宏观审慎管理框架下的支付系统流动性风险测度及评估研究

本文试图引入宏观审慎管理理念,从支付系统整体流动性入手,通过构建logistic模型来测度与评估支付系统流动性风险。实证结果显示,系统参与者整体流动性风险概率水平波动较为频繁,但处于较低状态。在宏观审慎管理框架下,人民银行应重点关注系统性风险,把系统潜在的流动性风险降到最低层次。     

How does competition affect bank systemic risk?

Using bank level measures of competition and co-dependence, we show a robust negative relationship between bank competition and systemic risk. Whereas much of the extant literature has focused on the relationship between competition and the absolute level of risk of individual banks, in this paper we examine the correlation in the risk taking behavior of banks. We find that greater competition encourages banks to take on more diversified risks, making the banking system less fragile to shocks. Examining the impact of the institutional and regulatory environment on bank systemic risk shows that banking systems are more fragile in countries with weak supervision and private monitoring, greater government ownership of banks, and with public policies that restrict competition. We also find that the negative effect of lack of competition can be mitigated by a strong institutional environment that allows for efficient public and private monitoring of financial institutions.     

Sell in May and Go Away: Evidence from China

Using the Chinese stock market data from 1997 to 2013, this paper examines the “Sell in May and Go Away” puzzle first identified by Bouman and Jacobsen (2002). We find strong existence of the Sell in May effect, robust to different regression assumptions, industries, and after controlling for the January or February effect. However, part of the puzzle is subsumed by the seasonal affective disorder effect. We then construct a trading strategy based on this puzzle, and find that it outperforms the buy-and-hold strategy and could resist the market downside risk during large recession periods.     

Size,value, and momentum in developed country equity returns: Macroeconomic and liquidity exposures

The paper investigates value and momentum factors in 23 developed international stock markets. We find that typically value and momentum premia are smaller and more negatively correlated for large market capitalization stocks relative to small. Momentum factors are more highly correlated internationally relative to value. We provide international evidence on three sets of risk exposures of value and momentum returns: macroeconomic risk, funding liquidity risk, and stock market liquidity risk. We find that value returns are typically lower prior to a recession while momentum returns often exhibit little sensitivity. Value returns are typically lower in times of poor funding liquidity, whereas, with notable exceptions, momentum returns are typically unaffected. Lastly, for almost all countries, value returns are high in poor stock market liquidity conditions.     

Sovereign risk and belief-driven fluctuations in the euro area

Sovereign risk premia in several euro area countries have risen markedly since 2008, driving up credit spreads in the private sector as well. We propose a New Keynesian model of a two-region monetary union that accounts for this “sovereign risk channel.” The model is calibrated to the euro area as of mid-2012. We show that a combination of sovereign risk in one region and strongly procyclical fiscal policy at the aggregate level exacerbates the risk of belief-driven deflationary downturns. The model provides an argument in favor of coordinated, asymmetric fiscal stances as a way to prevent self-fulfilling debt crises.     

Domestic or global imbalances? Rising income risk and the fall in the US current account

When default leads to exclusion from financial markets, the implied loss of consumption smoothing opportunities is more costly when income volatility is high. A rise in income risk thus makes default less attractive, allowing creditors to relax borrowing limits. I show how, in an open economy, this endogenous financial deepening may reduce aggregate foreign assets in response to a rise in individual income risk, against the precautionary savings intuition. Conditions for this depend on whether default constrains complete or uncontingent contracts. The post-1980 rise in US household income risk strongly reduces foreign assets when domestic markets are complete or world interest rates low.     

Competition among exchanges through simplified disclosure requirements: evidence from the American and Global Depositary Receipts

In this study, we address the ongoing debate as to whether the competition among the world's major exchanges through simplified disclosure requirements is justified. Companies from across the globe have a choice of cross-listing shares as either American or Global Depositary Receipts (ADRs and GDRs, respectively). The former are primarily listed on the US exchanges – NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX – whereas the latter are issued into non-US markets such as the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The GDRs listed on the LSE are subject to simplified disclosure requirements compared to their exchange-listed ADR peers that have to meet more stringent compliance standards. Proponents of the ‘light touch’ approach argue that firms cross-listing as GDRs are not subject to the higher reporting costs faced by ADRs yet still face similar valuation benefits. Those who challenge this approach argue that simplified disclosure requirements set by the LSE will ultimately be recognised by the market as ineffective, diverting traders from investing in GDRs. This study provides evidence that supports the LSE's ‘light touch’ approach and shows that the benefits of information risk reduction for ADRs and GDRs are comparable. The explanation for this finding is that the two avenues through which information asymmetry is expected to be resolved after cross-listing – disclosure and analysts – are substitutive and make equally important contribution to information risk reduction, eventually leading to similar cost of capital decline for ADRs and GDRs.     

Optimal reinsurance arrangements in the presence of two reinsurers

In this paper, we investigate the optimal form of reinsurance from the perspective of an insurer when he decides to cede part of the loss to two reinsurers, where the first reinsurer calculates the premium by expected value principle while the premium principle adopted by the second reinsurer satisfies three axioms: distribution invariance, risk loading, and preserving stop-loss order. In order to exclude the moral hazard, a typical reinsurance treaty assumes that both the insurer and reinsurers are obligated to pay more for the larger loss. Under the criterion of minimizing value at risk (VaR) or conditional value at risk (CVaR) of the insurer's total risk exposure, we show that an optimal reinsurance policy is to cede two adjacent layers, where the upper layer is distributed to the first reinsurer. To further illustrate the applicability of our results, we derive explicitly the optimal layer reinsurance by assuming a generalized Wang's premium principle to the second reinsurer.