Comparing the True Cost of Living Indices of Demographically Different Households

The comparison of true cost of living indices between demographically different households (relative equivalence scale) is argued to be sensitive to the way demographic characteristics enter demand analysis. In particular, parameters reflecting the cost of demographic characteristics at base prices, though themselves do not have welfare (equivalence scale) interpretation, can alter the benchmark from which demographically varying inflation effects are measured. The empirical analysis, based on a rank‐3 demand system applied to UK individual household data, shows that the inflation adjustment of child benefits can vary with the way demographic costs at base period prices are specified.     

自动化驼峰作业预想控制法

襄樊北站驼峰自动化控制系统于2001年11月28日正式投入运用,根据该系统在运用中出现的问题及产生原因,通过采用自动化驼峰作业预想控制法,将人的作业经验与自动化精确控制相结合,取得了扬长避短充分发挥自动控制作用、提高编组站驼峰作业能力的效果。     

政府预算过程中的多方利益博弈

本文通过探讨目标各异的多种角色参与的预算过程 ,指出预算过程是一种博弈过程 ,在此过程中代表各方利益的参与者为取得支出优先权展开竞争。本文主要对各支出部门之间、政府预算部门与支出部门之间、政府与公众之间以及中央与地方之间在预算决策中的竞争博弈行为进行分析 ,提出完善预算制度的政策建议。     

Effectiveness and Effects of China’s Capital Controls

I. IntroductionNations at every stage of development and in every region of the world are more closelylinked through trade in goods and services, through flows of funds and investments ineach others’ economies than ever before. But in sharp contrast to more and more nationsloosening restrictions on international trade, controls over capital flows are still substantialnearly everywhere except in the most developed economies. This is certainly the case inChina, where restrictions on movements …     

论国企留住人才的有效措施

未来经济的竞争主要是科学技术与人才的竞争,而归根结底是人才的竞争。人才是当今以及未来时代竞争的焦点,如何吸引人才而避免人才的流失成为企业,尤其是国有企业所面临的最严峻的课题。根据国企人才流失的最主要原因和人才最看重的是个人发展空间和机会,从而为国企如何为人才提供个人发展空间和机会提出了一些对策和建议。     

从敦煌本《百行章》看唐初的法制思想

唐代的法制思想，主要有两大特征，即仁刑恤典和厉行法制。对此，学者们多从正史的角度加以探讨和分析。而从敦煌所出唐代蒙书《百行章》所述内容同样清楚地显示了唐初的法制思想的以上特点。这一研究可以起到补充正史的作用。     

A Comparison of Cost of Equity Estimates of Local and Global CAPMs

Cost of equity estimates are compared for three pricing models: the traditional local CAPM, the single (market) factor global CAPM, and the two‐factor global CAPM, with both market and currency index factors. For 2989 US stocks, the average difference in the cost of equity estimates is about 48 basis points between the local CAPM and the single‐factor global CAPM, and is about 61 basis points between the two global models. For 70 developed‐market ADRs, the corresponding average differences are 76 and 47 basis points, respectively. For 48 emerging‐market ADRs, the corresponding average differences are 57 and 70 basis points.     

中石化上游领域竞争力和抗风险能力的定量分析

在分析石油公司上游领域竞争力影响因素的基础上，提出了定量评价上游 领域竞争力和抗油价风险能力的定量评价方法，按上游综合竞争力指标将世界石油公司分为三类，第一类公司的指标值均在90以上，第二类公司在55－70，第三类公司在25－35。分析表明中石化集团上游领域竞争力较低，承受体油价的时间很短，但是，中石化集团公司上游竞争力和抗风险能力有很大的改善余地，并提出提高竞争力和抗风险能力的措施和建议。     

Discussion and Analysis about Duration Method Based on Marginal Analysis

The selective principle of mutually exclusive project is the maximum of net present value, It is difficult to make decision when NPVA is equal to NPVLB. Some assistant analyses are put forward in ＂Enterprise Investment Decision Management＂. The scientific marginal analysis shows that the assistant analyses including the duration analysis are wrong. This problem can be solved by the classical marginal analysis.     

Public finance and the optimal speed of transition*

We develop a general equilibrium model that jointly considers the influence of capital accumulation constraints and of labour market frictions on the process of transition. We endogenize the economic and budgetary costs of different government policies and show that, early in transition, governments ought to subsidize state firms. Provided that intertemporal commitment is feasible, this policy limits the initial output fall, which relaxes capital accumulation constraints, accelerates transition, and increases welfare. Moreover, by resorting to indirect – instead of direct – taxes, governments can bring the path of transition closer to the first best. Yet, political pressures may induce a policy of suboptimal subsidization.