Political Entrepreneurship and the Democratic Allocation of Economic Resources

Political entrepreneurship occurs when an individual acts on a political profit opportunity. These profit opportunities can be divided into two categories: productive, and predatory. Productive opportunities enable entrepreneurs to profit from enhancing the efficiency of government, while predatory opportunities enable entrepreneurs to profit from forcibly transferring resources from some to others. This analysis shows that political institutions tend to favor predatory over productive political entrepreneurship, and shows that what is sometimes referred to as political exchange does not have the same efficiency characteristics as voluntary exchange in private markets.     

我国企业融资制度的现状及问题

细致分析了我国企业融资制度的现状,在此基础上指出我国企业融资制度存在的问题与缺陷,并提出了一些改善现有企业融资制度缺陷的建议和办法。     

Trends in British public investment

British public investment has declined sharply both as a share of GDP and as a share of government spending since the 1970s. Only part of this decline is explained by privatisation, which transferred some public investment to the private sector. More important was the very large and permanent reduction in public house‐building between the mid‐1970s and the early 1980s. Between the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the rate of public investment recovered somewhat, but after that time it declined again, reaching a record low in 1999. The most recent decline in public investment has affected a range of central government programmes, and it has not been significantly offset by investment under the Private Finance Initiative. The government now plans to increase investment spending, although levels look set to remain low by historical standards for some time to come.     

Stability and Segregation in Group Formation

This paper presents a model of group formation based on the assumption that individuals prefer to associate with people similar to them. It is shown that, in general, if the number of groups that can be formed is bounded, then a stable partition of the society into groups may not exist. (A partition is defined as stable if none of the individuals would prefer be in a different group than the one he is in.) However, if individuals' characteristics are one-dimensional, then a stable partition always exists. We give sufficient conditions for stable partitions to be segregating (in the sense that, for example, low-characteristic individuals are in one group and high-characteristic ones are in another) and Pareto efficient. In addition, we propose a dynamic model of individual myopic behavior describing the evolution of group formation to an eventual stable, segregating, and Pareto efficient partition. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, H41.     

财政补贴改革刍论

财政补贴是国家宏观调控的杠杆之一,但是,目前补贴不规范,财政补贴数额大、项目繁杂,补贴效果‘异化’,加大了社会不公。为了强化财政补贴杠杆功能,提高财政补贴效益,必须按照建立公共财政的要求,本着满足公共需要原则、弹性补贴制度原则和补贴方式间接化原则,改变“一刀切”和补贴刚性的局面,确保采暖费收支合理化,取消肉食、副食品、粮食等价格补贴,改革国有企业的亏损补贴制度。     

高职院校教学体系改革的思考

高职院校应以培养高级技术应用型专门人才为目标,建立具有自身特色的教学体系。首先要通过广泛的社会调研,了解相应的人才需求,在此基础上制定适宜的教学计划;同时要着力构建与高职教育相适应的教学体系,教学模式与方法尽量适应高职学生的特点和培养目标,加大实践教学的比重,建立设备较先进、具备实训教学功能的综合训练教学基地,加强"双师型"教师队伍建设,以培养出真正符合社会需求的、高质量的技术应用型人才。     

日本经济长期萧条的根本原因--在于"政府为特殊利益集团俘虏"吗?

从日本泡沫经济产生的根源、不良债权难以有效解决的原因、结构性经济改革难以推进的制约因素等方面分析，认为“政府为特殊利益访华团俘虏”是造成日本经济长期萧条的根本原因缺乏坚实的现实依据。仅从金融业的层面思考和解决不良债权问题不会从根本上解决该问题，仅从利益再调整的角度分析结构性改革的难度也没有完全理解改革的复杂性。     

峰荷需求、资本配置效率与中国网络型基础产业投融资机制改革——对阿弗奇-约翰逊模型的一个扩展

阿弗奇—约翰逊模型(A—J模型)表明规制对象具有过度使用资本倾向,相应的实证检验中同时存在肯定和否定的结果,但基本的A—J模型、已有扩展和实证检验都忽略了受规制行业的峰荷需求特征。本文从基本的A—J模型出发,假定生产要素单位使用成本与规制机构所认可的单位核算成本不同,考察了峰荷需求特征下受规制网络型基础产业的投资行为,提供了资本配置效率的衡量标准。本文的基本结论在于,峰荷需求条件下受规制企业不一定投资过多,这也解释了为何A—J效应的实证检验存在相互矛盾的结果。     

Make One——基于软件功能构件的通用电子设备模式研究

首先，指出并分析了基于传统的系统体系结构模式而设计的信息设备与其应用功能之间存在整体堆积性和时空不变性的优缺点；然后，根据先进的信息产品应用功能软件化、构件化的思想，提出一种新的设备与应用功能可互相分离、应用功能构件可重载的Make One设备模式，讨论了Make One模式设备的功能结构特点；进而，给出了一个Make One设备模型的嵌入式容器－构件实现方案；最后，探讨了在互联网环境下Make One模式的应用服务体系。     

Experience and enlightenment of recycling system of packaging waste in Europe

As economy explodes and packaging industry flourishes, it is a critical issue that international community encounters the waste of resources and environmental pollution caused by packaging waste. As far as the Packaging Waste Management is concerned, European countries are abundant in worthwhile experiences, which could be used for reference to China＇s Construction of Packaging Waste Recycling System. Based on the analysis of industrial chain of European Packaging Waste Recycling System, this paper illuminates the corresponding policies, managements and role of distinguished interest-individual in different stages, which administers suggestions on how to put forward policies and implementing ordinance to China＇s Packaging Waste Management.