塔洛克寻租理论对我国房地产业资源优化配置的启示

根据塔洛克对寻租活动社会成本的分析,寻租活动的发生是通过政府的政治行程进行的,它影响社会经济运行的交易成本。在我国,利益集团的寻租活动对房地产行业资源配置产生的负面效应是:寻租活动增加政府的廉政成本,误导社会的资源流向。要使我国的房地产行业资源得到一个较为合理有效的配置,政府应改革土地使用权出让制度;完善政府的信息披露制度;实行激励机制与制约机制相结合的制度。同时,政府要明确自身的权利、权力和责任,贯彻好国家的各项经济政策,提高行政效率;社会各方面也要对其进行监督,使政府自律与他律相结合。     

Property and Industrial Organization in Communist and Capitalist Nations

Endogenous growth theorists argue that certain equity-enhancing social institutions enhance growth. Despite the centrality of inequality in these approaches, there is no sense in which economic actors exercise power or collective action to create and maintain social norms and rules that are personally advantageous but socially costly. This despite the work of neoclassical economists on rent-seeking, which posits that efforts to claim unearned revenues can pose significant costs for growth. The question of the impact of gender equity on economic growth is an instructive context for understanding these contradictions. Even though gender practices are inherently about the exercise of power, that they have become a feature of the neoclassical growth literature alights on obvious tensions in the neoclassical institutionalist paradigm. By incorporating insights from both the rent-seeking and feminist economics literatures, we will present analternative explanation of why gender hierarchies persist despite their obvious economic costs.     

健全政府采购的监督机制的策略分析

政府采购制度是当今各国政府加强公共支出管理的重要手段。由于我国政府采购制度刚刚起步,在制度设计上还存在着缺陷,尤其是监督机制的不完善,导致寻租腐败等违法行为不断出现于我国政府采购中。本文以此为背景,从建立政府采购监督机制的必要性入手,围绕法制保障、内部监督和外部监督三部分内容,设计了完善我国政府采购监督机制的实施途径。     

寻租、权力腐败与社会福利——基于公共品供给的视角

激励与监督机制缺失是委托代理问题产生的根源所在,由此不但容易模糊政府之间的权力边界,造成上下级政府间垂直监督的缺位,而且也会对民主监督功能的发挥产生抑制,从而诱发政府官员的权力腐败以及社会福利的损失.基于这一逻辑关系,文章在引入寻租因素后,建立了一个完整的分析框架,从公共品供给视角讨论了委托代理、政府寻租与社会福利三者之间的关系,借此对我国政治体制改革中官员权力腐败的成因、过程及其对经济发展的影响做出了系统的解释.     

State-controlled economies vs. rent-seeking states: Why small and medium enterprises might support state officials

This study examines the reasons for support that small and medium enterprises (SMEs) provide to government representatives of their choice (in the form of donations, influence through their networks, information and votes). The study tests stakeholder and social capital approaches as legitimate explanations for SMEs’ relationships with state representatives in different transition economies, specifically Belarus and Ukraine. The study shows that the stakeholder approach is sensitive to business environments and more applicable in a rent-seeking state where the parties perceive value in their exchange. Social relations motivate the SMEs’ support in both types of transition economies.     

寻租下的政府监管龙头企业责任履行的博弈分析

财政扶持农业产业化龙头企业的出发点是通过龙头企业的壮大带动农民增收。然而,龙头企业在利润最大化的驱动下,会充分利用信息不对称从事不履行带动农民增收的可能。财政监管部门虽然对企业的这类行为进行监管,但在存在寻租的情况下,财政监管部门可能会接受"租金"而不对企业进行查处。所以要从博弈论的视角,对这一经济现象及其影响因素进行分析,以探索遏制企业寻租行为的制度创新途径。     

Political contributions and corruption in the United States

The empirical evidence presented in this study indicates that political contributions and corruption are complements, rather than substitutes. Based on panel data for seven election cycles, regression results show that in the United States, political contributions and federal corruption convictions are positively correlated. Accordingly, we propose an alternative explanation for the relationship between political contributions and corruption: two components of a comprehensive strategy for rent-seeking. As long-term investments, political contributions influence legislators to change the rules of the game; as short-term investments, corruption influences public officials to sidestep the existing rules, in order to maximize the rent collected.     

产业政策对企业跨界经营行为的影响

基于2006—2015年中国A股上市公司的数据,研究了产业政策对企业跨界经营行为的影响。结果表明:产业政策会引导企业通过跨界经营进入政策支持行业;通过有关联跨界进入政策支持行业的企业的经营绩效会显著提高,而无关联跨界反而会降低企业价值;在产业政策的引导作用下,企业为了政策寻租而采取的无关联跨界行为,既不利于自身的长远发展,又会降低产业政策的效果。     

创新还是寻租：“公务员热”与大学生人才配置的制度分析

大学生争相报考公务员是一种人才配置失当现象,公务员较高的真实收入是其主要诱因,这种激励结构的扭曲不利于创新和经济增长。一个社会是把人才配置到创新还是寻租上主要是由制度决定的,未来中国经济的健康和可持续发展取决于生产性领域的报酬相对于寻租领域得到提高,从而鼓励更多人才把才能配置到创新活动和“做大蛋糕”的生产性活动上。