我国资本市场存在的制度功能缺陷与对策

我国资本市场是在新旧体制转换中建立起来的，先天就存在着制度和市场功能方面的缺陷，亟需要采取有效应对策略以弥补，使我国资本市场的发展走上正常轨道。     

采取网络型的政府市场供给模式应对房价问题

面对不断飙升的房价,从理论界到政策层面对其原因都有不同的解读,但从实践结果来看对房价的治理并不理想。本文在综合分析理论研究与国家调控政策的基础上,认为创新措施采取网络型的政府市场供给模式是解决房价过快上涨的有效途径。文章着重对这一模式进行了分析,并认为此举对缓解供需矛盾、解决市场的信息不对称、市场操控、改变预期、稳定房价等都有非常重要的作用。     

“万村千乡”推广悖论及其解决方案

在农村消费市场存在差异的条件下，全国范围的以行政补贴和市场推广相结合的“万村千乡”推广方式将面临“推广悖论”，即工程的普遍服务职能与企业追求利润的目标之间的冲突，进而可能会造成财政补贴资金的浪费。应在不同区域采用不同的推广策略：发达地区农村，应以企业自主经营为主；具有一定消费市场潜力但企业开拓成本还比较高的地区，应行政补贴和市场推广相结合；尚不具备经营条件的农村地区，应加强基础设施建设，并提高农民收入水平，待时机成熟后再逐步推进。     

美、德农业社会化服务提供的启示

美国的农业社会化服务主要由三个部分组成：农业公共服务体系、集体农业服务体系和私人农业服务体系。公司＋农场、公司＋农户以及合作供销是美国农业社会化服务的三种形式。德国的农业社会化服务体系在于农业专业合作社组织的成功发展,尤其是健全的农村金融服务体系,由一个具有三级层次结构的分权型组织组成,通过立法和提供一些优惠政策,政府在服务体系中起了重要作用。我国农业社会化服务体系的组成和服务形式与美、德十分相似,在推动农村经济发展方面却有一定差异,美国和德国农业社会化服务的经验对中国农业社会化服务的发展具有重要启示。     

Information–driven trading at the Prague Stock Exchange: Evidence from Intra–Day Data

Many observers argue that informed and insider trading is widespread in the emerging financial markets of transition countries, yet rigorous treatment of this issue has been virtually non–existent. The current paper estimates the extent of informed trading on the Prague Stock Exchange (PSE) using intra–day transaction data. Our estimates confirm that the average share of informed trading is equal to 0.32, which is high relative to developed markets and varies considerably among stocks. Using the Easley et al. (1996) approach on the very best segment of the PSE we obtained a high average probability of informed trading. Since data used in this study cover the period after the major attempts to improve market regulations, our results indicate that the PSE needs further strengthening to recover credibility and to become a real source of corporate financing. JEL classification: G14, G15.     

我国企业融资制度的现状及问题

细致分析了我国企业融资制度的现状,在此基础上指出我国企业融资制度存在的问题与缺陷,并提出了一些改善现有企业融资制度缺陷的建议和办法。     

Does a Switch of Budget Regimes Affect Investment and Managerial Discretion of State-Owned Enterprises? Evidence from Italian Firms

We investigate the investment decisions of Italian state-owned enterprises (SOEs) across budget constraint regimes and carry out a natural experiment that exploits a regime switch in 1987. Drawing on the theory of capital market imperfections, we apply an empirical framework for investment analysis to a panel of manufacturing SOEs in competitive industries. We identify parallels between SOEs and widely held, quoted companies afflicted by agency problems, managerial discretion, and overinvestment. We argue that, in the case of SOEs, the soft budget regime increases managerial discretion, facilitates collusion with vote-seeking politicians, and results in wasteful investment. Consistent with our predictions, we find that the regime switch disciplines SOE's investment behavior. Following a hardening of the budget constraint, managers lose discretion to indulge in collusion and overinvestment. J. Comp. Econ., June 2002 30(4), pp. 787–811. London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom; and CERIS–CNR, Institute for Economic Research on Firms and Growth, National Research Council, Via Avogadro, 8, 10121 Turin, Italy. © 2002 Association for Comparative Economic Studies. Published by Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E32, G31, G32, L32, M40.     

DOES ORGANIZATION MATTER? A STUDY OF PHYSICIANS' IDEAL ORGANIZATION

It is a known phenomenon that it is difficult to make organizational changes within professional organizations. One recurring observation and experience from health care studies is that it is difficult to discuss the last organizational change with professionals because the most recent change is always perceived as the worst. In order to avoid this routine response, the authors of this article asked 56 senior physicians from the Swedish health care sector what their ideal organization looks like. The authors note that there is a strong institutionalized idea among the physicians of how health care should be organized. The image is not particularly complicated: the organization should be based on the meeting between doctor and patient. One conclusion in the article is that professionals dislike change, but nevertheless, they still want it. Actual change is not the problem – only changes that are not in compliance with the professionals' opinions of organization and management.     

影子价格两种定义的统一性及其经济学含义

通过应用库恩-塔克定理,本文论证了线性规划对偶解和一般数学规划的拉格朗日乘子这两种影子价格定义的统一性。由于非线性规划比线性规划更具有普遍性,本文的结论为深入讨论影子价格的经济学意义提供了极大方便。完全竞争是影子价格等于机会成本和市场价格的充分条件。但在不完全竞争条件下,影子价格一般不等于机会成本和市场价格,也不代表资源的最优配置价格,它反映的只是企业的资源利用效率。