Collusive Long-Run Investments Under Transmission Price-Caps

In the short run, constraints in the electricity transmission system may give market power to generators. This paper examines whether the constraints themselves are a long-run equilibrium outcome in a competitive environment. We show that independent transmission companies and generators can tacitly collude to raise prices to consumers and divide the resulting profits. We also show that price cap regulation does not prevent this behavior and may in fact contribute to it. The mechanism for collusion is that generators locate their plants so that a capacity-constrained transmission line lies between them and their consumer market. We show that this constraint-based collusion can be sustained in a static game without any punishment strategies.     

Corporate Lobbying, Regulatory Conduct and the Porter Hypothesis

Michael Porter, the influential Harvard management guru, has promoted the idea that compliance with stricter environmental regulations can afford secondary benefits to firms through improved product design, innovation, corporate morale and in other ways. Once these secondary benefits are factored, the net cost of compliance is argued to be lower than conventionally thought and may even be negative. Whilst environmental economists have rejected the Porter Hypothesis as being based on excessively optimistic expectations of the likely size of such secondary benefits the underlying ideas do enjoy significant credence in the business community. In the context of a lobbying model of regulatory policy-making we argue that the EPA should change the way it conducts regulatory policy to take account of Porter's views – even if it knows those views to be misguided. The model serves to illustrate the more general point that fashions in management thinking can be expected to impact the optimal conduct of regulatory policy.     

房地产还原利率的构成与测算

从分析投资的风险补偿入手，提出了房地产还原利率的构成和测算公式，同时指出了构成房地产还原利率的银行利率应是复利计算方式下，相应年期的利率，然后探讨了房地产还原利率各构成部分的测算过程，并以中国房地产市场个人住房抵押贷款市场为例，给出了不同收益年限的房地产还原利率参考数据。     

我国制造业环境管制的实证研究

从制造业的角度出发,分析了政府对环境管制(ER)的两种形式:正式管制(FER)和非正式管制(I-ER),建立了环境管制均衡方程,并且采用面板数据的分析方法对理论假设进行了验证。研究表明,假设的影响制造业环境管制的主要因素:政府保护意愿、劳动密集程度、产业规模、经济外向度、产业国有化程度、科技吸收转化支出和劳动力素质的高低均产生了显著的影响。     

On wage- and profit-led demand regimes: learning from the evidence

Abstract

This paper contributes to the empirical research around the “wage-led” or “profit-led” demand regimes. It first reviews how Kalecki, and then Steindl, approached the relationship between economic growth and income distribution. Then, empirical analysis carried out under the probabilistic approach to econometric modeling shows statistical evidence, estimated through cointegration analysis, that in the long run, in three very open economies—Mexico, France, and Korea—the wage share is positively associated with demand and output. It finally discusses the macroeconomic dilemma that almost all countries have to face, i.e., a positive effect of a high-wage policy on demand and employment may diverge from a negative effect on output compatible with external equilibrium.     

Consistency and optimality in a dynamic game of pollution control II: Monopoly

This paper continues a line of research begun in Batabyal (1995a). I model the interaction between a regulator and a monopolistic, polluting firm as a Stackelberg differential game in which the regulator leads. The firm creates pollution, which results in a stock externality. I analyze the intertemporal effects of alternate pollution control measures. The principal issue here concerns the dynamic inconsistency of the optimal solution. Inter alia, I compare the steady state levels of pollution under optimal and under dynamically consistent policies.     

基于顾客需求的物流地产价值创新

借助对物流地产与商业地产、工业地产的比较分析,探讨了物流地产的内涵,对普洛斯的物流地产运作模式进行了案例分析,并对其物流地产的价值创新战略进行了阐释。     

汇率和需求不确定下跨国投资决策的实物期权分析

在对实物期权理论和跨国投资相关文献研究基础上,分析企业在汇率和需求不确定条件下跨国投资的风险和期权特征,构建了基于实物期权思想的跨国投资决策模型。通过数值求解,分析了跨国投资情况下,企业拥有的实物期权价值。     

论房地产开发风险

明确了房地产开发风险的涵义及其特征，阐述了房地产开发面临的主要风险；并剖析了导致房地产开发风险的诸多因素，提出了处置房地产开发风险的具体措施。     

The Case of the Missing Pollution Haven Hypothesis

One particularly vexing puzzle for economists and policymakers over the past several decades concerns the empirical significance of the theoretically predicted pollution haven hypothesis. While neoclassical theory and conventional wisdom both surmise that local economies will suffer deleterious effects from stricter environmental regulations, empirical studies have largely failed to validate such claims. This study utilizes the method of matching to show that the impact of stricter regulation is heterogeneous spatially, varying systematically based on location-specific attributes. Previous studies that assume a homogenous response may therefore inadvertently mask the overall impact of more stringent regulations by pooling unaffected and affected regions.JEL Classification: Q25, Q28, H00, L51, R1The authors wish to thank to Michael Crew, Anthony Heyes, an anonymous referee, Werner Antweiler, Randy Becker, Wayne Gray, Shelby Gerking, Michael Greenstone, Vern Henderson, and Arik Levinson. Participants at various university seminars and conferences also lent useful insights to this line of research.