民营企业建立现代企业制度相关问题分析

我国民营公司制企业,特别是非上市有限责任公司,仍然是封闭式家族企业。既使是上市公司,其目的也是通过上市筹集资金,现代公司治理结构的改造进展缓慢。我国民营企业进行现代企业制度改造,其重点不是消除家族企业色彩,改制主要围绕完善内部管理,提高经营管理水平和企业决策的科学性。通过建立健全企业内部规章制度,规范企业行为,使民营企业能够按政府颁布的法律法规开展生产经营活动。     

我国财产税制度存在的缺陷及其改革构想

财产税不仅是一种历史悠久的税收形态，而且是当今各国税制体系的重要组成部分，具有其他税种难以替代的作用。我国现行财产税制度在改革开放后虽然有所发展，但仍存在着税种缺失、税制老化等诸多问题，亟待改革。     

Incentive Contract and Weather Risk

We study contracts designed to remunerate a farmer for the production of an ecosystem service with the payment dependent on the results of the farmer’s actions and on weather conditions. Two contracts are proposed: the first takes into account both the results of the farmer’s actions and a weather variable that reflects the actual atmospheric conditions during the life of the contract; the second bases the payment on the results alone incorporating only the average effect of weather. Social welfare is optimal when both the results and the specific atmospheric conditions are taken into account; however, this type of contract may be less acceptable to the farmer due to his perception of the level of risk involved.We thank two referees for valuable comments.     

Efficiency wages and union-firm bargaining with private information

We consider efficiency wage effects in a union-firm bargaining model with private information. We show that an increase in the efficiency wage effects does not necessarily increase the wage level at equilibrium, even when the wage bargaining with private information is close to one with complete information. However, if it is commonly known that the firm is stronger than the union and the demand is sufficiently elastic, then an increase in the efficiency wage effects increases for sure the wage at equilibrium.JEL Classification: J41, J50, J52We thank Juan Dolado and two anonymous referees for valuable comments. Vincent Vannetelbosch is Chercheur Qualifié at the Fonds National de la Recherche Scientifique. The research of Ana Mauleon has been made possible by a fellowship of the Fonds Européen du Développement Economique Régional (FEDER). Financial support from the Belgian French Communitys program Action de Recherches Concertée 99/04-235 (IRES, Université catholique de Louvain) is gratefully acknowledged.     

对称双支柱模式:当代金融体系发展的新趋向

经验分析表明：金融体系正在从不对称的双支柱模式或者单支柱模式向对称双支柱模式演变。对银行和资本市场功能的分析也支持了这一结论。在这一转变过程中，金融体系还表现出了“非银行化”特征。但是“非银行化”并不是金融体系发展的最终方向，而只是对称双支柱模式转变中的一个附属物。     

民营经济发展中的深层阻滞因素辨析

民营经济的快速发展已经像其成为中国经济增长的重要引擎。但从运行层面看,民营经济仍然面对各种体制与非体制、人为和非人为的制约因素。目前民营企业普遍反映影响其可能持续发展的主要因素集中在政府政策、融资及资金、人才、创新与技术进步以及管理问题等方面。     

基于生态位理论城市商业银行的发展策略

生态位是生态学中的一个重要概念,本文从生态位基本理论出发,分析了基于生态位理论城市商业银行发展的自然特性、层次性、社会性和时空性,提出了生态位理论下的城市商业银行要明确市场定位,突出特色立行的发展策略。     

中英电信"双寡头垄断"模式比较研究

中国电信南北分拆以后,将在固定电话和移动电话两个业务领域形成新一轮"双寡头垄断"竞争格局.英国是率先实行"双寡头垄断"作为过度,最终走向电信全面开放竞争的典范.中国电信业在1994～1999年第一阶段改革中,曾试图仿效"英国模式",构建中国电信和中国联通的"双寡头垄断",最终以失败告终.在中国即将形成新一轮"双寡头垄断"竞争格局之时,我们有必要通过对英国电信改革的理论背景、具体实施过程、取得的成就的回顾,探求英国"双寡头垄断"成功的奥秘,并为中国新一轮电信重组所借鉴,提升中国的电信业国际竞争力,更好地应对WTO的挑战.     

生态系统服务测度下市域生态空间管控体系构建

生态空间承载着人类、动植物和自然生态多种过程，是生态系统服务功能的策源地和枢纽区。以实施生态空间管控为导引，借助多源数据和ArcGIS、C-Plan系统工具，核心应用系统保护规划(SCP)技术，建立生态服务测度下市域生态空间管控体系的构建方法。基于此，以哈尔滨为例，以不可替代性为表征实现生态空间测度指标综合与功效评价，构建生态空间关键区识别、功能区优划以及网络格局优化模型，提出“重点保护-分区指引-格局优化”的市域生态空间管控体系，为新型城镇化及绿色发展战略的实施奠定科学基础和提供技术支撑。     

Researching Preferences,Valuation and Hypothetical Bias

A number of recent papers in environmental economics have focused on the process of researching preferences – agents are uncertain about preferences but with effort may narrow their uncertainty. This issue has arisen in formulating bids in contingent valuation (CV) as well as the debate over the divergence between WTP and WTA. In the context of CV, it has been suggested that the hypothetical nature of the preference elicitation process biases responses. This paper provides both a theoretical model and experimental evidence to contribute to this debate. The model is a model of competitive bidding for a private good with two components that are particularly relevant to the debate. The first component is that bidders are unsure of their own value for the private good but may purchase information about their own value (researching preferences). The second component is that there is a probability that the auction is hypothetical – that the winning bidder will not get the private good and will not pay the winning bid. The experiment tests this theoretical model of bidding equilibrium and analyzes the effects of variations in the parameters (hypotheticalness, information costs and number of agents) on the endogenous variables (such as the proportion of bidders who become informed and the winning bid). Experimental results suggest that an increase in the hypotheticalness of an auction tends to decrease the likelihood that bidders pay for information on their valuation with an ambiguous effect on the winning bid.