedded in a relationship‐based governance system with less protection of minority shareholders. In such locations, ownership structure should be a key determinant of governance reform. Firms with dispersed ownership are likely to face agency problems but may lack sufficient ownership power in the hand of external owners for adoption to occur. Extensive ownership by external parties facilitates adoption but decreases the need and motivation to adopt governance reform. We examined the adoption of stock‐based incentive plans and transparent accounting regulations (e.g., greater disclosure to shareholders) among large German firms (DAX 100) during the late 1990s. We found an inverse ‘U’‐shaped relationship between ownership concentration and governance reform. In addition, we found that firms adopting governance reform were more likely to engage in corporate divestitures and achieve higher levels of market performance than firms not adopting governance reform. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

个人理财市场细分及客户群差异性分析

目前我国商业银行个人理财业务尚处于初级阶段,个人理财市场的细分还很简单,尚没有进行更深入的、多层次的分析。针对这一情况,本文借鉴“家庭生命周期”的分析思路,选取人口统计变量和家庭生命周期变量等综合指标作为客户细分变量,对给定的调查样本实施市场细分。为此,本文利用方差分析探讨了一般客户、重要客户、未来潜力客户和战略客户4组客户理财个性的差异性以及对银行理财服务质量期望的差异性。同时,还分析这组客户对主要理财工具、理财产品的需求特点,并在市场细分的基础上制定出4差异化的、有针对性的营销策略。     

管理层薪酬和持股激励效应的行业性差异分析--来自我国上市公司的实证证据

本文的研究以我国上市公司不同行业的实际数据为考察样本,运用实证分析方法验证我国上市公司不同类型行业管理层薪酬和持股与公司绩效之间的相关关系,分析结果表明:我国上市公司管理层薪酬和持股激励效应存在着较大的行业性差异,并提出不同行业企业应该根据自身特点和性质以及管理层薪酬和持股激励效应的大小,相机选择薪酬激励或股权激励,制定出详细周密、客观有效、切合实际的企业管理层激励方案,从而使其激励效应最大化。     

Agency hazards and alliance portfolios

Prior research over several decades has catalogued many positive motives underlying firms' decisions to engage in joint ventures and other forms of alliances. In this empirical analysis, we investigate whether agency problems brought about by the separation of ownership and control also stimulate the development of firms' joint venture portfolios. By focusing on joint ventures, as opposed to diversification in general or acquisitions, we address the recent debate on agency theory's domain. Results from a sample of U.S. manufacturing firms' alliance portfolios offer supporting evidence, and comparable findings are obtained for international and domestic joint ventures. Agency hazards are also found to bring about extensions of firms' nonequity alliance portfolios in both the international and domestic settings. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

我国银行业改革与引进外资的开放竞争策略

针对我国银行业面临的问题和外资银行进入后的竞争压力,本文通过分析几种不同改革思路后认为,我国银行业改革的核心问题是产权和公司治理,两者紧密相连,产权改革是为了获得良好的公司治理,私有化和引入外资都是可供选择的产权改革方式之一,理论上不存在何者更优.国有商业银行改革的关键在于改变国有独资所有权结构为多元投资结构,可供选择的方案有不改变所有权性质的多个国有投资主体的单一所有制和引进包括国有、民营、外资参股的多元所有制.鉴于我国银行业目前的特点,外资参股并不是一种最优的选择,引进外资银行的正确策略是:独资优于合作,合作优于合资.     

基于"综合谈判力"的企业所有权安排

现代企业理论打开了“企业”这一“黑箱”,为理解和创建现代企业制度提供了有力的理论支撑。本文通过对企业各要素所有者谈判力三个方面,即:签约人自身实力、签约人相互关系地位、签约外部环境的具体分析,阐释了各要素所有者对企业剩余的分享,并以此初步构建一个以企业要素所有者“综合谈判力”为基础的企业所有权安排分析框架。