基于动态竞争优势的价值链管理模式构建

本文首先从速度经济时代的现实出发引出企业动态竞争优势和价值链管理;其次指出了传统价值链管理的局限;再次,阐述了基于竞争优势的价值链管理理论演进;最后,构建了基于动态竞争优势的价值链管理模式。     

论我国民营企业的核心权利及其确立的现实意义

民营企业享有生存权、产权、发展权和竞争权，四项权利构成民营企业权利体系的核心权利，承认并保护民营企业的核心权利具有极为重要的理论和实践意义。     

广东温氏集团企业“和”文化精神的制度化研究

中国传统文化及其影响下的家族制企业文化基于原始血缘伦理关系,具有“和而统”的特点。要适应现代市场竞争,就必须在普适法则的基础上包容多样性,并保持一种有张力的平衡,实现真正的“和而不同”。这需要制度制衡机制,将中国传统文化中的“和”文化精神制度化,创建竞争制衡的“和而不同”企业文化。广东温氏集团的成功就在于它实现了这种文化整合与创新,使传统家族制企业在普遍秩序中开拓出广阔的发展空间。     

高校品牌竞争优势及其法则

学校品牌竞争的目标是社会满意最大化,品牌忠诚最大化。高校的教育服务产品面临学生的就学市场、社会人才市场的选择和竞争,高等教育产品的市场竞争类型是垄断竞争市场。要确认本校的竞争优势并选择相对竞争优势,采取定位准确的品牌市场竞争法则,制订并实施学校、专业、课程营销组合策略。     

M公司外部环境和优劣势研究

M公司所处的外部宏观环境、铝型材行业竞争态势及公司自身内部条件表明,M公司存在诸多威胁和有利条件,企业内部也具有自身的优劣势.这表明M公司只有进行品牌创建,实施品牌策略,才能在激烈的市场竞争中立于不败之地.     

标尺竞争法在公司投资决策中的应用

论文主要分析了标尺竞争法在公司投资决策中应用的问题。标尺竞争法是一种相对常见的对配电行业公司进行监督的方法,论文将其应用到配电行业公司的投资决策中,并运用标尺竞争法的“影子公司”概念构建“虚拟模型公司”。论文对“虚拟模型公司”的选择问题与选择对策进行分析,找出适合标尺竞争法在公司投资决策中应用的模式。     

Effect of credible quality investment with Bertrand and Cournot competition

We show how credible revelation and ability to commit to quality choice effect equilibrium qualities and welfare when product market is either Bertrand or Cournot competition. We show that results depend on the type of competition but not generally on the cost of quality function. We show that with Bertrand competition, the equilibrium qualities are lower with credible commitment. Competition is moderated and producer surplus is higher and consumer surplus lower. With Cournot competition, higher quality will be better but lower quality will be worse with credible commitment. Consumer surplus is always greater with credible commitment and if cost does not increase too quickly with quality, producer surplus will also increase. Thus credible commitment is a collusive device with Bertrand competition but it can improve social welfare with Cournot competition. Received: February 8, 2000; revised version: February 14, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" The idea of this paper originated in the weekly workshops of Mordecai Kurz at Stanford. I am forever in debted to Mordecai and fellow students – Luis Cabral, Peter DeMarzo, John Hillas, Michihiro Kandori, Steve Langois, Patrick McAllister, Steve Sharpe, Peter Streufert, Steve Turnbull and Gyu-Ho Wang – for their criticism and encouragement. I also benefited from comments from Yi-Heng Chen, Jin-Li Hu, Kala Krishna, Jinji Naoto, Thomas J. Prusa, and Shyh-Fang Ueng at various later stages of this work. Last but not least, I am grateful for the detailed comments of the referee.     

Cost Structures and Nash Play in Repeated Cournot Games

This paper reports an experiment designed to assess the effects of a rotation in the marginal cost curve on convergence in a repeated Cournot triopoly. Increasing the cost curve's slope both reduces the serially-undominated set to the Nash prediction, and increases the peakedness of earnings. We observe higher rates of Nash equilibrium play in the design with the steeper marginal cost schedule, but only when participants are also rematched after each decision. Examination of response patterns suggests that the treatment with a steeper marginal cost curve and with a re-matching of participants across periods induces the selection of Nash Consistent responses.     

Unemployment insurance: The role of electoral systems and regional labour markets

Levels of insurance against unemployment vary considerably across countries. Replacement rates, the ratio relating income from unemployment to what people earned when they were employed, are higher in countries with proportional electoral systems than in countries with majoritarian systems. Also, replacement rates are positively correlated with per capita income and negatively correlated with the countries' unemployment rates. I develop an electoral competition model that replicates these stylized facts.     

Taxation of Mobile Factors as Insurance under Uncertainty

This paper considers the effects of the taxation of mobile factors, i.e., capital, under uncertainty. The wages earned by residents of a jurisdiction are uncertain due to random shocks. Since the uncertain wages in a jurisdiction depend on the amount of mobile capital employed in the jurisdiction, and since taxation alters the quantity of capital employed, taxation affects the riskiness of uncertain wages. In particular, the taxation of capital moderates the fluctuation of uncertain wages, thereby providing insurance. For this reason, jurisdictions use distortionary capital taxation even if lump‐sum taxation is available. In addition, this insurance effect counteracts the tendency toward too low tax rates on capital arising from tax competition, and possibly improves the efficiency of tax competition.