浅析企业全面预算管理的目标

全面预算管理是企业管理的重要组成部分。明确全面预算所要达到的管理目标对于制定全面预算计划,提升企业的全面预算管理水平都有非常重要的意义。从企业战略管理和企业核心竞争力的角度,分析了全面预算的管理目标,指出了全面预算的真正管理意义所在。     

Domestic entry, optimum-welfare and maximum-revenue tariffs

In this paper, we examine the ranking of the maximum-revenue tariff and the optimum-welfare tariff under a linear Cournot oligopoly model without and with free entry of domestic firms. We demonstrate that in a regulated entry oligopoly with asymmetric costs, when the marginal cost of the domestic firms exceeds a critical value, the maximum-revenue tariff is higher than the optimum-welfare tariff. We then show that under free entry of domestic firms with asymmetric costs, when the fixed cost gets larger and the domestic firms become fewer, the difference between the optimum-welfare tariff and the maximum-revenue tariff becomes larger.     

Do banking system transparency and competition affect nonperforming loans in the Chinese banking sector?

The increasing importance of transparency practices and the improving status of bank competition in China are rarely explored in nonperforming loans (NPLs) literature. Thus, the purpose of this study is to examine banking system transparency and competition along with macroeconomic and bank-specific variables as determinants of NPL. We use the two-step system GMM dynamic panel model for Chinese banks based on annual data from 2000 to 2014. Our results indicate that high transparency in the Chinese banking system decreases poor-quality assets but not in the case of government-owned banks, whereas increase in competition increases NPL. Moreover, we find mixed results in the context of macroeconomics and bank-specific variables. Our study has practical implications in risk management practices and macro prudential policies.     

集群企业间知识溢出、研发竞争与集群主导设计形成的关系

考察了产业集群企业间的研发竞争和知识溢出对集群企业采纳潜在主导设计的影响。通过数理分析和实证检验,得到如下结论:集群企业间的研发竞争有利于主导设计的形成;集群企业间的知识溢出对主导设计的形成也有正向影响;企业间的研发竞争正向调节知识溢出与主导设计形成的关系。     

The impact of environmental regulation on Chinese spatial development

We examine the relationship between environmental regulation and spatial development in China. Exploiting changes in national pollution standards for three industries, ammonia, paper and cement, we measure the impact of environmental regulation on industry productivity. Our results suggest that national pollution standards do not affect industry productivity, but they reallocate productivity spatially. We show that regulated industries located in developing cities increase their productivity compared to similar industries in other cities. This means that environmental regulation affects the spatial distribution of technology in China and might influence long‐term spatial development by reducing geographical disparities.     

发展外部性:区位竞争优势战略定位的研究基础--以济南市为例

发展是有外部性的,既有正外部性,也有负外部性。区域发展的不平衡且差距的扩大就是发展负外部性的表现,区域经济一体多样化中竞争与合作良性互动关系就是发展正外部性的表现。文章以济南市为例,探讨了区域发展中当存在发展外部性时,一个地区如何取得区位竞争优势,化不利因素为有利因素的现实问题,这对区域发展的战略定位研究有重要意义。     

动态竞争环境下我国企业运作模式构建的思考

在全球化、信息化和个性化为主要特征的时代背景下,我国企业所面对的竞争环境越来越复杂多变。适应这种多变竞争环境的企业运作模式主要包括企业管理模块和企业经营模块的构建。     

Codetermination,Price Competition and the Network Industry

This research develops a tractable two‐stage non‐cooperative game with complete information describing the behaviour of price‐setting firms that must choose to be profit maximisers or bargainers under codetermination in a network industry with horizontal product differentiation. The existing theoretical literature has already shown that codetermination might arise as the endogenous market outcome in a strategic competitive quantity‐setting duopoly. In sharp contrast with this result, the present article shows that codetermination does never emerge as a Nash equilibrium in a price‐setting non‐network duopoly. Then, it aims at highlighting the role of network externalities in determining changes of paradigm of the game and letting codetermination become a sub‐game perfect Nash equilibrium when prices are strategic substitutes or strategic complements. This equilibrium may be Pareto efficient. Results allow distinguishing between mandatory codetermination and voluntary codetermination. The article also proposes a model of endogenous codetermination according to which every firm may choose to bargain with its own corresponding union bargaining unit only whether the firm's bargaining strength is exactly the profit‐maximising one. The equilibrium outcomes emerging in this case range from a uniform Nash equilibrium, in which both firms are codetermined, to mixed Nash equilibria, in which only one of them chooses to be codetermined. These results are ‘network depending’ and do not hold in a non‐network duopoly.     

Competing for Good Immigrants

I analyze the competition among different countries for ‘desirable’ and ‘undesirable’ potential immigrants, using both an immigration quota and a level of (imperfect) ‘scrutiny’ that would‐be immigrants face. Scrutiny imposes costs on immigrants and therefore makes it less attractive to immigrate. The number of applying undesirable immigrants increases in immigration quota and decreases in the level of scrutiny. In contrast, the number of desirable applicants can go in either direction as scrutiny increases and is independent of the immigration quota, because an increase in the immigration quota is completely crowded out by more applications by undesirable immigrants.     

Bidding for Firms with Unknown Characteristics

When a region successfully attracts a firm by offering subsidies, the firm often commits itself to performance targets in terms of employment. In this paper, we interpret these firm‐specific targets as a consequence of incomplete information. We analyze a model of two regions that compete for a firm, assuming that the firm's productivity is ex ante unknown. We show that performance targets often induce overemployment in high‐productivity firms, and that tax credits are often superior to lump‐sum payments. Moreover, when regions differ in wage rates, the low‐wage region wins the bid and has a higher surplus than under complete information. Finally, we show that, under incomplete information, bidding might not lead to efficient firm location.