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211.
从不同的保护目的出发,可将最优关税区分为最佳福利关税和最大收入关税。假定一个国家自身生产一种产品,同时进口另外一种产品,且两种产品的质量不同,分析最佳福利关税和最大收入关税问题,结果发现：第一,如果本国的产品质量较低而进口的产品质量较高,那么,无论企业之间是进行Bertrand竞争还是Cournot竞争,假如国外企业的效率较高（低）,那么最大收入关税大（小）于最佳福利关税;此外,Cournot竞争条件下的最佳福利关税和最大收入关税分别高于Bertrand竞争条件下的最佳福利关税和最大收入关税。第二,如果本国的产品质量较高而进口的产品质量较低,那么当本国企业的效率较低（高）时,最大收入关税高（低）于最佳福利关税。 相似文献
212.
213.
Tatsuo Hatta 《Frontiers of Economics in China》2018,13(1):52
A duty drawback is an export subsidy determined as a percentage of the tariffs paid on the imported inputs used in its production. This paper examines the revenue-constrained optimal tariff structure in a small open economy including a duty drawback as a trade policy tool. This paper has two main aims. First, we show that the revenue-constrained optimal combination of tariff and duty drawback for a given revenue level is not unique. Second, we show that if the optimal import tariff rates are all positive when the duty drawback rate is zero, then the optimal import tariff rates are always positive when the duty drawback is positive. 相似文献
214.
在法律意义和司法实践中我们通常将窃电行为认定为盗窃罪。但是,随着科学技术的不断发展,各种各样的窃电行为也层出不穷,其行为表现也日趋复杂,因此对窃电行为的认定也具有相当大的难度。虽然主流观点是认为所有的窃电行为都构成盗窃罪,但是认真的分析一下该种认定显然是很偏颇的。文中就是从犯罪对象的定性、电费给付请求权以及行为人取得财产的最终手段等角度对窃电犯罪进行分析,从而认为部分窃电行为应该构成诈骗罪。 相似文献
215.
ABSTRACTWe present a small open economy DSGE model with internal and external sticky prices in an incomplete exchange rate pass-through environment. Import tariff is included as another variable that affects the law of one price. The model is calibrated for the Brazilian economy, and the responses of endogenous variables to shocks in import tariff, aggregate supply, monetary policy, and foreign interest are analyzed. The long-run effect of the first shock is deterioration in the terms of trade because the exchange rate appreciation following this shock offsets the initial effect of the increase in import tariff. 相似文献
216.
中国贸易条件的变动趋势测算及影响因素分析 总被引：2，自引：0，他引：2
利用回归方程对1981-2007年中国贸易条件变动趋势进行测算,研究发现:中国贸易条件以每年4.6%的速度下降,其中工业制成品贸易条件下降是主要动因.在此基础上,对于贸易条件的影响因素进行理论分析和实证检验:长期来看,汇率变化对于贸易条件无显著影响,出口商品结构、FDI和关税水平对贸易条件都有显著影响. 相似文献
217.
This study examines the superiority of the discriminatory and uniform tariff regimes under both simultaneous and sequential arrangements in terms of social and global welfare by considering asymmetrically increasing marginal costs among exporters. Under Cournot competition, the importing country has an incentive to manipulate the tariff structure using a sequential tariff arrangement, which implies that it prefers to impose tariff on a low-cost exporter first and a high-cost exporter later. Sequential discriminatory (uniform) tariffs can achieve Pareto superiority from the perspective of consumer surplus, and social and global welfare if product differentiation is low (high). It is mainly because high-cost (low-cost) exporters are handicapped (subsidized) under alternative tariff regimes. In contrast to previous research, our analysis suggests the possibility that preferences for tariff regimes will change in the same direction for consumer surplus, social welfare, and global welfare. 相似文献
218.
Roger G. Mauldon 《Australian economic history review》2021,61(1):45-63
Analysis of home consumption pricing by Giblin and Copland in the 1930s preceded the development of an identifiable Australian agricultural economics profession. They demonstrated that costs of increasing domestic prices of agricultural products above export levels would be borne largely by lightly assisted exporters and hinder their development. This work was taken up later within a framework of computable general equilibrium modelling. Now largely of historical interest, their work sheds light on likely consequences of some past policy debates ? of protection all round in the 1920s and tariff compensation in the 1970s. 相似文献
219.
We present a new tariff-game rule and a new numéraire rule in Krugman's celebrated model to form symmetric trading blocs. We hold that to maintain logical consistency in a world of symmetric trading blocs, an individual bloc should act on the actions of other individual external blocs in a one-to-one fashion, rather than to the actions of the rest of the world as a whole as assumed by Krugman, and show that Krugman's seemingly innocuous choice of the world price of a given good as the numéraire will produce asymmetry in the optimum Nash equilibrium tariff. We prove that the optimal tariff schedule is monotonically decreasing in our relative bloc size, and that the world welfare increases with our new relative bloc size as the latter grows beyond the lowest-welfare pessimal number, which is rather small by our simulations. Though confined to symmetric trading blocs, this paper fortifies the analytical foundation of Krugman's model. In some sense, it reinforces Kemp–Wan–Shimomura's and Ohyama–Panagariya–Krishna's results with the provisos that countries are symmetric and interact mutually in a symmetric fashion without a compensation scheme. It strengthens the case of regionalism as a stepping stone (building bloc) toward a complete world economic integration. 相似文献
220.
Playing computer games online is a fast growing, billion dollar industry which has received little academic attention. The industry exhibits a number of interesting economic features. The industry structure is determined by creative destruction as in Aghion and Howitt (1992) [Aghion, P., Howitt, P. 1992. A model of growth through creative destruction, Econometrica, 60(2), 323–351], with game makers experiencing market power within a genre until the game is superceded. Furthermore, the attractiveness of playing a game online depends on the existence of opponents (positive network externalities) while technical and reputational problems eventually arise (negative network externalities). We model the choice of two-part tariffs by a monopolist under creative destruction and network externalities and derive conditions for the multiple equilibria which currently exist in the industry. 相似文献